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CHAP. X.

THE SAME SUBJECT.

WITH regard to the second class of arguments for necessity, which are intended to prove, that liberty of action would be hurtful to man, I have only to observe, that it is a fact too evident to be denied, whether we adopt the system of liberty or that of necessity, that men actually receive hurt from their own voluntary actions, and from the voluntary actions of other men ; nor can it be pretended, that this fact is inconsistent with the doctrine of liberty, or that it is more unaccountable upon this system than upon that of ne cessity.

In order, therefore, to draw any solid argument against liberty, from its hurtfulness, it ought to be proved, that, if man were a free agent, he would do more hurt to himself, or to others, than he actually does.

To this purpose it has been said, that liberty would make men's actions capricious; that it would destroy the influence of motives; that it would take away the effect of rewards and punishments; and that it would make man absolutely ungovernable.

These arguments have been already considered in the fourth and fifth chapters of this Essay; and, therefore, I shall now proceed to the third class of arguments for necessity, which are intended to prove, that, in fact, men are not free agents.

The most formidable argument of this class, and, I think, the only one that has not been considered in some of the preceding chapters, is taken from the pres cience of the Deity.

God foresees every determination of the human mind. It must therefore be what he foresees it shall be; and therefore must be necessary.

This argument may be understood three different ways, each of which we shall consider, that we may see all its force.

The necessity of the event may be thought to be a just consequence, either barely from its being certainly future, or barely from its being foreseen, or from the impossibility of its being foreseen, if it was not necessary.

1st, It may be thought, that, as nothing can be known to be future which is not certainly future; so if it be certainly future, it must be necessary.

This opinion has no less authority in its favour than that of Aristotle, who indeed held the doctrine of liberty, but believing, at the same time, that whatever is certainly future must be necessary; in order to defend the liberty of human actions, maintained, that contingent events have no certain futurity; but I know of no modern advocate for liberty, who has put the defence of it upon that issue.

It must be granted, that as whatever was, certainly was, and whatever is, certainly is, so whatever shall be, certainly shall be. These are identical propositions, and cannot be doubted by those who conceive them distinctly.

But I know no rule of reasoning by which it can be inferred, that, because an event certainly shall be, therefore its production must be necessary. The manner of its production, whether free or necessary, cannot be concluded from the time of its production, whether it be past, present, or future. That it shall be, no more implies that it shall be necessarily, than that it shall be freely produced; for neither present, past, nor future, have any more connection with necessity, than they have with freedom.

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I grant, therefore, that, from events being foreseen, it may be justly concluded, that they are certainly future; but from their being certainly future, it does not follow that they are necessary.

2dly, If it be meant by this argument, that an event must be necessary, merely because it is foreseen, neither is this a just consequence: for it has often been observed, that prescience and knowledge of every kind, being an immanent act, has no effect upon the thing known. Its mode of existence, whether it be free or necessary, is not in the least affected by its being known, to be future, any more than by its being known to be past or present. The Deity foresees his own future free actions, but neither his foresight nor his purpose makes them necessary. The argument, therefore, taken in this view, as well as in the former, is inconclusive.

A third way in which this argument may be understood, is this: it is impossible that an event which is not necessary should be foreseen; therefore every event that is certainly foreseen, must be necessary. Here the conclusion certainly follows from the antecedent proposition, and therefore the whole stress of the argument lies upon the proof of that proposition.

Let us consider, therefore, whether it can be proved, that no free action can be certainly foreseen. If this can be proved, it will follow, either that all actions are necessary, or that all actions cannot be foreseen.

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With regard to the general proposition, that it is impossible that any free action can be certainly foreseen, I observe,

1st, That every man who believes the Deity to be a free agent, must believe that this proposition not only is incapable of proof, but that it is certainly false for the man himself foresees, that the Judge of all the earth will always do what is right, and that he will fulfil what

ever he has promised; and at the same time, believes, that, in doing what is right, and in fulfilling his promises, the Deity acts with the most perfect freedom.

2dly, I observe, that every man who believes that it is an absurdity or contradiction, that any free action should be certainly foreseen, must believe, if he will be consistent, either that the Deity is not a free agent, or that he does not foresee his own actions; nor can we foresee that he will do what is right, and will fulfil his promises.

3dly, Without considering the consequences which this general proposition carries in its bosom, which give it a very bad aspect, let us attend to the arguments of fered to prove it.

Dr. Priestley has laboured more in the proof of this proposition than any other author I am acquainted with, and maintains it to be, not only a difficulty and a mystery, as it has been called, that a contingent event should be the object of knowledge, but that, in reality, there cannot be a greater absurdity or contradiction. Let us hear the proof of this.

"For," says he, "as certainly as nothing can be known to exist, but what does exist; so certainly can nothing be known to arise from what does exist, but what does arise from it, or depend upon it. But, according to the definition of the terms, a contingent event does not depend upon any previous known circumstances, since some other event might have arisen in the same circumstances."

This argument, when stripped of incidental and explanatory clauses, and affected variations of expression, amounts to this: nothing can be known to arise from what does exist, but what does arise from it: but a contingent event does not arise from what does exist. The conclusion, which is left to be drawn by the reader, must, according to the rules of reasoning, be-there

fore a contingent event cannot be known to arise from what does exist.

It is here very obvious, that a thing may arise from what does exist, two ways, freely or necessarily. A contingent event arises from its cause, not necessarily, but freely, and so, that another event might have arisen from the same cause, in the same circumstances.

The second proposition of the argument is, that a contingent event does not depend upon any previous known circumstances, which I take to be only a variation of the term of not arising from what does exist. Therefore, in order to make the two propositions to correspond, we must understand by arising from what does exist, arising necessarily from what does exist. When this ambiguity is removed, the argument stands thus: nothing can be known to arise necessarily from what does exist, but what does necessarily arise from it: but a contingent event does not arise necessarily from what does exist; therefore a contingent event cannot be known to arise necessarily from what does exist.

I grant the whole; but the conclusion of this argument is not what he undertook to prove, and, therefore the argument is that kind of sophism which logicians call ignorantia elenchi.

The thing to be proved is not, that a contingent event cannot be known to arise necessarily from what exists; but that a contingent future event cannot be the object of knowledge.

To draw the argument to this conclusion, it must be put thus: nothing can be known to arise from what does exist, but what arises necessarily from it: but a contingent event does not arise necessarily from what does exist; therefore a contingent event cannot be known to arise from what does exist.

The conclusion here is what it ought to be; but the first proposition assumes the thing to be proved, and therefore the argument is what logicians call petitio principii.

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