BOOK V. which he is to inherit, will always have a right to interpofe his advice, and even his authority, if it be neceffary, against any future violation of our liberties; and to procure an effectual redress of our grievances, which we have hitherto fought in vain. If all the English in both armies unite, as I hope they may, in this plan of pacification, they will be able to give the law to the foreigners, and oblige both the king and the duke to confent to it. This will secure the public tranquillity, and leave no fecret ftings of resentment, to rankle in the hearts of a fuffering party, and produce future disturbances. As there will be no triumph, no infolence, no exclufive right to favour on either fide, there can be no shame, no anger, no uneafy defire of change. It will be the work of the whole nation; and all must wish to fupport what all have established. The fons of Stephen indeed may endeavour to oppose it; but their efforts will be fruitlefs, and muft end very foon, either in their fubmiffion or their ruin. Nor have they any reasonable cause to complain. Their father himself did not come to the crown by hereditary right. He was elected in preference to a woman. and an infant, who were deemed not to be capable of ruling. a kingdom. By that election our allegiance is bound to him during his life: but neither that bond, nor the reafon for which we chofe him, will hold as to the choice of a fucceffor. Henry Plantagenet is now grown up to an age of maturity, and every way qualified to fucceed to the crown. He is the grandfon of a king whofe memory is dear to us, and the nearest heir male to him in the courfe of defcent: he appears to refemble him in all his good qualities, and to be worthy to reign over the Normans and English, whose nobleft blood, united, enriches his veins. Normandy has already fubmitted to him with pleasure. Why should we now divide that duchy from England, when it is fo greatly, the interest of our nobility to keep them always connected? If we had no other inducement to make us defire a reconcilia

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tion between him and Stephen, this would be fufficient. Our eftates in both countries will by that means be fecured, which otherwife we muft forfeit, in the one or the other, while Henry remains poffeffed of Normandy and it will not be an eafy matter to drive him from thence, even though we should compel him to retire from England. But, by amicably compounding his quarrel with Stephen, we fhall maintain all our interefts, private and public. His greatnefs abroad will increafe the power of this kingdom; it will make us refpectable and formidable to France; England will be the head of all thofe ample dominions, which extend from the British ocean to the Pyrenean mountains. By governing, in his youth, fo many different states, he will learn to govern us, and come to the crown, after the decease of king Stephen, accomplished in all the arts of good policy. His mother has willingly refigned to him her pretenfions, or rather fhe acknowledges that his are fuperior: we therefore can have nothing to apprehend on that fide. In every view, our peace, our fafety, the repose of our confciences, the quiet and happiness of our pofterity, will be firmly established by the means I propofe. Let Stephen continue to wear the crown that we gave him, as long as he lives; but after his death let it defcend to that prince, who alone can put an end to our unhappy divifions. If you approve my advice, and will empower me to treat in your names, I will immediately convey your defires to the king and the duke.

LORD LYTTELTON.

CHAP. VIII.

MR. PULTENEY'S SPEECH ON THE MOTION FOR REDUCING THE ARMY.

SIR,

We have heard a great deal about parliamentary armies, and about an army continued from year to year. I have always been, Sir, and always thall be, against a ftanding army of any kind to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of parliamentary or any other defignation; a ftanding army is ftill a standing army, whatever name it be called by; they are a body of men diftinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws, and blind obedience and an entire fubmiffion to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle. The nations around us, Sir, are already enslaved, and have been enflaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one loft their liberties: it is indeed impoffible that the liberties of the people can be preferved in any country where a numerous standing army is kept up. Shall we then take any of our measures from the example of our neighbours? No, Sir; on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid thofe rocks upon which they have split.

IT fignifies nothing to tell me, that our army is commanded by fuch gentlemen as cannot be fuppofed to join in any measures for enflaving their country: it may be fo; I hope it is fo; I have a very good opinion of many gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any such meafures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be fure how long they may be continued in command; they may be all difmiffed in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room. Befides, Sir, we know the paffions of men, we know how dangerous it is to trust the best of men

with too much power. Where was there a braver army than that under Julius Cæfar? Where was there ever an army that had ferved their country more faithfully? That army was commanded generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country; yet that army enflaved their country. The affections of the foldiers towards their country, the honour and integrity of the under officers are not to be depended on; by the military law, the administration of justice is fo quick, and the punishments fo fevere, that neither officer nor foldier dares offer to difpute the orders of his fupreme commander; he must notconfult his own inclination; if an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of his houfe, he must do it; he dares not difobey; immediate death would be the fure confequence of the leaft grumbling. And if an officer were fent into the court of requests, accompanied by a body of musketeers with fcrewed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote, I know what would be the duty of this house; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be taken and hanged up at the door of the lobby: but, Sir, I doubt much if fuch a fpirit could be found in the House, or in any Houfe of Commons that, will ever be in England.

SIR, I talk not of imaginary things; I talk of what has happened to an English Houfe of Commons, and from an English army; not only from an English army, but an army that was raised by that very Houfe of Commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them. Therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army raised and maintained by authority of Parliament, will always be fubmiffive to them: if an army be fo numerous as to have it in their power to overawe the Parliament, they will be fubmiffive as long as the Parliament does nothing to difoblige their favourite general; but when that cafe happens, I am afraid that in place

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of the Parliament's difmiffing the army, the army will dif. mifs the Parliament, as they have done heretofore. Nor does the legality or illegality of that Parliament, or of that army, alter the cafe: for with refpect to that army, and according to their way of thinking, the Parliament difmiffed by them was a legal Parliament; they were an army raised and maintained according to law, and at first they were raised, as they imagined, for the prefervation of thofe liberties which they afterwards deftroyed.

It has been urged, Sir, that whoever is for the Proteftant fucceffion must be for continuing the army: for that very reafon, Sir, I am againft continuing the army. I know that neither the Proteftant fucceffion in his Majesty's most illuftrious houfe, nor any fucceffion, can ever be safe as long as there is a ftanding army in the country. Armies, Sir, have no regard to hereditary fucceffions. The first two Cæfars at Rome did pretty well, and found means to keep their armies in tolerable fubjection, because the generals and officers were all their own creatures. But how did it fare with their fucceffors? Was not every one of them. named by the army, without any regard to hereditary right, or to any right? A cobler, a gardener, or any man who happened to raise himself in the army, and could gain their affections, was made emperor of the world was not every fucceeding emperor raised to the throne, or tumbled headlong into the duft, according to the mere whim or mad frenzy of the foldiers?

WE are told this army is defired to be continued but for one year longer, or for a limited term of years. How abfurd is this diftinction ? Is there any army in the world continued for any term of years? Does the most abfolute monarch tell his army, that he is to continue them for any number of years, or any number of months? How long have we already continued our army from year to year? And if it thus continue, wherein will it differ from the standing armies of

thofe