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ple act of seeing: the eye can take in a considerable field at one look; but no object in the field is seen distinctly, but that singly which fixes the attention: in a profound reverie that totally occupies the attention, we scarce see what is directly before us. In a train of perceptions, the attention being divided among various objects, no particular object makes such a figure as it would do single and apart. Hence, the stillness of night contributes to terror, there being nothing to divert the attention:

Horror ubique animos, simul ipsa silentia terrent.

All things were full of horror and affright,
And dreadful even the silence of the night.
Zara. Silence and solitude are ev'ry where!
Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors
That hither lead, nor human face nor voice
Is seen or heard. A dreadful din was wont

Eneid, II.

To grate the sense, when enter'd here from groans
And howls of slaves condemn'd, from clink of chains,
And crash of rusty bars and creaking hinges:

And ever and anon the sight was dash'd
With frightful faces and the meagre looks
Of grim and ghastly executioners.

Yet more this stillness terrifies my soul

Than did that scene of complicated horrors.

Mourning Bride, Act V. Sc. 8. And hence it is, that an object seen at the termination of a confined view, is more agreeable than when seen in a group with the surrounding objects:

The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark
When neither is attended; and, I think,
The nightingale, if she should sing by day,
When every goose is cackling, would be thought
No better a musician than the wren.

Merchant of Venice.

35. In matters of slight importance, attention is mostly directed by will; and for that reason, it is our own fault if trifling objects make any deep impression. Had we power equally to withhold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof against any deep impression. But our power fails us here: an interesting object seizes and fixes the attention beyond the possibility of control; and while our attention is thus forcibly attached to one object, others may solicit for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a small misfortune is scarcely felt in presence of a greater:

Lear. Thou think'st 'tis much, that this contentious storm
Invades us to the skin; so 'tis to thee;

But where the greater malady is fix'd,

The lesser is scarce felt. Thou'dst shun a bear;

But if thy flight lay tow'rd the roaring sea,

Thou'dst meet the bear i' th' mouth. When the mind's free,

The body's delicate: the tempest in my mind
Doth from my senses take all feeling else,
Save what beats there.

King Lear, Act III. Sc. 4.

are sweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day; and I suppose they are sweeter to blind men than to others: and it is manifest, that between sleeping and waking, when all the senses are bound and suspended, music is far sweeter than when one is fully waking.

36. Genus, species, modification, are terms invented to distinguish beings from each other. Individuals are distinguished by their qualities. A number of individuals considered with respect to qualities that distinguish them from others, is termed a species: a plurality of species considered with respect to their distinguishing qualities, is termed a genus. That quality which distinguisheth one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a modification: thus the same particular that is termed a property or quality when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a modification when considered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another: a black skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro: the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different species, are denominated modifications.

37. Objects of sight, being complex, are distinguishable into the several particulars that enter into the composition: these objects are all colored; and they all have length, breadth, and thickness. When I behold a spreading oak, I distinguish in that object, size, figure, color, and sometimes motion: in a flowing river, I distinguish color, figure, and constant motion; a die has color, black spots, six plain surfaces, all equal and uniform. Objects of touch have all of them extension: some of them are felt rough, some smooth some of them are hard, some soft. With respect to the other senses, some of their objects are simple, some complex. A sound, a taste, a smell, may be so simple as not to be distinguishable into parts: others are perceived to be compounded of different sounds, different tastes, and different smells.

38. The eye at one look can grasp a number of objects, as of trees in a field, or men in a crowd: these objects having each a separate and independent existence, are distinguishable in the mind, as well as in reality; and there is nothing more easy than to abstract from some and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its spreading branches fixes our attention upon itself, and abstracts us from the shrubs that surround it. In the same manner, with respect to compound sounds, tastes, or smells, we can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abstracting our attention from the rest. The power of abstraction is not confined to objects that are separable in reality as well as mentally; but also takes place where there can be no real separation: the size, the figure, the color, of a tree, are inseparably connected, and have no independent existence; the same of length, breadth, and thickness: and yet we can mentally confine our observations to one of these, abstracting from the rest. Here abstraction takes place where there cannot be a real separation.

39. Space and time have occasioned much metaphysical jargon; but after the power of abstraction is explained as above, there remains no difficulty about them. It is mentioned above, that space as well as place enter into the perception of every visible object; a tree is perceived as existing in a certain place, and as occupying a certain space. Now, by the power of abstraction, space may be considered

abstractedly from the body that occupies it; and hence the abstract term space. In the same manner, existence may be considered abstractedly from any particular thing that exists; and place may be considered abstractedly from any particular thing that may be in it Every series or succession of things, suggests the idea of time; and time may be considered abstractedly from any series of succession. In the same manner, we acquire the abstract term motion, rest, number, and a thousand other abstract terms; an excellent contrivance for improving speech, as without it speech would be wofully imperfect. Brute animals may have some obscure notion of these circumstances, as connected with particular objects: an ox probably perceives that he takes longer time to go round a long ridge in the plough, than a short one; and he probably perceives when he is one of four in the yoke, or only one of two. But the power of abstraction is not bestowed on brute animals; because to them it would be altogether useless, as they are incapable of speech.

40. This power of abstraction is of great utility. A carpenter considers a log of wood with regard to hardness, firmness, color, and texture: a philosopher, neglecting these properties, makes the log undergo a chemical analysis; and examines its taste, its smell, and its component principles: the geometrician confines his reasoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickness. In general, every artist, abstracting from all other properties, confines his observations to those which have a more immediate connection with his profession.

41. It is observed above, p. 478, that there can be no such thing as a general idea; that all our perceptions are of particular objects, and that our secondary perceptions or ideas must be equally so. Precisely, for the same reason, there can be no such thing as an abstract idea. We cannot form an idea of a part without taking in the whole; nor of motion, color, figure, independent of a body. No man will say that he can form any idea of beauty, till he think of a person endued with that quality; nor that he can form an idea of weight, till he takes under consideration a body that is weighty. And when he takes under consideration a body endued with one or other of the properties mentioned, the idea he forms is not an abstract or general idea, but the idea of a particular body with its properties. But though a part and the whole, a subject and its attributes, an effect and its cause, are so intimately connected, as that an idea cannot be formed of the one independent of the other; yet we can reason upon the one abstracting from the other.

This is done by words signifying the thing to which the reasoning is confined; and such words are denominated abstract terms. The meaning and use of an abstract term is well understood, though of itself, unless other particulars be taken in, it raises no image nor idea in the mind. In language it serves excellent purpose; by it different figures, different colors, can be compared, without the trouble of conceiving them as belonging to any particular subject; and they contribute with words significant to raise images or ideas in the mind.

42. The power of abstraction is bestowed on man, for the purpose solely of reasoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as clearness of any process of reasoning, that, laying aside every other circumstance, we can confine our attention to 'he ingle property we desire to investigate. 43. Abstract terms may be separated into three different kinds, all equally subservient to the reasoning faculty. Individuals appear to have no end; and did we not possess the faculty of distributing them into classes, the mind would be lost in an endless maze, and no progress be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty of abstraction that we distribute beings into genera and species: finding a number of individuals connected by certain qualities common to all, we give a name to these individuals considered as thus connected, which name, by gathering them together into one class, serves to express the whole of these individuals as distinct from others. Thus the word animal serves to denote every being that can move voluntarily; and the words man, horse, lion, &c. answer similar purposes. This is the first and most common sort of abstraction; and it is of the most extensive use, by enabling us to comprehend in our reasoning whole kinds and sorts, instead of individuals, without end. The next sort of abstract terms comprehends a number of individual objects, considered as connected by some occasional relation. A great number of persons collected in one place, without any other relation than merely that of contiguity, are denominated a crowd: in forming this term, we abstract from sex, from age, from condition, from dress, &c. A number of persons connected by the same laws and by the same government, are termed a nation: and a number of men under the same military command, are termed an army. A third sort of abstraction is, where a single property or part, which may be common to many individuals, is selected to be the subject of our contemplation; for example, whiteness, heat, beauty, length, roundness, head, arm.

44. Abstract terms are a happy invention: it is by their means chief ly, that the particulars which make the subject of our reasoning are brought into close union, and separated from all others however naturally connected. Without the aid of such terms, the mind could never be kept steady to its proper subject, but be perpetually in hazard of assuming foreign circumstances, or neglecting what are essential. We can, without the aid of language, compare real objects by intuition, when these objects are present; and when absent, we can compare them in idea. But when we advance farther, and attempt to make inferences and draw conclusions, we always employ abstract terms, even in thinking; it would be as difficult to reason without them, as to perforin operations in algebra without signs; for there is scarcely any reasoning without some degree of abstraction, and we cannot easily abstract without using abstract terms. Hence it follows, that without language man would scarcely be a rational being.

45. The same thing, in different respects, has different names. With respect to certain qualities, it is termed a substance; with respect to other qualities, a body; and with respect to qualities of all sorts, a subject. It is termed a passive subject with respect to an action exerted upon it; an object with respect to a percipient: a cause with respect to the effect it produces; and an effect with respect to its cause.

INDEX.

ABSTRACTION, power of, 486. Its use,

487.
Abstract terms, ought to be avoided in
poetry, 122, 404.
Cannot be com-
pared but by being personified, 326.
Personified, 351. Defined, 486. The
use of abstract terms, 487.
Accent, defined, 292. The musical ac-
cents that are necessary in an hexam-
eter line, 296. A low word must not
be accented, 310. Rules for accenting
English heroic verse, 309, 310. How
far affected by the pause, 311. Ac-
eent and pause have a mutual influ-
ence, 312
Action, what feelings are raised by hu-
man actions, 27. 115. 172. We are
impelled to action by desire, 29. Some
actions are instinctive, some intended
as means to a certain end, 31. Ac-
tions great and elevated, low and gro-
velling, 115. Slowness and quickness
in acting, to what causes owing, 152.
157. Emotions occasioned by pro-
priety of action, 168. Occasioned by
impropriety of action, ib. Human
actions considered with respect to dig-
nity and meanness, 175. Actions the
interpreters of the heart, 208. Action
is the fundamental part of epic and
dramatic compositions, 420. Unity
of action, 429. We are conscious of
internal action as in the head, 475.
Internal action may proceed without
our being conscious of it, ib.
Action and reaction betwixt a passion
and its object, 65.
Actor, bombast actor, 126. The chief
talents of an actor, 206. An actor
should feel the passion he represents,
217. Difference as to pronunciation
betwixt the French and English ac-
tors, 219, note.
Admiration, 65. 131.
Eneid. See Virgil.
Affectation, 167.

Affection, to children accounted for, 43.
To blood-relations, ib. Affection for
what belongs to us, ib. Social affec-
tions more refined than selfish, 62.
Affection in what manner inflamed
into a passion, 65. Opposed to pro-
pensity, 67. Affection to children
endures longer than any other affec-

tion, ib. Opinion and belief influ-
enced by affection, 88. Affection de-
fined, 195. 484.

Agamemnon, of Seneca censured, 231.
Agreeable emotions and passions, 58,
&c. Things neither agreeable nor
disagreeable. See Object.

Alcestes, of Euripides censured, 242.
438, 439.

Alexandre, of Racine censured, 225.
Alexandrine line, 298.
Allegory, defined, 370. More difficult
in painting than in poetry, 376. In
an historical poem, 424.

All for Love, of Dryden censured, 235.
Alto Relievo, 459.

Ambiguity, occasioned by a wrong
choice of words, 255; occasioned by
a wrong arrangement, 270.
Amynta, of Tasso censured, 222.
Amor patria, accounted for, 45.
Amphibrachys, 324.
Amphimacer, 324.

Analytic and synthetic methods of rea-
soning compared, 22.
Anapestus, 323.

Anger, explained, 47, &c. Frequently
comes to its height instantaneously,
65. Decays suddenly, 66. Some-
times exerted against the innocent, 85.
and even against things inanimate, ib.
Not infectious, 95. Has no dignity
in it, 175.

Angle, largest and smallest angle of
vision, 92.

Animals, distributed by nature into
classes, 467.
Antibacchius, 324.
Anticlimax, 286.
Antispastus, 324.

Antithesis, 259. Verbal antithesis, 183.
259.

Apostrophe, 359, &c.

Appearance, things ought to be described
in poetry, as they appear, not as they
are in reality, 393.

Appetite, defined, 31. Appetites of hun-
ger, thirst, animal love, arise without
an object, 40. Appetite for fame or
esteem, 100.
Apprehension, dulness and quickness of
apprehension, to what causes owing,
152.

Architecture, ch. xxiv. Grandeur or

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