others, and perceive the true means of accomplishing that good. In order to act conformably to that desire and those perceptions, we must have the COURAGE to encounter the pains, which, it is possible or probable our action may bring upon us, and which, the wiser we are, we shall be the more likely to foresee. It often happens that the delights of virtue are only to be won by first encountering a host of pains. The apprehension of future pains, of whatever kind, is a present pain called Fear: and a pain which has a vast influence over human conduct. Moral fear, that is to say, the fear of moral pain, as it is a great preventive to actions injurious to others, and as it necessarily implies a certain degree of force in the sentiment of benevolence, is esteemed a good quality, a virtue; and so is the fear of shame, or that dread of the pain of inferiority, which, as we have just now seen, is essential even to ordinary virtue.* But fear, in general, that is to say, the dread of encountering pain in general, inasmuch as it is almost universally an obstacle in the way of beneficial action, is esteemed a bad quality, a vice. Courage is that constitution of mind which leads men, in pursuit of a pleasure, whether a moral pleasure or any other, to encounter pains; it is that state of mind in which pains of desire triumph over pains of anticipation; and as it is absolutely essential to the performance of many actions beneficial to others, it thence has acquired the character of a virtue.

* "I dare do all that may become a man,

Who dares do more, is none."

Macbeth, Act I. Sc. 7.

4. It is necessary, however, carefully to distinguish between the moral approbation which we bestow upon courage, and which never is bestowed except when that quality is contemplated as an aid towards actions beneficial to others; and the admiration with which extraordinary courage is regarded, -a sentiment founded entirely on the fact, that it is extraordinary. The sentiment of admiration may, and often does, operate to modify our moral judgments, of which some extraordinary instances will presently be pointed out; but admiration and moral approbation, though often confounded together, are, in their nature and origin, totally distinct.

5. But though courage may suffice to induce us tò commence a virtuous action, or course of action, in spite of the pains with which that action threatens us, we need FORTITUDE to induce us to persevere, after those pains of apprehension begin to be realized. Courage may owe its origin to ignorance, to thoughtlessness, to folly; and it may fail at the very moment when it most is needed. Fortitude, which consists in persevering endurance, is the only security we can have for the fulfilment of a virtuous intent; and it has accordingly, in a moral point of view, been always ranked as superior to courage.

6. Both Courage and Fortitude may be considered under the twofold aspect of physical courage and physical fortitude, moral courage and moral fortitude. Physical courage and physical fortitude consist in the encounter of such pains as hunger, wounds, and bodily torments ending in death. This quality, among communities constantly engaged in war, and

when every man is liable to be called upon at any moment to risk his body and his life in the common defence, has, for very obvious reasons, been raised to the highest rank of virtues. Courage among the Romans was virtue par excellence; and the same estimate of it has been transmitted, from barbarous and warlike ancestors, to the nations of Modern Europe.

What is called moral courage and moral fortitude, consists in enduring, through the force of the moral sentiment, those numerous pains which spring from the malevolence of others to whom our conduct gives offence; particularly those pains to which we are subject through the sentiment of self-comparison, pains of obloquy, mortification, and disgrace.

7. The sentiment of self-comparison often combines with the sentiment of benevolence to produce physical courage and physical fortitude. Whereas, in cases requiring moral courage and moral fortitude, it often happens that, the whole force, or almost the whole force, of that powerful sentiment, then called false shame, impels the other way. As moral courage and moral fortitude indicate, in general, a stronger force of moral obligation than physical courage and physical fortitude, they are, on that account, objects of a higher moral approbation; and as they are more rare, they are on, that account, objects also of greater admiration.

8. There is another quality called CONSTANCY, FIRMNESS, STEADINESS, PERSEVERANCE, closely related to Fortitude, and, indeed, only a modification of it, which is absolutely necessary towards the accom

plishment of any thing that requires continuous exertions. This quality results from the continuous predominancy of certain pains and desires, and an ability to bear certain pains without yielding to them. It depends partly on temperament or constitution, including the state of health, and partly on position. Temper or Self-control falls under this head. What is called Patience, is sometimes this quality, and is sometimes fortitude, properly so called, or a mixture of both. Faithfulness or Fidelity is one particular modification of constancy.

9. But all these means for the production of virtuous actions must fail to be effectual, unless there be added to them a certain HOPEFULNESS, otherwise called CONFIDENCE, and, by some recent writers, FAITH; that is to say, a certain persuasion that we shall be able to accomplish the beneficial objects at which we aim. To point out the origin, nature, and modifications of this Hopefulness, or Faith, would lead us into some curious and important inquiries, which, however, would be foreign to the immediate objects of this Treatise. This Hopefulness or Faith, being essential to actions beneficial to others, is esteemed a virtue, and the want of it is stigmatized as a vice, under the names of Doubtfulness, Despondency, Skepticism. Doubt is painful in itself; it produces a pain of inferiority, and is shunned on that account. Confidence, or Faith, is in itself a pleasurable feeling, a pleasure of certainty, a pleasure of superiority, and on that account is sought and desired. Hopefulness is often carried to a degree which leads to absurd and impracticable enterprises, and makes

us exhaust our energies to no purpose.

It is then no longer a virtue, but a vice, and is stigmatized as blind, irrational Folly and Credulity. A rational confidence is commonly implied in the use of the word, Wisdom.

10. But Benevolence, though seconded by all the qualities heretofore enumerated, must still fail to be productive in virtuous acts, unless there be added to it a certain degree of ACTIVITY, or inclination to act. Activity is of two sorts, muscular and mental, each head embracing many varieties. It depends upon the relative force of the pleasures of activity, through which men find a certain enjoyment in action independent of any of its other consequences either to themselves or others, and of the pains of activity, those pains which flow from every kind of action, when continued beyond a period greater or less. All this depends very much upon the state of the body as regards sickness or health; and to a certain degree, also, on original temperament; but much more upon habit. That degree of exertion which gives pleasure to a man in health accustomed to it, is absolutely intolerable to a sick man, or to one unaccustomed to it.

The influence of bodily health upon moral character is a most important matter, which of late years is beginning to attract the attention it deserves. It affects, to a greater or less degree, all our capacities of pain and pleasure; and so influences our whole course of conduct.

Activity is so essential to virtuous actions, that the want of it, under the names of Sloth, Indolence,