shall show presently how it has been attempted to combine and identify these motives.

70. It is necessary that the Disinterested theory of morals should be freed from these incumbrances; and should be so modified as to be made conformable to human conduct and human. opinions, such as they everywhere actually exist. Instead of bending facts to theory, we must make theory conformable to facts. To that task we now turn.

71. We have already explained the moral distribution of actions, looking merely to their external character, into the three great classes, Praiseworthy, Indifferent, and Wrong. We have shown that all actions are arranged in one or the other of these classes, accordingly as they are regarded as productive of pleasure, of pain, or of neither, to sensitive beings other than the actor; a distribution, be it observed, which originates entirely in the sentiment of benevolence.

But there is a great class of actions, to which just now we had occasion to allude, the results of which are not simple, but complex. These actions produce pleasure to some, and pain to others; or they produce both pleasure and pain to the same individual. It is with regard to this sort of actions that the greatest differences exist in systems of practical morals. We shall find, however, that actions of this complicated character, where different individuals are affected by them, are reckoned as praiseworthy or wrong, accordingly as attention is principally directed to the pleasures, or to the pains, which

they occasion.* Where all the results, both painful and pleasurable, fall upon the same individual, the classification of the act depends upon our opinion as to the relative vivacity and permanency of the pleasures and the pains.

72. Such is the moral classification of actions, when we consider only, or principally, their external character; that is to say, the results which they produce. But when we come to consider actions with regard to their internal character, that is, with regard to the motives which produce them, they are divided into the five following classes:

1st. MERITORIOUS ACTIONS; actions which entitle men to applause, and to the character of superior virtue. These actions rise by various gradations one above another.

2d. DUTIES, or OBLIGATORY ACTIONS; actions the performance of which is expected from all men ; and which entitle the performer to the character of ordinary virtue. These actions also admit of various degrees, some being considered much more obligatory than others.

3d. INDIFFERENT ACTIONS; actions which do not affect the moral character in any way. Morally considered, these actions are all perfectly alike.

4th. PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS; actions which, although they may be painful to others, and intended to be so, are yet not esteemed vicious; that

* The laws according to which the pleasurable or the painful results of an action, in its effect upon others, principally attract our attention, will be stated in the next chapter.

is, are not considered as proofs of a want of ordinary virtue. These actions likewise admit of many gradations, some being esteemed more permissible than others.

5th. VICIOUS, CRIMINAL, or WICKED ACTIONS; the performance of which proves a want of ordinary virtue. These actions descend by various gradations to the lowest depths of iniquity.

Before the Disinterested Theory of Morals can become at all satisfactory, it must be made consistent with this quintuplicate division of actions; a division which prevails in all practical systems of morals, all the world over; and we must explain, also, and reconcile to this theory the great discrepancies everywhere discernible in practical systems of morals, in the classification of actions under these several divisions.

73. For that purpose the following propositions will suffice.

First. Those actions beneficial to others, or supposed to be so, which are performed by the greater number of any given society, and which, therefore, argue only an ordinary degree of virtue, that is to say, an ordinary degree of the force of those sentiments by which acts beneficial to others are produced, are esteemed by that society to be DUTIES. The performance of these actions entitles to the character of ORDINARY VIRTUE; and men are considered under a MORAL OBLIGATION to perform them.*

* It was the perception of the truth of this proposition that led Aristotle to define virtue as consisting in a habit of mediocrity,—a definition correct enough, so far as ordinary virtue is concerned, but which excludes all idea of extraordinary virtue. Hence, too, both in

Second. Those actions esteemed beneficial to others, which are not performed by the majority of any society, and which, therefore, argue a superior force of those sentiments by which acts beneficial to others are produced, are esteemed by that society to be virtues of a high degree, MERITORIOUS ACTS; and meritorious in proportion to their rarity; entitling the performer to the character of

EXTRAORDINARY VIRTUE.

Third. Those actions esteemed injurious to others, from the performance of which the majority of any society are not restrained by the force of moral obligation, that is to say, by the force of those sentiments by which acts beneficial to others are produced, are in that society esteemed PERMISSIBLE; that is, are regarded as acts the performance of which does not detract from a man's reputation for ordinary virtue.

Fourth. Those actions esteemed injurious to others from the performance of which the majority of any society are restrained by the force of moral obligation, that is, by the force of those sentiments by which actions beneficial to others are produced, are in that society esteemed bad, VICIOUS, CRIMINAL, WICKED; and the performance of such acts subjects him who performs them to the character of a VICIOUS, WICKED MAN, deficient in the sense of moral obligation; an unprincipled man; a bad man ; and bad in proportion to the rarity of the sort of acts to which he owes that reputation.

Fifth. With respect to that great class of actions which have a double result, injurious to some and beneficial to

the Greek and Latin languages morals and manners were designated by the same word,- that being esteemed moral or ordinarily virtuous, which was customary, which the average force of the sentiment of benevolence induced or allowed men to do.

others, we have already stated upon what principles those actions are classified as right or wrong. We shall presently show how it happens that a slight benefit to one party will often so engross our attention, as to make us overlook, or neglect, a great injury to another party; and how a slight injury to one party will often so engross our attention as to make us overlook and neglect a great benefit to another party; thus producing very discordant opinions as to the point whether these actions with double results are right or wrong. That point being once settled, the action, if we regard it as right, is esteemed meritorious, or a duty; if we regard it as wrong, it is esteemed permissible or criminal, according to the rules enunciated in the four preceding propositions.

74. If these propositions are well founded, it will follow that Morality, instead of being an abstract thing, independent of human nature, something external to it, whether originating in the absolute nature of things, in the decrees of God, or the arts of man, grows, in fact, out of man's very constitution, and so affords matter for a true subjective science of morals. It will also follow, that we may discard as unfounded the opinion so sedulously propagated, not only by partisans of the mystic school, but even by many forensic writers, that it is possible, indeed certain, that individuals and whole communities may and will shake off or lose all sense of moral distinctions, and cast off the restraint of moral obligation, unless public teachers of morality be employed and paid, to inculcate moral precepts. The first of these conclusions is of the greatest importance to abstract science, the second to practical politics.