or misled, is accompanied by a pain of inferiority. Men frequently insist upon the obligation of oaths and the duty of veracity, merely because they wish to employ them as means of increasing their own power, and of binding and subjecting others to the fulfilment of their will; that is, as instruments of despotism. Thus the subscription to creeds as a condition of civil privileges and of the right to teach was first introduced by the Jesuits as a means of reëstablishing the Catholic faith. The Protestants soon followed the example; and both, of course, were very loud and very positive as to the binding obligation of such subscriptions. 10. When we detect a man in having told us what is not true, a painful feeling at the idea of having been deceived rises in our minds. To this is added another painful feeling, at perceiving that we can no longer rely upon that man's assertions, a pain of anticipation at the idea of the future deceits. which he may put upon us. To these are added other painful feelings produced by the present pains to which this defect of veracity has exposed us, or by the idea of certain future pains, to which it is likely to expose us. All these pains thus inflicted upon us naturally excite a feeling of malevolence against the person who deceives; and, quite independently of any sentiment of moral disapprobation, serve to render a liar an odious character. 11. Mere falsehood, however, when unaccompanied with the intention to inflict some additional serious injury, of which the falsehood serves as an instrument, is a practice into which men so habitu ally and universally fall, that, however severely it may be condemned by professed moralists, in all practical codes of morals, it is reckoned among the more trivial offences. In a very large proportion of cases in which men deceive, they have no fixed deliberate intention of doing so. With the vast majority of men the imagination is so much an overmatch for the memory, the judgment is so sluggish, or so much under the influence of emotions, that it is impossible for them to report correctly what they have seen, or what they have heard. Hence that universal tendency to misrepresent, which leads all those who rely upon tradition or hearsay into infinite errors, even in those numerous cases where there is no intention to deceive. The same may be said of simple breach of promise, as, for instance, the nonpayment of debts, which, unless the debts were contracted with a predetermination not to pay, seems, in these days, to be reckoned hardly any offence at all. Even when there is a design to deceive, simple falsehood when it inflicts no positive injury, as, for instance, putting off a dun by promises to pay him, or denying ourselves to persons whom we do not wish to see, is practically regarded as a trivial matter. - 12. The pain of inferiority at being detected in a falsehood, or a breach of contract, — for the greater part of falsehoods proceed from fear, and the greater part of breaches of contract from inability, - has, in general, much more influence than the sentiment of benevolence in inducing men to tell the truth and to fulfil their engagements. There are many very benevolent men whose word or promise cannot safely be trusted; and many men of but little benevolence very strict in fulfilling their engagements. 13. But when falsehood is employed as a means of inflicting other additional injuries, as in the case of Slander, False Testimony, and Fraud, it has always and for obvious reasons been denounced as among the greatest of crimes. 14. We may here remark, that cheating in trade does not always spring, as is commonly supposed, from a mere sordid cupidity or desire of gain. To make a good bargain, as it is called, implies a certain degree of superior dexterity, a dexterity which, in a community of traders, comes to be highly prized, to be regarded, in fact, as the great test of talent. Of course, its possession and exercise produce a certain pleasure of superiority. Hence it often happens that men of princely fortunes, and above every imputation of meanness, who will entertain you as a guest for weeks together with the most profuse liberality, and who are constantly performing acts of charity and munificence, when you come to deal with them as merchants, will be highly delighted at cheating you out of a sixpence. What is esteemed allowable sharpness, and what shall be reckoned fraud, varies greatly in different systems of morals. Among savages, moral sentiment upon this point, is, in general, sufficiently delicate. The European code of honor admits upon this point no chicanery nor subtle distinctions. But the practice of commerce has led to the introduction, among merchants and lawyers, of many refinements and many quibbles unknown to the simplicity of ruder times. 15. Closely related to frauds are what are called unfair advantages; as when I take advantage of a man's ignorance or his necessities, to induce him to make a disadvantageous contract, sale, or purchase. Upon this point, the mercantile and legal standard of moral obligation is exceedingly low. Men who would shrink from a positive fraud or a positive false statement, do not feel themselves obliged to communicate information which would cut them off from an advantageous bargain; or to pay a higher price, when, by concealing certain information in their possession, they can compel or induce the acceptance of a lower one. 16. The doctrine of contracts, and the doctrine of frauds constitute two of the most important branches of legal learning, both of which have been very much complicated by the subtleties of scholastic lawyers, and by a profound ignorance, so universal among lawyers, of the real nature and foundation of moral distinctions. CHAPTER IV. POLITICAL DUTIES. 1. WE come now to the consideration of a class of duties of the most interesting and important character, called Political Duties. The duty of obedience to civil magistrates, and of conformity to the laws, and the correlative duty of legislators to make just and equal laws, and of magistrates to administer those laws with equity, are evidently founded upon the benefits which society derives from a settled government, and from just laws faithfully administered and submissively obeyed. Hence, in all forensic codes of morals, when the government is administered in such a way as to produce more harm than good, or much less good than it might or ought to produce; when laws are enacted injurious to the public; when government, instead of contributing to the benefit of all, is made an instrument for elevating or enriching one or a few at the expense of the many, civil obedience is no longer esteemed a duty; in fact, it may become a duty to disobey, and even to rebel. It is, however, a matter so nice and difficult to determine when that point is reached which makes rebellion, civil war, and the danger of anarchy preferable to further submission to a tyrannical government and unjust, or in other words, unequal laws, that all cases of disobedience and rebellion give rise |