sensitive being other than the actor. And further, actions considered in themselves, and without immediate reference to the motives of the actor, are classed as more or less praiseworthy in proportion to the amount and extent of pleasure which they are supposed to confer, or to tend to confer, upon sensitive beings other than the actor; and they are pronounced more or less wrong, in proportion as the pain to sensitive beings other than the actor, which they inflict, or are supposed to inflict, or to tend to inflict, is greater or less in acuteness, permanence, and extent.

These allegations are of such great importance, and, if founded in fact, afford such a clue towards the discovery of the real nature and actual law of moral distinctions, that it is necessary to establish their truth somewhat in detail.

24. In all societies of men, the most rude and savage, as well as the most civilized, there exist sets of opinions on the subject of right and wrong actions,

that is, as to what actions ought to be performed, and what actions ought not to be performed, which sets of opinions, out of analogy to the codes of civil law, have been called the moral code, or the moral law. Indeed it is the moral code, which everywhere furnishes, to a greater or less extent, the foundations of the civil code.

These bodies of opinion, these moral codes, pass from generation to generation, sometimes by oral, and sometimes by written tradition; sometimes they are handed down for ages almost unchanged; sometimes they are gradually and imperceptibly modified; and sometimes they undergo very sudden and very violent alterations.

When we come to compare these moral codes with each other, we find, as in the various codes of civil laws, upon some points a perfect coincidence, and upon others a general similarity; while upon other points, and those often of the highest importance, we observe the most strange, and apparently unaccountable discrepancies; and sometimes the most positive contradictions.

It is the existence of these discrepancies and contradictions, it is the disputes which are constantly arising in every inquisitive and progressive society, upon certain points of the Moral Law, which give its chief interest and importance to our present inquiry. What are the principles upon which the distinction between Right and Wrong depends? Amid so many disputes and contradictions, by what rule shall we be guided?

The rule above stated, according to which actions are classified as Praiseworthy, Indifferent, and Wrong, will at once help us, if it be true, to explain many of these discrepancies, to reconcile many of these contradictions, and to account for many of the changes, slight or extensive, slow or sudden, imperceptible or violent, which moral codes are constantly undergoing. There are, indeed, some discrepancies and contradictions in these codes, and some changes, which are dependent upon other causes, to be pointed out hereafter.

Not only the term Moral Law, but the greater part of the phraseology of morals, has been borrowed from legal analogies. Thus certain actions which produce pleasure to others, and the abstinence from

certain actions which produce pain to others, are classed under the borrowed term of debts, dues, or Duties; and modern authors, who have reduced the moral code to writing, have distinguished these actions into three classes, namely, Duties to others, Duties to ourselves, and Duties to God. How certain acts, beneficial to others, have come to be distinguished, in particular, as Duties will be explained hereafter. Our present business is, to show, that all those acts which have, at any time, been classed as moral duties, are, in fact, acts productive of pleasure, or supposed to be productive of pleasure, to some sensitive being or beings other than the actor; and that the supposed possession of this quality of producing some pleasure to some sensitive being or beings other than the actor is an essential characteristic of duty.

25. With respect to that class of actions included under the head of Duties to others, and which are generally arranged under the two great divisions of Justice and Benevolence, it is obvious, at the first glance, that pleasure to others is of the very essence of all those actions.

Why will such an action be unjust? Because it will inflict pain upon some person other than the actor. It is impossible to imagine an act of injustice without some pain inflicted upon another, including under the word pain, the deprivation of pleasures. Indeed, injustice may be defined in general terms, as the securing of pleasure to ourselves at the expense of pain to others.

Why is such an act benevolent? Because it con

fers a pleasure upon somebody other than the actor. Every benevolent act implies a pleasure or benefit conferred. Justice requires us to abstain from inflicting pain, or, if we have inflicted it, to make up for it; benevolence requires us to confer gratuitous, positive pleasures.

26. We proceed next to consider that class of acts called Duties to ourselves. They are usually arranged under the three heads of Prudence, Temperance, and Economy. These duties, in most codes of morals, hold a very high rank; so much so, that in the English language, what is meant, in common parlance, by a moral man, is, a man observant of these duties. The duties of this class differ, in one obvious and striking particular, from those called Duties to others, namely, in not operating directly upon others, but only indirectly, by first operating upon ourselves. It is for this reason that they are arranged in a separate class. But the effect of these actions, upon the welfare of others, is not, on that account, any the less certain or important, or any less the reason why they are distinguished as duties.

27. Prudence, Temperance, and Economy are essential to place a man in such a position, as will enable him to confer pleasures upon others; while Imprudence, Intemperance, and want of Economy lead, of necessity, to the infliction of the severest injuries upon others. No man stands alone. Every man is surrounded, to a greater or less extent, by those whose welfare is more or less dependent upon him; and in this way it becomes a duty to others, to take care of ourselves; to keep ourselves in a posi

tion which will preserve us from inflicting pains, and will enable us to confer benefits.

28. What are called acts of imprudence, are, in general, acts which result in some loss or suffering to the actor; which loss and suffering the actor foresaw, or might have foreseen. But no such act is ever condemned as morally wrong, unless the loss or suffering of the actor overflows, and embitters the cup of some other person, or seems likely to do so. It is in this alone that the moral wrongfulness of imprudence consists; and, therefore, whether we shall condemn a man or not, as guilty of imprudence, depends entirely upon circumstances. Many acts are reckoned imprudent in a poor man, which would not be considered so in a rich man; in a weak man, which would not be so in a strong man ; in the father of a family dependent upon him for support, which would not be so in a person without incumbrances; and so in many other instances.

29. The three chief breaches of the virtue of temperance, are gluttony, intoxication, and excessive sexual indulgence. The moral wrongfulness of these acts does not consist, as the Epicureans allege, in the pains which they are likely to produce to the actor, but in the pains which they may probably cause him to inflict upon others. All these indulgences, when excessive, tend to destroy the muscular and mental faculties; and thus to deprive us of the power of conferring benefits upon others. They tend also to weaken or destroy the force of those motives by which we are restrained from inflicting. pain, and are impelled to confer pleasure, and thus