excuses for them, and to see all their actions in a favorable light; nor do we easily believe that they are destitute of, or deficient in, that most excellent of all qualities, virtue. Hence it is, that so many apologists have started up to represent Alexander, Cæsar, Bonaparte, in spite of the enormous injuries which they inflicted upon mankind, as worthy to be classed among the most virtuous and beneficent of men. Hence it happens, that men of genius, poets, artists, and philosophers, who are sometimes men of very little virtue, always find so many zealous defenders of their moral character. Hence, too, the indulgent moral judgments respecting each other, formed by relatives, friends, and associates. On the other hand, all those who are the causes to us of pain, even though that pain be inflicted involuntarily, or out of pure good will, become thereby objects of our malevolence, in the shape either of simple dislike or hatred, of envy, or contempt. These persons will be likely, in consequence, to have their motives very sharply criticized ; and it will be with great difficulty, that we shall be induced to admit that there is any thing virtuous or good in their motives, or their conduct. Of this we have striking illustrations in the rage of party contests; in which we see great bodies of men, whose differences of opinion and of conduct are often scarcely perceptible, mutually denouncing each other as fools and knaves, destitute alike of sense and of virtue. 5. Men, in general, and especially that sort of men called men of the world, men who have had an extensive experience of mankind, are much more apt to suppose that any given action, even though in their estimation beneficial, originated in selfish, or what are called bad, motives than in good or disinterested motives; and hence persons of this class have generally been supporters of the selfish theory of morals. This is partly owing to the fact, that observation has proved the general predominance of selfish motives over human conduct. It is partly owing, however, to a pain of inferiority, which does not allow us easily to admit that others are more virtuous than ourselves; and which often excites a certain degree of malevolence towards men of the most exalted virtue. People become tired of hearing Aristides called the Just. 6. This, however, is the case with respect to our contemporaries only, and those whom we have been accustomed to regard as our equals. With respect to the dead, who are no longer our rivals, or to whom we have been taught to look up with admiration. from our infancy, as a sort of demi-gods; or with respect to kings, princes, or superiors, whom, in like manner, we have always regarded as far above all rivalry of ours, we may even derive a certain pleasure of superiority from extolling them, because their excellence and exaltation reflects an honor upon human nature, in which as men, and more particularly as subjects, or fellow-countrymen, we may esteem ourselves to have a share. 7. This double operation of the sentiment of Selfcomparison, leading us now to depreciate, and now to extol, it may be, the same persons, produces what have been pointed out as some of the strangest inconsistencies of human nature. We call them inconsistencies, but they depend upon fixed and certain laws; and they can no more to excite surprise in a mind versed in the science of man, than do the phenomena of eclipses, or the aberrations of the planets, in the mind of the astronomer. The laws upon which the phenomena of human action depend, had they been only as patiently and accurately investigated, would appear quite as certain, and quite as regular, as those which govern the motion of the planets. PART SECOND. SOLUTION OF MORAL PROBLEMS AND CON- CHAPTER I. OF PERSONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES RELATIVE TO IT. 1. HAVING, in the preceding part of this treatise, by an analytical examination of the phenomena of human thought and action,* investigated the origin and nature of Moral Distinctions, and the laws according to which actions are classed as praiseworthy, indifferent, and wrong, meritorious, obligatory, permissible, and criminal; and having, also, pointed out the origin and foundation of the several prevailing theories of morals, and of the systems of practical morality founded upon those theories; we now propose to show the application of these results, as means of explaining both the coincidences and discrepances, so remarkable in the various systems of practical morality prevalent in different ages and countries. * This examination is not complete, but limited to the objects of the present treatise. In the Theory of Knowledge it will be pursued to a greater extent. Let us begin with those moral precepts, those Rights and Duties, which have an immediate reference to life and personal security. 2. In all systems of morals, deliberate and unprovoked homicide has been esteemed a high crime; and that for the obvious reason, that Death has ever been regarded as one of the greatest of evils, if not the very greatest, which a man can suffer, or inflict. 3. If we inquire why death is regarded as so great an evil, we shall find that several circumstances concur to give it that character. In the first place, except where it is instantaneous, it is the result of, or at least is or appears to be attended by, intense pains consequent upon the disorganization or disturbed action of the vital system. Thus the idea of excessive suffering becomes intimately, and almost inseparably, associated with the idea of death. In the second place, the idea of death is attended by a pain of inferiority of the acutest kind. Death levels all distinctions. It takes away all that makes us superior to mere clods of earth; it reduces the most beautiful and the most illustrious to heaps of disgusting corruption, and puts the wisest, the wittiest, and the strongest, below the level of the meanest worm that crawls. A live dog is better than a dead lion. It is this pain of inferiority which makes men clutch so eagerly at the idea of a new life after death, however slight and unsatisfactory may be the evidence by which that idea is supported.* "that must be our cure To be no more? sad cure; for who would lose, |