"the Greek philosophy being above measure refined and "speculative, it always used to be determined by metaphysical rather than moral principles; and to stick to

"all

66

consequences, how absurd soever, that were seen to "arise from such principles. Of this we have a famous "instance in the ancient democritic philosophy, &e.-So "well supported, we see, is that censure which a cele"brated French writer passes upon them: When the philosophers once besot themselves with a prejudice, they are even more incurable than the people them"selves: because they besot themselves not only with the "prejudice, but with the false reasoning employed o. support it. The reverence and regard to metaphysical principles being so great, we shall see, that the Greek philosophers must of necessity reject the doctrine of a "future state of rewards and punishments, how many "invincible moral arguments soever there really be in support of it, when we come to shew, that there were "two metaphysical principles concerning God and the "soul, universally embraced by all, which necessarily "exclude all notion of a future state of reward and "punishment."

46

66

In the conclusion I repeat the same observation in the following words:-"These two errors in the metaphy "sical speculations of the philosophers, concerning the "nature of God and of the soul, were what necessarily "kept them from giving credit to a doctrine highly probable in itself, and rendered so even by themselves, “from many moral considerations, perpetually preached "up to the people. But, as we observed before, it was "their ill fate to be determined,. in their opinions, rather by metaphysical than moral arguments. This is seen by comparing the belief and conduct of SOCRATES "with the rest. He was singular in confining himself to "the study of morality, and as singular in believing the "doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment. "What could be the cause of this latter singularity but "the former? Of which it was a natural consequence. "For, having thrown aside all other speculations, he had "nothing to mislead hin. Whereas the rest of the "philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of fana

"ticism, to physics and metaphysics, had drawn a number "of absurd, though subtile conclusions, that directly 66 opposed the consequences of those moral arguments. "And as it is common for parents to be fondest of their "weakest and most deformed offspring, so these men, as "we said, were always more swayed by their metaphy"sical than moral conclusions *. Now this was all I could, in conscience, allow to common sense, when antiquity stood so directly in my way.

66

גי

But lest it should be said he had overlooked all fact, he has thought fit to make the following observation: Who can read Plato's Gorgias (which is not ranked amongst the exoterics by a late IVriter, in which alone the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, he thinks, is detailed out); who can read that, and conceive that Plato did not really believe, &c. The force of this observation, the reader sees, lies in the parenthesis, that I have not ranked the Gorgias of Plato amongst his exoterics. But how, if this be false? Let the following words of the Divine Legation determine: "It is very true, that, in his writings, he [Plato] inculcates the "doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; "but this always in the grossest sense of the populace"that the souls of ill men descended into asses or swine— "that the uninitiated lay in mire and filth: that there were three judges of Hell; and talks much of Styx, Cocytus, Acheron, &c. and all so seriously as shews he "had a mind to be believed. But did he himself believe "them? We may be assured he did not†." Where, at the word seriously, I expressly refer to the GoRGIAS, Phado, and Republic. Now, if the Phado and Republic (as he will not deny) be of the exoteric kind, and I place the Gorgias in the same class, is not this ranking the Gorgias amongst the exoterics? What then was it that could induce this Writer to say, I had not ranked it there? Was it the following passage ? "But Albinus, an old Platonist, has, in some measure, supplied this loss [namely, the loss of a treatise of Numenius, "concerning the secret doctrine of Plato] by his Intro"duction to the Dialogues of Plato. From whence it appears, that those very books, in which Plato details + Ibid. Book III. § 3.

66

* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

"" out

out the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment, are all of the exoteric kind. For in that class "Albinus ranks the Criton, Phado, Minos, Symposium, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus, Clitophon, and "Philebus*" If this were the passage, 'tis plain the Writer mistook the latter part for a formal list of Plato's eroteric writings. But the very words might have taught him better: (I only say that in that class Albinus ranks such and such tracts.) Especially if he had looked into the discourse referred to: where he would have found the reason why I expressed myself in that manner. And I don't use to write at hazard, as hasty as he thinks me. Albinus in his fifth section, divides Plato's dialogues' into classes. Not into the two general ones of exoteric' and esoteric; but into the more minute, and different, of natural, moral, dialectic, confutative, civil, explorative, obstetric, and subversicet. It will be asked then, how I came to say, that Albinus ranked the Criton, Phado, Minos, Symposium, Lazes, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus, Clitophon and Philebus, in the exoteric class? For this plain reason, he says they were all of the civil kind. And I hope I need not tell the learned reader, that all of that kind were exoterical. And now it is seen why I might well suppose the Gorgias of the exoteric kind; and yet, why I could not use Albinus's authority for placing. it with the rest: because it is evidently of the civil class, and yet not ranked there by that old Platonist. The reason of his different assignment was this: The Gorgias is a dialogue concerning the use and abuse of rhetoric. The Sophists had abused this art to pervert public justice, and to amass wealth and power. They are here shewn that its true use was to aid and inforce the laws, and to render the members of a community wiser and better. Hence, in conclusion, the Author takes occasion to inforce the practice of virtue from consideration of future rewards and punishments: his usual manner of concluding his political discourses; the Gorgias being, indeed, properly a supplement to the books of Law and

* Div. Leg. Book III. § 3.

† Τῷ μὲν φυσικῷ, τῷ δὲ ἠθικῷ τῷ δὲ λογικῷ, τῷ δὲ ἐλε[κλικῷ, τῷ δὲ πολιτικῷ, τῷ δὲ πειρατικῷ, τῷ δὲ μαιευτικῷ, τῷ δὲ ἀντεπλικῷ. Alb. Introd, in Plat. Dial, sect. 5. apud Fabr. Bibl. Græc. lib. 3. c. 2.

Republic:

Republic: but it being at the same time altogether employed in overturning the practice of the Sophists, was, I suppose, the reason why Albinus thought it came more naturally into that class which he calls subversive. This is a true account of the Gorgias; as well as of my plain sentiments, concerning it, in the first volume of The Divine Legation. And yet this Writer cries out, Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive that Plato did not really believe a future state of rewards and punishments? Rather, let me ask, Who that has read the Gorgias, can talk at this rate?

"

Well, but his reason: "When he [Plato] had pro❝fessed at large, how wicked men are punished, and how good men are rewarded in a future state, he declares "that to be his full persuasion, and from thence it was, "that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge having

a most pure soul." The original is, 'Eyw μèv žv, ☎ Καλλίκλεις, ΥΠΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ πέπεισμαι, κι σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανέμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεςάτην ἔχων τὴν Jux. Here, we see, the Writer has sunk upon us the important words ὑπὸ τέτων τῶν λόγων, upon which the whole sentence turns. This could hardly be by chance. The reasons of the omission are but too evident. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ΥΠΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ AOгON WEμai, I am persuaded (says the speaker) O Callicles, ON THE AUTHORITY OF THESE DOCTRINES. Say you so? To understand then how full the persuasion was, we must consider what credibility these doctrines had. Now he that reads the Gorgias will find, that they consisted of a long fabulous account of the establishment of the three judges of Hell*: and of a strange opinion, that the dead not only retained the visible marks of the passions and affections of the soul, but also the scars and blemishes of the body †. It was on the authority, therefore, of these goodly doctrines, that the speaker founds his belief: and what is more, it was to these doctrines that the very words, in which he expresses this belief, allude: Ameganăjai tập KPITH, relating to the infernal judges; and the TTIEZTATHN ΥΓΙΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ Tux, the most sound or healthy soul, to its affections,

* Tom. I. p. 523. Ed. Serr.-See Div. Leg. Book II. § 4. Plato, ut suprà, tom. I. p. 524.-See Div. Leg, as above.

marks,

marks and blemishes. The speaker therefore must of course believe a future state thus circumstanced, if he believed any future state at all. Here is no room for the Writer's evasion: who supposes, the philosophers might reject the fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elysian Fields, and yet believe the thing conveyed under these words. For here the belief of the thing is expressly said to be built on the authority of those fables: but those fables our Author gives up as not really believed. By his favour therefore I would conclude that the thing built upon them was not believed.

But as I little thought this Writer would have had the better of me on the believing side, I will suppose, as he does contrary to evidence, that the speaker did indeed in this place deliver his real sentiments. Let us see now what will come of it. He asks, Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive, that Plato did not really believe when he has professed at large. So then; the dispute between us is, Whether PLATO believed a future state of rewards and punishments? And, to prove that PLATO did, he gives me a speech of SOCRATES. For unluckily what he quotes for the words of Plato are the words of his master; who, I have endeavoured to shew, by better reasons than such a kind of speech, did really believe a future state of rewards and punishments.

be

But he goes on:-And IF THEY IMAGINED men to punished for sin, and rewarded for virtue, even supposing that this was talked of in a way that might be PROVED fabulous, yet the doctrine itself was unshaken. Without doubt, if I will allow they imagined a future state of rewards and punishments, he will prove they believed one; that being the conclusion he seems to aim at in the aukward expression of proved fabulous, and--was unshaken. For the point between us is not about what was true or false, but about what was believed or disbelieved. But he himself seems dissatisfied with his expression, and therefore attempts to mend it in this repetition (for it would be hard that he who begs his question, should not be able to get to his conclusion). Suppose the fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elysian Fields, may be all DEMONSTRATED to be false, yet it does not follow, that the thing conveyed under VOL. XI.

P

these