a system of substances variously formed, and variously actuated agreeably to those forms; a system of substances both immensely great and small, rational, animal, vegetable, and inanimate. "As many families make one village, many villages one province, many provinces one empire; so many empires, oceans, wastes, and wilds combined, compose that earth on which we live. Other combinations make a planet or a moon; and these, again, united, make one planetary system. What higher combinations subsist, we know not: their gradation and ascent it is impossible we should discover. Yet the generous mind, not deterred by this immensity, intrepidly passes on through regions unknown, from greater system to greater, till it arrive at that greatest, where imagination stops, and can advance no further. In this last, this mighty, this stupendous idea, it beholds the universe itself, of which every thing is a part; and, with respect to which, not the smallest atom is either foreign or detached." "Wide as its extent, is the wisdom of its workmanship; not bounded and narrow, like the humbler works of art: these are all of origin no higher than human. We can readily trace them to their utmost limit, and with accuracy discern both their beginning and their end. But where the microscope that can shew us from what point wisdom begins in nature? Where the telescope that can descry to what infinitude it extends? The more diligent our search, the more accurate our scrutiny, the more only are we convinced, that our labours can never finish; that subjects inexhaustible remain behind, still unexplored. "Hence the mind truly wise, quitting the study of particulars," - Οὐδὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὕτως ἄτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὁ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, κἀκεῖθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν· ἐπεὶ κἂν τὴν ὕλην εἴποις, εὑρήσεις καὶ ταύτην ἀγαθόν· κἂν αὐτὸ τὸ κακὸν, εὑρήσεις καὶ τοῦτο μετέχον ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλως ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενον, ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρωννύμενον, καὶ μεταλαμβάνον ἀγαθοῦ τινός. αλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαι σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελῆ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν ἐξαισχύνονται, πρὸς τὴν τούτων ἀποβλέπουσαι φύσιν, οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μειζόνων οὖσα γεννητικὴ πολλῷ πλέον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐλασσόνων· οἱ δὲ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, πάντα ὅσα πέρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες, οὐδὲν ἄτιμον, οὐδὲ ἀποβλητὸν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Διὸς ὁρῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀγαθὰ, καθόσον ἐκ προνοίας ὑφέστηκε, καὶ καλὰ, κατ' αἰτίαν γεγονότα Thy Oelav. "There is, therefore, nothing ignoble and base, which doth not participate of the good principle, and hath not from thence its origin. Should you even instance matter, you will find even that to be good; should you instance evil itself, you will find that also participating of some good, and no otherwise able to subsist, than as coloured by good, and partaking of it. The opinions, indeed, of ordinary men are ashamed to refer little and contemptible things to the primary and divine cause, looking [in their reasonings to the nature of the subjects, not to the power of the cause; and [to this necessary consequence] that if it be productive of the greater effects, much more so is it of the inferior. But those, on the contrary, who are truly philosophers, referring all things, both great and small, that exist in the universe, to a Providence, behold nothing ft to be rejected in this mansion of Jove ; but all things good, as having been established by a Providence, and fair, as having been produced by a cause which is divine.” Proclus, in his manuscript Comment on the Parmenides of Plato. • The Platonics, considering science as something ascertained, definite, and steady, would admit nothing to be its object which was vague, infinite, and passing. For this reason they excluded all individuals, or objects of sense, and (as Ammonius expresses it) raised themselves, in their contemplations, from beings particular, to beings uni H as knowing their multitude to be infinite and incomprehensible, turns its intellectual eye to what is general and comprehensive, and through generals learn to see and recognise whatever exists. “It perceives, in this view, that every substance, of every degree, has its nature, its proper make, constitution, or form by which it acts, and by which it suffers. It perceives it so to fare with every natural form around us, as with those tools and instruments by which art worketh its wonders. The saw is destined to one act, the mallet to another; the wheel answers this purpose, and the lever answers a different: so nature uses the vegetable, the brute, and the rational, agreeably to the proper form and constitution of every kind. The vegetable proceeds with perfect insensibility; the brute possesses a sense of what is pleasurable and painful, but stops at mere sensation, and is unable to go further. The rational, like the brute, has all the powers of mere sensation, but enjoys, superadded, a further transcendent faculty, by which it is made conscious, not only of what it feels, but of the powers themselves, which are the sources of those very feelings: a faculty, which, recognising both itself and all things else, becomes a canon, a corrector, and a standard universal.P versal; Consonant to this, we learn, it was the advice of Plato, with respect to the progress of our speculations and inquiries, when we proceed synthetically, that is to say, from first principles downwards, that we should descend from those higher genera, which include many subordinate species, down to the lowest rank of species, those which include only individuals. But here it was his opinion that our inquiries should stop, and, as to individuals, let them wholly alone; because of these there could not possibly be any science. Διό μέχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατίον τας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾷν· μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἄν ποτε γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. Porphyr. Isagog. c. 2. Such was the method of ancient philosophy. The fashion at present appears to be somewhat altered, and the business of philosophers to be little else than the collecting, from every quarter, into voluminous records, an infinite number of sensible, particular, and unconnected facts; the chief effect of which is to excite our admiration. So that if that well-known saying of antiquity be true, “ it was wonder which induced men first to philosophize,” we may say that philosophy now ends whence origi nally it began. P See before, p. 63. In Epictetus, l. i. c. 1. p. 6. the δύναμις λογική, or “ reasoning power,” is called the power ἡ καὶ αὐτὴν θεω ροῦσα, καὶ τ ̓ ἄλλα πάντα. So Marcus: τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς· ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, ἑαυ τὴν διαρθροῖ, &c.: “ the properties of the reasoning soul are, it beholdeth itself, it formeth itself," &c. l. xi. c. 1. So again Epictetus: ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ νὴ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῇν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτὸ, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ μέμνησο δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκε κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τού των, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάζον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστου λογιούμενον : “ for seeing, for hearing, and, indeed, for life itself, and the various means which cooperate "Hence to the rational alone is imparted that master-science, of what they are, where they are, and the end to which they are destined. "Happy, too happy, did they know their own felicity; did they reverence the dignity of their own superior character, and never wretchedly degrade themselves into natures to them subordinate. And yet, alas! it is a truth too certain, that as the rational only are susceptible of a happiness truly excellent, so these only merge themselves into miseries past endurance. "Assist us, then, thou Power Divine, with the light of that reason by which thou lightenest the world; by which grace and beauty is diffused through every part, and the welfare of the whole is ever uniformly upheld; that reason, of which our own is but a particle or spark, like some Promethean fire, caught from heaven above. So teach us to know ourselves, that we may attain that knowledge which alone is worth attaining. Check our vain, our idle researches into the laws, and natures, and motions of other beings, till we have learnt and can practise those which peculiarly respect ourselves. Teach us to be fit actors in that general drama where thou hast allotted every being, great and small, its proper part, the due performance of which is the only end of its existence.' "Enable us to curb desire within the bounds of what is natural. Enable us even to suspend it till we can employ it to our emolument. Be our first work to have escaped from wrong opinion and bad habit;" that the mind, thus rendered sincere to its support; for the fruits of the earth, for wine and oil; for all these things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee something else, which is better than all these; something which is to use them, to prove them, to compute the value of each. Arr. Epict. 1. ii. c. 23. p. 321. 4 See Arr. Epict. L. ii. c. 24. p. 337. See also l. i. c. 6. p. 36; and Pers. Satyr. iii. 66. See Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 3. p. 21. Atà ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες, λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί· οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι· οἱ πλείους δ ̓ ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες, &c. “Through this affinity, (he means our affinity to the body, or baser part,) some of us, degenerating, become, like wolves, faithless, and treacherous, and mischievous; others, like lions, fierce, and savage, and wild; but the greater part turn foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched animals." Cum autem duobus modis, id est, aut vi aut fraude fiat injuria ; fraus, quasi vulpeculæ, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. de Offic. 1. i. c. 19. See also Arr. Epict. 1. ii. c. 9. p. 210. In our own language we seem to allude to this degeneracy of human nature, when we call men, by way of reproach, sheepish, bearish, hoggish, ravenous, &c. * Αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι, καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Arr. Εpict. 1. i. c. 14. p. 81. Ο δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ· ouros dé èotiv d ékdotov voûs kal λóyos. Mar. Ant. 1. v. s. 27. Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum nullo alio nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest. Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 13. p. 371. 'See before, p. 89, and note t. See also Arr. Εpict. l. iii. c. 22. p. 444. Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι, &c. The passage is sublime and great, but too long to be here inserted. « Απόσχου ποτὲ πανταπάσιν ὀρέξεως, iva TOTÈ Kal evλóyws opexons. "Abstain for a time from desire altogether, that in time thou mayst be able to desire rationally." Arr. Epict. 1. iii. c. 13. p. 414. Again the same author: Zhμepov opékei OVK ἐχρήσαμεν, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετ TIKά. "To-day my faculty of desire I have not used at all; my aversion I have employed with respect only to things which are in my power," l. iv. c. 4. p. 588, Seo and incorrupt, may with safety proceed to seek its genuine good and happiness. "When we are thus previously exercised, thus duly prepared, let not our love there stop where it first begins; but insensibly conduct it, by thy invisible influence, from lower objects to higher, till it arrive at that supreme, where only it can find what is adequate and full. Teach us to love thee, and thy divine administration; to regard the universe itself as our true and genuine country, not that little casual spot where we first drew vital air. Teach us each to regard himself but as a part of this great whole; a part which, for its welfare, we are as patiently to resign, as we resign a single limb for the welfare of our whole body. Let our life be a continued scene of acquiescence and of gratitude: of gratitude for what we enjoy; of acquiescence in what we suffer; as both can only be referable to that concatenated order of events, which cannot but be best, as being by thee approved and chosen. "Inasmuch as futurity is hidden from our sight, we can have no other rule of choice, by which to govern our conduct, than what seems consonant to the welfare of our own particular natures. If it appear not contrary to duty and moral office, (and how should we judge but from what appears?) thou also Enchir. c. 2. and Charact, v. iii. p. 202. Plat. Gorg. 505. B. vol. i. edit. Serr. Пepl δὲ ψυχὴν. Horace seems also to have alluded to this doctrine: Virtus est, vitium fugere; et sapientia prima, See Plat. Symp. p. 210. vol. iii. edit. Serrani. Δεῖ γὰρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα, ἄρχεσθαι, &c. See Arrian. Epict. 1. i. e. 9. p. 51. Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit: totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur. Tusc. Disp. 1. v. c. 37. p. 427. * Πῶς οὖν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ pbow, &c. "In what sense, then, (says the philosopher, since all is referable to one universal Providence,) are some things called agreeable to our nature, and others the contrary? The answer is, They are so called, by considering ourselves as detached, and separate from the whole. For thus may I say of the foot, when considered so apart, that it is agreeable to its nature to be clean and free from filth. But if we consider it as a foot, that is, as something not detached, but the member of a body, it will behove it both to pass into the dirt, and to trample upon thorns, and even upon occasion to be lopped off for the preservation of the whole. Were not this the case, it would be no longer a foot. Something, therefore, of this kind should we conceive with respect to ourselves.-What art thou? -A man.-If thou consider thy being as something separate and detached, it is agreeable to thy nature, in this view of independence, to live to extreme age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou consider thyself as a man, and as the member of a certain whole; for the sake of that whole, it will occasionally behove thee, at one while to be sick, at another while to sail and risk the perils of navigation, at another while to be in want, and at last to die perhaps before thy time. Why, therefore, dost thou bear these events impatiently? Knowest thou not, that after the same manner as the foot ceaseth to be a foot, so dost thou, too, cease to be longer a man?” Arr. Epict. 1. ii. c. 5. p. 191. * Μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾖ τὰ ἑξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχομαι, πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸς γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τοιού των ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν· εἰ δέ γε ᾔδειν, ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπ ̓ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ποὺς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι. Arr. Epict. 1. ii. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above sentiment was of Chrysippus. In the tenth chapter of the same book we have it repeated, though in words somewhat different. Διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλοσοφοί, öri, &c. So Seneca: Quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quasi tibi volueris accidere. Debuisses enim velle, si scisses omnia ex decreto Dei fieri. Nat. Quæst. iii. in præfat. canst not but forgive us, if we prefer health to sickness; the safety of life and limb to maiming or to death. But did we know that these incidents, or any other, were appointed us; were fated in that order of uncontrollable events by which thou preservest and adornest the whole; it then becomes our duty to meet them with magnanimity, to cooperate with cheerfulness in whatever thou ordainest; that so we may know no other will than thine alone, and that the harmony of our particular minds with thy universal, may be steady and uninterrupted through the period of our existence.b "Yet since to attain this height, this transcendent height, is but barely possible, if possible, to the most perfect humanity; regard what within us is congenial to thee; raise us above ourselves, and warm us into enthusiasm. But let our enthusiasm be such as befits the citizens of thy polity; liberal, gentle, rational, and humane-not such as to debase us into poor and wretched slaves, as if thou wert our tyrant, not our kind and common father; much less such as to transform us into savage beasts of prey, sullen, gloomy, dark, and fierce; prone to persecute, to ravage, and destroy, as if the lust of massacre could be grateful to thy goodness. Permit us, rather, madly to avow villany in thy defiance, than impiously to assert it under colour of thy service. Turn our mind's eye from every idea of this character; from the servile, abject, horrid, and ghastly, to the generous, lovely, fair, and godlike. "Here let us dwell; be here our study and delight. So shall we be enabled, in the silent mirror of contemplation, to behold those forms which are hidden to human eyes-that animating wisdom which pervades and rules the whole-that law irresistible, immutable, supreme, which leads the willing, and compels the averse, to cooperate in their station to the general welfare-that magic divine,' which, by an efficacy past • Εἶναι δ ̓ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικητοῦ βούλησιν: “ 'The virtue of a happy man, and the felicity of life, is this; when all things are transacted in harmony of a man's genius, with the will of him who administers the whole.” Diog. Laert. l. vii. c. 88. p. 418. This is what Epictetus calls τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν συνάρμοσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, “το attune or harmonise one's mind to the things which happen." Diss. 1. ii. c. 14. p. 242. See before, page 92, &c. See also notes c, p. 92; and e, p. 93. d See before, note r, p. 99. e This power is called by the emperor Marcus, τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, καὶ οἰκονομοῦντα τὸ πᾶν. l. v. s. 32. * Καὶ τὸ χάσμα οὖν τοῦ λέοντος, καὶ τὸ δηλητήριον, καὶ πᾶσα κακουργία, ὡς ἄκανθα, ὡς βόρβορος, ἐκείνων ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν· μὴ οὖν αὐτὰ ἀλλότρια τούτου, οὗ σέβεις, φαντάζουν ἀλλὰ τὴν rávTwv anyhv éxiλoyíçov. M. Ant. 1. vi. s. 36. See also 1. iv. s. 44; l. iii. s. 2. "Ωσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι (φησίν) ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρουσιν, ἃ καθ ̓ ἑαυτὰ μέν ἐστι φαῦλα, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινὰ προστίθησιν· οὕτως ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν, τοῖς δ ̓ ἄλλοις οὐκ ǎxpηorós éσTI. Chrysip. apud Plutarch. p. 1065. D. Oudé Ti yiyvetai épyov éπl xlovì coû díxa, Οὔτε κατ ̓ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ ̓ ἐπὶ Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέξουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις. |