requires, said I, to be illustrated.-As if, continued he, a company of travellers, in some wide forest, were all intending for one city, but each by a rout peculiar to himself: the roads, indeed, would be various, and many, perhaps, false; but all who travelled would have one end in view.-It is evident, said I, they would. So fares it, then, added he, with mankind in pursuit of good: the ways, indeed, are many, but what they seek is

one.

For instance did you ever hear of any one, who, in pursuit of their good, were for living the life of a bird, an insect, or a fish?— None. And why not?-It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their nature. You see, then, said he, they all agree in this, that what they pursue, ought to be consistent, and agreeable to their proper nature. So ought it, said I, undoubtedly.-If so, continued he, one preconception is discovered, which is common to good in general; it is, that "all good is supposed something agreeable to nature."-This, indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands.

But again, said he, is there a man scarcely to be found of a temper so truly mortified, as to acquiesce in the lowest, and shortest necessaries of life? who aims not, if he be able, at something further, something better?-I replied, scarcely one.-Do not multitudes pursue, said he, infinite objects of desire, acknowledged every one of them to be in no respect necessaries? exquisite viands, delicious wines, splendid apparel, curious gardens; magnificent apartments adorned with pictures and sculpture; music and poetry, and the whole tribe of elegant arts?— It is evident, said I.-If it be, continued he, it should seem that they all considered the chief or sovereign good, not to be that which conduces to bare existence, or mere being; for to this the necessaries alone are adequate.-I replied, they were.-But if not this, it must be somewhat conducive to that which is superior to mere being.—It must.-And what, continued he, can this be, but well-being? well-being, under the various shapes in which differing opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else?—

want, is true; but that he was happy, was false. The conclusion, therefore, is false through the minor proposition.

"It is thus also you will find the lover of pleasure, and the lover of money, erring in their reasonings through the same proposition. For one of them lays down the good of man to be pleasure, the other to be riches; but that every thing desirable is good, this they possess in common, and assent to on both sides.

"It may be said, indeed, universally, that all individuals produce the general propositions, which they lay down, from their common or universal ideas, and from the faculty of reason: but that their minor pro

positions are produced from imagination, from sense, and from irrational passions. And hence it is, that about these last they differ one with another, while in the former they all agree. The passions, indeed, may be considered within the souls of men as the causes of division and distance; for they are Titanic, and distract and tear our intellect to pieces. But reason is the same and common to all, as is also the faculty of speech, the medium of its promulgation. And hence it is that Hermes (the type of rational discourse) is called 'common and universal,' if we may be allowed to give of him an ethical explanation."

I replied, I could not.-Mark here, then, continued he, another preconception, in which they all agree: the sovereign good is somewhat conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being.-I replied, it had so appeared.

Again, continued he, what labour, what expense, to procure those rarities which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter? Nay, more, how do we baffle nature herself; invert her order; seek the vegetables of spring in the rigours of winter, and winter's ice during the heats of summer?—I replied, we did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail?—It is true.-If this, then, be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our chief and sovereign good, is "something which, as far as possible, we would accommodate to all places and times."I answered, so it appeared.-See, then, said he, another of its characteristics, another preconception.

But further still; what contests for wealth? what scrambling for property? what perils in the pursuit, what solicitude in the maintenance? And why all this? To what purpose, what end? Or is not the reason plain? Is it not, that wealth may continually procure us whatever we fancy good; and make that perpetual, which would otherwise be transient?—I replied, it seemed so. Is it not further desired, as supplying us from ourselves, when, without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of others, and depend on their caprice for all that we enjoy?It is true, said I, this seems a reason.

Again; Is not power of every degree as much contested for as wealth? Are not magistracies, honours, principalities, and empire, the subjects of strife, and everlasting contention?-I replied, they were.-And why, said he, this? To obtain what end? Is it not to help us, like wealth, to the possession of what we desire? Is it not further to ascertain, to secure our enjoyments; that when others would deprive us, we may be strong enough to resist them?-I replied, it was.

Or to invert the whole, Why are there who seek recesses the most distant and retired? fly courts and power, and submit to parsimony and obscurity? Why all this, but from the same intention? From an opinion that small possessions, used moderately, are permanent; that larger possessions raise envy, and are more frequently invaded; that the safety of power and dignity is more precarious than that of retreat; and that there

fore they have chosen what is most eligible upon the whole?It is not, said I, improbable, that they act by some such motive.

Do you not see, then, continued he, two or three more preconceptions of the sovereign good, which are sought for by all, as essential to constitute it? And what, said I, are these?That it should not be transient, nor derived from the will of others, nor in their power to take away; but be durable, selfderived, and (and if I may use the expression) indeprivable.I confess, said I, it appears so.-But we have already found it to be considered as something agreeable to our nature; conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being; and what we aim to have accommodate to all places and times.-We have.

There may be other characteristics, said he, but these I think sufficient. See then its idea; behold it, as collected from the original, natural, and universal preconceptions of all mankind. The sovereign good,' they have taught us, ought to be something, "agreeable to our nature; conducive to well-being; accommodate to all places and times; durable, self-derived, and indeprivable."-Your account, said I, appears just.

The original preconceptions of the sovereign good here recited, may be justified by the following authorities, from among many which are omitted.

Agreeable to nature. Neque ulla alia in re, nisi in natura, quærendum esse illud summum bonum, quo omnia referrentur. Cic. Acad. 1. i. c. 5. p. 27. edit. Davis.

Conducive to well-being.-Epictetus calls that truth or knowledge, which respects our real happiness," (Thν àλhoetav Tv Tepi Tns evdayiovías); the "truth or knowledge which regards not mere living, but which conduces to living well," (où Thy περὶ τοῦ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.) Arrian. Epict. 1. i. c. 4. p. 28. edit. Upt. Αἱ κοιναὶ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἔννοιαι, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, εὐδαιμονίαν λέγουσι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, καὶ τὸ εὖ βιοῦν, καὶ τὴν εὐζωΐαν, εὐδαιμονίαν φασὶν εἶναι: “ Our common preconceptions concerning happiness call it, the living according to nature ; further than this, they say it is living or existing well, the life of well-being. Alex. Aphrod. Tepi ux. p. 157. edit. Ald.

Accommodate to all places and times. Antoninus, speaking of that happiness which he deemed our sovereign good, calls it something which was in our power, πανταχοῦ καὶ διηνεκώς, everywhere and perpetually," 1. vii. s. 54.

Durable, and indeprivable.-Nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono, beatus esse nemo potest. Tusc. Disp. 1. v. c. 14. p. 372. edit. Davis. So, immediately after, in the same page: An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo genere, que vita beata

completur, si id possit amitti? Nihil enim interarescere, nihil exstingui, &c. Kal Tis αὕτη ἡ εὔροια, ἣν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐ λέγω Καίσαρ ή Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, αὐλητὴς, πυρετός, ἄλλα τρισμύρια; ἡ δ' εὔροια οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔχει &s To dinvekès kal áveμπódioтov: “And what sort of happiness is this, which any thing intervening may embarrass; I say not Cæsar, or Cæsar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, a thousand things beside? Happiness, surely, implies nothing so much as perpetuity, and being superior to hinderance or impediment." Arrian. Epict. l. iv. c. 4. p. 585. edit. Upt. See also l. ii. c. 11. p. 227.

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Self-derived. -Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate sapientis : nam, si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 27. p. 163. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ ̓ ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ ̓ αὐτῷ [οἱ θεοὶ] "That man might not fall τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο : into real evils, the gods have put the whole in his own power." M. Ant. 1. ii. s. 11. Τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; εὐσταθήναι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, πάντα ὡς θέλει ποιεῖν, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μηδ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι: "For what is it that every man seeks? To be securely fixed. to be happy, to do all things according to his own will, not to be hindered, not to be compelled." Arrian. Epict. 1. iv. c. 1. p. 539, 540. Aristotle joins self-derived and indeprivable in his idea of good: Tayaldv dè oikeîov TI Kai durapaíperov elvai pavтevóμeba. Eth. Nic, 1. i. c. 3.

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It matters, continued he, little, how they err in the application; if they covet that as agreeable to nature, which is in itself most contrary; if they would have that as durable, which is in itself most transient; that as independent, and their own, which is most precarious and servile. It is enough for us, if we know their aim; enough, if we can discover, what it is they propose; the means and method may be absurd, as it happens. I answered, their aim was sufficient to prove what he had asserted.

:

It is true, replied he, it is abundantly sufficient. And yet, perhaps, even though this were ever so certain, it would not be altogether foreign, were we to examine, how they act; how they succeed in applying these universals to particular subjects. Should they be found just in the application, we need look no further the true sovereign good would of course be plain and obvious; and we should have no more to do, than to follow the beaten road. It is granted, replied I: but what if they err?Time enough for that, said he, when we are satisfied that they do. We ought first to inform ourselves, whether they may not possibly be in the right.—I submitted, and begged him to proceed his own way.

III. Will you, then, said he, in this disquisition into human conduct, allow me this: That such, as is the species of life, which every one chooses; such is his idea of happiness, such his conception of the sovereign good?—I seem, said I, to comprehend you, but should be glad you would illustrate.-His meaning, he answered, was no more than this: if a man prefer a life of industry, it is because he has an idea of happiness in wealth; if he prefers a life of gaiety, it is from a like idea concerning pleasure. And the same, we say, holds true in every other instance. I told him, it must, certainly.

And can you recollect, said he, any life, but what is a life of business, or of leisure-I answered, none.-And is not the great end of business either power or wealth?-It is.-Must not every life therefore of business be either political or lucrative?— It must.-Again, are not intellect and sense the soul's leading powers? They are. And in leisure, are we not ever seeking to gratify one or the other?-We are. Must not every life therefore of leisure be either pleasurable or contemplative?- If you confine pleasure, said I, to sense, I think it necessarily must. If it be not so confined, said he, we confound all inquiry.Allow it.

Mark, then, said he, the two grand genera, the lives of business and of leisure: mark also the subordinate species; the political and lucrative, the contemplative and pleasurable." Can you think of any other, which these will not include?—I replied, I knew of none.-It is possible, indeed, said he, that there may be other lives framed, by the blending of these, two or more m This fourfold distinction of lives is mentioned in Aristotle's Ethics, l. i. c. 5.

of them together. But if we separate with accuracy, we shall find that here they all terminate.-I replied, so it seemed probable.

If, then, continued he, we would be exact in our inquiry, we must examine these four lives, and mark their consequences. It is thus only we shall learn, how far those, who embrace them, find that good and happiness, which we know they all pursue.I made answer, It seemed necessary, and I should willingly attend him.

IV. To begin then, said he, with the political life. Let us see the good, usually sought after here. To a private man, it is the favour of some prince, or commonwealth; the honours and emoluments derived from this favour; the court and homage of mankind; the power of commanding others. To a prince, it is the same thing nearly, only greater in degree; a larger command; a stricter and more servile homage; glory, conquest, and extended empire. Am I right in my description?—I replied, I thought he was.-Whether, then, said he, all this deserves the name of good or not, I do not controvert. Be it one or the other, it affects not our inquiry. All that I would ask concerning it is this, do you not think it a good (if it really be one) derived from foreign and external causes?-Undoubtedly, replied I.-It cannot come then from ourselves, or be self-derived?—It cannot. And what shall we say as to its duration and stability? Is it so firm and lasting, that we cannot be deprived of it ?—I should imagine, said I, quite otherwise.-You insist not, then, said he, on my appealing to history? You acknowledge the fate of favourites, of empires, and their owners?—I replied, I did.

If so, said he, it should seem that this political good, which they seek, corresponds not to the preconceptions of being durable and indeprivable.-Far from it.—But it appeared, just before, not to be self-derived.-It did.-You see, then, said he, that in three of our preconceptions it entirely fails.-So, indeed, said I, it appears.

But, further, said he, we are told of this good, that in the possession it is attended with anxiety; and that when lost, it is usually lost with ignominy and disgrace; nay, often with prosecutions and the bitterest resentments; with mulcts, with exile, and death itself. It is frequently, said I, the case.--How, then, said he, can it answer that other preconception, of contributing to our well-being? Can that contribute to well-being whose consequences lead to calamity, and whose presence implies anxiety? This, it must be confessed, said I, appears not probable.

But, once more, said he, there are certain habits, or dispositions of mind, called sincerity, generosity, candour, plain-dealing, justice, honour, honesty, and the like.-There are: and it has been generally believed, that these are agreeable to nature.Assuredly. But it has been as generally believed, that the political good we speak of, is often not to be acquired but by habits contrary to these; and which, if these are natural, must