capacity itself; imperfect and obscure, because such is capacity to which it belongs. And so much for motion physical, its different species, and its general character. We are now to inquire concerning motion of another kind. CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL. THIS MEANS METAPHYSICAL, AND WHY SO CALLED. SPONTANEITY-WANT-PERCEPTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, ANTICIPATION, PRECONCEPTION APPETITE, RESENTMENT, REASON. MOTION PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL, HOW UNITED. DISCORD AND HARMONY OF THE INTERNAL PRINCIPLES-POWERS VEGETATIVE, ANIMAL, RATIONAL-IMMORTALITY. REST, ITS SEVERAL SPECIES. MOTION, TO WHAT PERCEPTIVE BEINGS IT APPERTAINS; TO WHAT NOT-AND WHENCE THE DIFFERENCE. OUR contemplation hitherto may be called physical, because it is about physical motions that the whole has been employed, and it is from physical observations that the whole has been deduced. But he who stops here, has but half finished his work, if it be true that corporeal masses only move, because they are moved; and therefore cannot be considered as the original source of motion. h We have just before styled it, the energy of capacity; here, the actuality of capacity. These expressions are difficult, unless we attend to the manner in which they are used. The original Greek expresses the sentiment thus: 'H TOû duváμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς OT: "The energy of what exists in power, considered as so existing, is motion." Arist. Physic. 43. edit. Sylb. And soon after, p. 45, Toû de dokeîv àópioтov εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὔτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε εἰς ἐνέργειάν ἐστι θεῖναι αὐτὴν ἁπλῶς· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι ποσὸν κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὔτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ποσόν· ἥτε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ· αἴτιον δ ̓ ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατὸν οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια κίνησις· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι, ἢ εἰς δύναμιν, ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀπλῆν· τού των δ ̓ οὐθὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον· λείπεται τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημένος τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μέν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ' ἐνέργειαν, οἵαν εἴπομεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' elva. Arist. Phys. 1. iii. c. 2.: "The reason why motion appears to be indefinite, is, that there is no placing it simply, either in the capacity of things, or in their energy: for neither is that necessarily moved which is capable of becoming a certain quantity; nor that which is a certain quantity in energy and act. Indeed, the motion itself appears to be a certain sort of energy, but then it is an imperfect one; and the reason of this is, the capacity itself is imperfect, of which it is the energy. Hence, therefore, it becomes hard to comprehend its nature: for it is necessary to place it either in privation, or in capacity, or else in simple energy, and yet no one of these appears to be possible. The manner, therefore, which we have mentioned, is the only one remaining, which is, that it should be a peculiar sort of energy, and that such a one as we have described; hard to discern, and yet possible to exist.” Page 45, ut supra. edit. Sylb. Η Τὸ κινοῦν φυσικῶς, κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ, κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό: "That which gives motion physically, is itself moveable: for every thing which gives motion in this manner, is moved also itself” And soon after, Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ θίξει ὥστε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει: “ This (namely, the giving motion) it does by contact; so that at the same time (while it acts) it is acting upon." Aristot. Physic. 1. iii. c. 1. p. 44, 45. edit. Sylb. When a boy carries about with him an insect in a box, we call not this motion the insect's motion as an animal, because a nut or a pebble would have moved in like manner. When the same boy, piercing a wing of this insect, makes it describe a circular motion round a pin or needle, even this cannot well be called the insect's motion; for its motion, as an animal, is not, like a planet, round a centre. So far however the motion differs from that in the box, that by being a mixed motion, the centrifugal part is the animal's own, the centripetal is extraneous. But if ever the wing detach itself, and the fortunate insect fly off; at that instant the mixture of extraneous is no more, and the motion thenceforward becomes properly and purely animal. And what is it which gives the motion this proper and pure character? It is spontaneity, that pure and innate impulse arising from the animal itself, by which alone its flight is then produced and conducted. And thus, while we pass from flying to innate and spontaneous impulse, that is to say, in other words, from flying to its cause, we pass also insensibly from motion physical to metaphysical; for metaphysics are properly conversant about primary and internal causes. We call not such impulse metaphysical, as if it were μετὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κίνησιν, “ something subsequent to natural motion," that is, to flying, (for this would set effect before cause, a preposterous order indeed ;) but we call it metaphysical,* because though truly prior in itself, it is subsequent in man's contemplation, whose road of science is naturally upward, that is, from effect to cause, from sensible to intelligible.' m Spontaneous impulse is to the insect the cause of flying; so it is to the dolphin, of swimming; to the man, of walking. But what is the cause of this impulse itself? And why do animals possess it, more than stocks or stones? 1 Ἐοίκε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι, οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθένTOS: "That seems to be forced, or compelled, of which the principle or moving cause is from without, while the being compelled contributes nothing from itself." Ethic. Nic. 1. iii. c. 1. p. 37. edit. Sylb. j Tò éкovσlov dóželev av elva, où àρxì èv aùtậ: "That should seem to be spontaneous, of which the principle or moving cause is in the being itself." Eth. Nic. 1. iii. c. 1. p. 38. edit. Sylb. * Philoponus, in a very few words, well explains the term metaphysical. Speaking of the first and supreme cause of all things, he adds, Пepl uèv ovv ékeívov elTeiv, Ts πρώτης ἔστι φιλοσοφίας θεολογία γὰρ οἰκεῖον, καὶ τῇ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματείᾳ. μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸ τῶν φυσικῶν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς γὰρ vστepа τà Tỷ púσει πρóтeра: “To speak concerning this principle, is the business of the first philosophy, for it is a subject be longing to theology, and to that speculation which is metaphysical, that is to say, subsequent to matters physical, or rather indeed it is a subject prior to matters physical, inasmuch as those things with regard to us are subsequent, which are by nature prior." Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. p. 12. edit. Ald. Venet, 1527. 1 See Hermes, p. 119. See also p. 26, note; and of the present treatise, p. 350, note. 'Opun. Diog. Laert. vii. 85. Una pars in appetitu posita est. Cic. de Offic. i. 28. Appetitionesque, quas illi ópuàs vocant, obedientes efficere rationi. De Offic. ii. 5. Animalia, quæ habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus. Ejusd. ii. 3. Naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant ὁρμὴν, itemque, &c. De Fin. iv. 14. Seneca uses the words, spontaneos motus. Epist. cxxi. To solve this question, we must first remark, that every animal, however exquisite in its frame, is nevertheless far from being perfect, being still the part of a greater and more perfect whole," to which it is connected by many necessary wants. One of these, for example, is common to all animals, that of food or aliment. Suppose then this want were not to be gratified, what would be the consequence? The animal would perish. And how has Providence obviated this danger? It has given to every animal, however base, however young, not only a consciousness of this want, but an obscure sensation of some distinction in things without; and a preconception or anticipation in favour of that aliment which it is to prefer, from an inward feeling of its proper constitution. It is thus without either teaching or experience, but merely from an innate feeling of what is conducive to their proper being, that infants are able to distinguish milk from vinegar; and silk-worms the leaf of a mulberry from that of a laurel or an ash. Now the consequence "Ipse autem homo-nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam particula perfecti. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 14. See chap. x. and the end of the present chapter. What is applied by Cicero in the above passage to man, may with equal propriety be applied to all other animals, and needs no proving. It was a fundamental doctrine of the Stoics. • Πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι παντὶ ζώῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ σύστασιν, καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείSnow: "The thing primarily intimate to every animal, is its own constitution, and a consciousness of it." Diog. Laert. vii. 85. P Simul atque natum sit animal-ipsum sibi conciliari, et commendari ad se conservandum et suum statum, et ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus status, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur adferre. Cic. de Fin. iii. 5. Thus Seneca: Omnibus (sc. animalibus) constitutionis suæ sensus est, et inde membrorum tam expedita tractatio. Epist. cxxi. Soon after: Constitutionem suam [animal] crasse intelligit, summatim, et obscure. And again: Ante omnia est mei cura: hoc animalibus inest cunctis: nec inseritur, sed innascitur. And soon after, speaking of the terror which some animals feel in their earliest state, when they first behold a hawk, or a cat, he adds-Apparet illis inesse scientiam nocituri, non experimento collectam; nam, antequam possint experiri, cavent. Even the ferocious tribes of animals, when their powers become mature, are shewn how to employ them, by an innate, internal instinct. Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, unde, nisi intus Monstratum. As to innate ideas, there is certainly nothing so true, (and it requires no great logic to prove,) that, if by innate ideas be meant innate propositions, there never were, nor ever can be, any such things existing. But this no ways tends to subvert that innate distinction of things into eligible and ineligible, according as they are suit able to every nature, or not suitable; a distinction which every being appears to recognise from its very birth. Hence the author above quoted, in the same epistle: Tenera quoque animalia, a materno utero, vel quoquo modo effusa, quid sit infestum ipsis protinus norunt, et mortifera devitant. And it is upon this reasoning we may venture to affirm, that every such being in its earliest moments perceives itself to be an animal, though it may not be philosophically informed what an animal really is: Quid sit animal, nescit; animal esse se sentit. Ibid. Whatever others, in ancient, or even in modern days, may have thought concerning this subject, that philosopher surely can be hardly suspected of favouring innate ideas, who held the human soul, or rather its intellective part," from its comprehending all things to be for that very reason something pure and unmixed,”—èπel návтa voeî, àμyn elva-and this, because [in any compound] "that which is alien, by shewing itself along with other objects impedes and obstructs ”παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ àλλóтρiov, kal ávtippáttei. "That therefore the human intellect in its nature was of this consciousness, of these preconceptions or anticipations, is a spontaneous impulse; for it is in these that such impulse finds an adequate efficient cause. But if we include all these under the common name of perception, we shall then find that per nothing else than mere capacity, or the being capable”—ὥστε μήδ ̓ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν τίνα μηδεμίαν, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι SúvaTov-"that in consequence it was not any simple one of the whole tribe of beings, before it comprehended aud understood it " — ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς— οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων, πρὶν νοεῖν— "that it was not therefore probable it should be blended with the body, for that then it would become vested with some corporeal quality, and be either hot or cold, and have some corporeal organ, as the sensitive faculty has; whereas now it has none”—διὸ οὐδὲ μεμίχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποῖος γὰρ ἄν τις γίγνοιτο, θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρὸς κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ νῦν δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι. He concludes, at last, his reasonings with telling us, "that the intellect, as he had said before, was in capacity, after a certain manner, the several objects intelligible; but was in actuality no one of them, until it first comprehended it; and that it was the same with the mind, or human understanding, [in its original state,] as with a rasa tabula, or writing tablet, in which nothing as yet had been actually written "-did εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πως ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ ̓ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν, πρὶν ἂν μὴ νοῇ· δεῖ δὲ οὕτως, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. Aristot. de Anima, l. iii. iv. As to the simile of rasa tabula, or (to speak in a language more modern and familiar) that of a sheet of fair writing paper, though it be sufficiently evident of itself, it may be illustrated in the following manner. The human intellect is pure unmixed, untainted capacity, as a sheet of fair writing paper is pure unmixed, untainted whiteness. The pure unmixed character of this intellectual capacity renders it fit for every object of comprehension, as the pure unmixed character of the paper makes it adequate to every species of writing. The paper would not be adequate to this purpose, were it previously scrawled over with syllables or letters. As far only as it is clear, it is capable; and if we suppose it perfectly clear, then is it perfectly capable. The same sort of reasoning is applicable to the human understanding. Such we take to be the sentiments of this ancient sage on this important subject. The sentiments and subject, being both of them curious, will (it is hoped) be an q apology for this digression. By it we think it appears, that it was a received opinion among the ancients, that instincts both in man and beast were original, and founded in nature. That Aristotle held the same, appears not only from his History of Animals, but from the following remarkable passage in his Politics relative to man. There, speaking of the social state, or state of society, he says, φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Tolaúтny Kowvwvíav, "that the tendency to such a society was by nature in all men." Pol. p. 4. edit. Sylb. We think also it further appears, that whatever Aristotle thought of instincts residing in the lower faculties of man, instincts respecting the purposes of common life and society, yet, as to the supreme and intellective part, this he held in its original state to be wholly pure and unmixed, and only fitted, by that purity, for general and universal comprehension. He seems (like the rest) to have justly distinguished between innate instincts, and innate propositions. This word, perception, is of the most extensive meaning, and not only includes intellection, but sensation also, and that of the lowest degree. What is here called perception, is by Aristotle called knowledge. Γνώσεώς τινος πάντα (scil. ζῶα) μετέχουσι, τὰ μὲν πλείονος, τὰ δ ̓ ἐλάττονος, τὰ δὲ πάμπαν μικρᾶς, αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν· ἡ δ ̓ αἴσθησις, γνωσίς τις. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίμιον καὶ ἄτιμον πολὺ διαφέρει σκοποῦσι πρὸς φρόνησιν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως μόνον πρὸς δὲ ἀναισθησίαν, βέλτιστον. ̓Αγαπη τὸν γὰρ ἂν δόξῃ τὸ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ μὴ κεῖσθαι τεθνεὼς καὶ μὴ ov: "All animals share a degree of knowledge; some of them, a greater; others of them, a less; and some of them, an exceedingly small degree; for they have all of them sensation, and sensation is a sort of knowledge. But the value and the novalue of sensation is widely different, when we compare it with rational comprehension on the one side, and with the race of beings inanimate on the other. With regard to rational comprehension, the mere partaking of taste and touch alone appears to be as nothing; but with regard to pure insensibility, it is something most excellent. For [when compared to beings insensible] it may surely appear a blessed event, to be ception is the proper cause of spontaneous impulse; that it is so the animal impels itself, because it is so that it perceives; it does not so perceive, because it is so impelled." The impulse hitherto spoken of is of earliest date, commencing in a manner with the animal itself; and, as it merely respects the body and bodily pleasure, is distinguished from other impulses by the name of appetite." As animals advance, the scene of perception enlarges, and the number of spontaneous impulses increase, of course, with it. Yet while pleasure corporeal continues the sole object, and there appears no danger, either in acquiring or preserving it, the impulse is still an appetite, varying only in its name, as the pleasure, to which it is referred, varies in the species. Yet, besides these preconceptions, the sources of simple appetite, there are also preconceptions of offering violence, and others of resisting danger, and these naturally call forth another power, I mean the power of anger. Few animals, when young, feel any such preconceptions; but the more ferocious and savage are sure to find them at maturity; and the irascible impulses soon spontaneously attend, prompting the lion to employ his fangs, the vulture his talons, the boar his tusk, and every other animal of prey his proper and natural preparations. All these spontaneous impulses, as well of anger as of appetite, are equally included under the common name of irrational," being called by this name, because they have nothing to do with reason. But when reason becomes strong enough to view its proper objects; that sight, to which no being here but man alone is equal; when the moral and the intelligible rise before his mental eye, and he beholds the fair forms of good and of truth; then, too, arise impulses of a far more noble kind, those to friendship, to society, to virtue, and to science.* agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, concordiam; multo eam pluris æstimavit, quam omnia illa, quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit, ut statueret in eo conlocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum. Cic. de Fin. iii. 6. Unicuique ætati sua constitutio est: alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni: omnes enim constitutioni conciliantur, in qua sunt. Infans sine dentibus est: huic constitutioni suæ conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic, &c. Sen. Epist. cxxi. The whole epistle is worth perusal, in particular what follows: Ergo infans ei constitutioni suæ conciliatur, quæ tunc infanti est, non quæ futura juveni est. Neque enim, si aliquid illi majus in quo transeat, restat; non hoc quoque, in quo nascitur, secundum naturam est. |