From all these speculations one thing at least appears, (whatever else may be doubtful,) that relations of hostility, as well as friendship, have their use in the universe. Both also equally arise from want on one side, and from the power of removing it on the other. The difference is, that in friendly relations the help is communicated either with pleasure, as when the mother suckles her child; or at least without pain, as when we shew a traveller his way, In hostile relations, the help, without regard to the communicator, is either taken by force, as when the wolf devours the lamb; or obtained by stratagem, as when the spider ensnares the fly. And thus by the reciprocal relations of want and help, (both of which under a variety of forms exist in every individual,) is there a kind of general concatenation extended throughout the universe; while each being communicates what help it can afford, and obtains, in its turn, that help which it requires. To all these relations must be added that chief, though mentioned last, that of the whole universe, and every being in it, to the first, supreme, and intelligent Cause, through which relation they are called his offspring, and he their Father. Here, indeed, the relations are not blended as before; they are all purely referable to want on one side, and all purely arise from spontaneous help on the other; the correspondence existing, as far as perfect has respect to imperfect, independent to dependent, the object desired to the beings which desire," the maker to his works, the parent to his children.* And now to conclude with a remark, which regards relation in general. "As to every continuous being the genus of quality gives distinctions, which help to mitigate its sameness, and render it, as it were, discrete; so to beings discrete, however remote, the genus of relation gives a connection, which serves to mitigate their diversity, and to render them, as it were, continuous. Thus is the world maintained as well in its union, as in its variety, while both species of quantity run through the whole, and through every part." And so much for the arrangement or genus of relation, its nature, its properties, its utility, and extent." rishable, out of which this lower and visible relation between the object of desire, and world is wholly composed. How far the want of good leads to arts and action, may be seen in p. 14, and in notes subjoined. We here perceive it to extend, not only to the whole animal world, but even to the vegetable. More will be found on this subject in the treatise upon Motion, a part of the present work. * Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγει ται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν Tŷ ¿pieμévy; "How is God called an object desirable to all beings, if there be no the being which desires ?" Simplic. in Prædic. p. 43. B. edit. Basil. 1551. See before, note c, p. 314. St. Paul has given his sanction to that verse of Aratus, Toù yàp kal yévos ẻoμév: "For we are his offspring." Arat. Phon. v. 5. Acts xvii. 28. y Before we quit this arrangement, we shall subjoin the following note. The old logicians held, that things intelligible, and intellection, were relatives; so also things sensible, and sensation. But CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ACTION AND PASSION. ACTION, ITS FIVE SPECIES-THOSE OF PASSION RECIPROCATE-MIND DIVINE, HUMAN-LATTER, HOW ACTED UPON-POLITICS, ECONOMICS, ETHICS. PASSIVITY IN BODIES ANIMATE AND INANIMATE. ACTION AND RE-ACTION, WHERE THEY EXIST, WHERE NOT. SELF-MOTION, WHAT, AND WHERE. POWER, WHENCE AND WHAT-REQUISITE BOTH IN ACTION AND IN PASSION. POWER, THOUGH LIKE NONENTITY, YET WIDELY different. DOUBLE IN THE REASONING FACULTY. POWER, NOT FIRST IN EXISTENCE, BUT ENERGY, WHICH NEVER HAS CEASED, OR WILL CEASE, OR CAN CEASE. In treating of relatives, we have considered principally those which possess the relative character in a degree above every then they started an objection-If relatives coexist, and always reciprocate in their existence, what would become of Euclid's theorems, supposing there were no geometricians? What would become of sensible objects, supposing there were no beings sensitive? One solution of this objection is derived from the percipient: the first original and supreme percipient is everywhere, and always in the full energy of universal perception. Another solution is from the objects perceived, be they sensible or intelligible. Every such object has a double nature; an absolute nature, and a relative one. The sound A is an octave to the sound B. B ceases, and A continues. A is no longer an octave, but still it is a sound: and even though we should call it no sound, if there were to be no hearers; it would still be an undulation of air, capable of producing sound, if there were an ear capable of perceiving it, that is, an organ adequate to the sensation. The instance given on this occasion by the philosophers Porphyry and Simplicius, is curious, because it is taken from that difficult system of music, the enharmonic. The following are the words of Simplicius: Κἂν γὰρ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν ἀποβάλωμεν ποτὲ τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν, οὐδὲν ἧττον μένει τὰ ὄντα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπιστητά· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ πρότερον μὲν κατηκούομεν διέσεως, νῦν δὲ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τούτου τοῦ diaoтhμatos loμév: "For if ever, through any sloth or indolence, we reject knowledge, those things, which are intelligible, remain nevertheless. It is thus that in music we used in former days to hear the quarter-tone, but now we are unable to distinguish this interval." Simplic. in Præd. p. 48. B. edit. Basil. 1551. Porphyry having told us, that though there were no geometry, considered as a science, there would still be objects geometrical, subjoins-ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ τὸ μὲν πάλαι τοῦ διεσιαίου διαστήματος ἤκουον οἱ μουσικοί, ὕστερον δὲ ἀμεληθείσης τῆς ἐναρμονίου μελῳδίας, καθ ̓ ἣν τὸ διεσιαῖον διάστημα ἐμελῳδεῖτο, οὐκέτι τοῦ τοιούτου αἴσθησις ἔσται (lege ἐστὶ) διαστήματος· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦτο διάστημα, εἰ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιTEV: "For thus, too, in music, musicians used formerly to hear (and distinguish) the interval of the quarter-tone; but in latter days, the enharmonic melody having been neglected, by which this interval used to be modulated, there is no longer now any sensation of such an interval: and yet it is evident that this sensible interval has an existence in nature, although for the present the sensation of it be lost." Porphyr. in Prædic. p. 40. ed. Paris. 1543. Porphyry flourished in the third century; Simplicius in the sixth. We may remark, by the way, from the above quotations, how fast the arts of elegance were sinking, even in the more early of those two periods. As for the state of philosophy in the latter period, we may form a judgment of it by what we learn from Simplicius in the same treatise, with regard to the Stoics. Having, in his Commentary on the Predicaments of Action and Passion, given many quotations from the Stoic logic, he concludes the chapter with the following words: Πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξερ other. But there are things which, as they possess it blended with characters more eminent, have been formed for that reason into separate arrangements. Such, for example, is the relation between a being and the place which it occupies; that between a being and the time while it exists; the first of which relations gives an answer to the question, where; the latter to the question, when. There are also relations of position; relations of habit; and, besides these, there are relations of action and passion; all of which are distinguished by peculiar attributes of their own, and have therefore merited distinct examinations from the ancient writers upon logic. Thus, if we consider the two last, I mean action and passion, we shall find them diffused through every part of the universe; and that, either united in one subject, or else separate, and in different subjects. By Horace they are united: Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam, Hor. Art. Poet. 412. So are they by Livy, in that manly speech of Caius Mucius: Et facere et pati fortia, Romanum est." So are they by Shakspeare: Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer So are they by Milton: Fall'n cherub, to be weak is miserable, Hamlet. Par. Lost, i. 157. In Virgil we see them separated, and passion given to man, action to the Deity: O! passi graviora, dabit Deus his quoque finem. Æn. i. 203. As, therefore, action and passion are of the most extensive influence; as they partake in some degree the nature of qualities or attributes, by being intimately and essentially connected with substance; while the relatives when, where, and position seem rather connected accidentally: we shall give action and passion their just precedence, and make them the subject of the present chapter. The species of action are as many as are the different modes of acting in the different species of agents. γασία παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς· ὧν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγ Ypaμμáτwv émiλéλotev: "There is much elaborate discussion of these matters among the Stoics, of whom both the doctrine and most of the writings are in our times lost, and at an end." Simpl. in Præd. p. 84. B. edit. Basil. 1551. Mahomet soon followed, whose successor Omar burnt the Alexandrine library ; nor did the succeeding caliphs emerge from barbarity till the race of the Abbassidæ, near two centuries after. The barbarity of Western Europe continued much longer, and did not begin to lessen till the fifteenth century, that preceding the age of Leo the Tenth. 2 Liv. ii. 11. The first sort of action is that of mere body alone, considered either as void of sensation wholly, like fire, when it burns; or, at least, as void of sensation, at the time when it operates. Such is that great and universal power, the power of attraction, which all body, animal, vegetable, and elementary, is found to possess in proportion to its quantity; that active power, (if it may for the present be so called,) the effects of which modern philosophy has scrutinized with so much penetration. Such, too, are those energies peculiar to different bodies, and arising out of them from their different natures; as when we say, the heavens emit light; the trees produce leaves; the fields give us corn, &c. Cælum nitescere, arbores frondescere, Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 28. Such, too, are those more secret operations of bodies, whether magnetic or electric; to which may be added the virtues and efficacies of bodies medicinal. All these energies in a comprehensive sense may be called the action of body, considered merely as body." A second sort of action is that which is the result of sensation, instinct, and natural appetite, and which therefore, being complicated, must necessarily be confined to bodies of a higher genus, to bodies sensitive, that is, to animals. Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, &c. Hor. Sat. ii. 1. Nowhere are these actions expressed with more elegance and conciseness, than by our own epic poet, in his Paradise Lost: Air, water, earth, By fowl, fish, beast, was flown, was swam, was walked." Par. Lost, vii. 502. There is a third species of action more complicated even than the preceding, being derived not only from sensation, instinct, and natural appetite, but from reason also, superadded to these. This is a mode of action peculiar to man, because of all the animals we see around us, man alone possesses the reasoning faculty. * This is that genus of energies which, as Iamblichus describes it, "indicates no action belonging to soul, or to animal nature, or to reasonings, or to life, but which (on the contrary) exhibits the particular energy of bodies, considered as bodies purely inanimate ; and that as well with respect to all the peculiarities which appear to surround body, as to all those various inherent powers of bodies, not only as they are solid and capable of resisting, but as they contain within them a multitude of powers that are efficacious and active." Γένος ἐνεργειῶν, ὅπερ ψυχῆς καὶ φύσεως καὶ λόγων καὶ ζωῆς οὐκέτι ἐπιδείκνυσι ποίησιν, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων, ᾗ σώματά ἐστιν ἄψυχα, φανερὰν καθίστησι τὴν σωματοειδή ἐνέργειαν κατὰ πάσας μὲν τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰς φαινομένας ἰδιότητας, κατὰ πάσας δὲ αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ ᾗ μόνον στερεά ἐστι καὶ ἀντίτυπα, ἀλλ ̓ ᾧ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν exe woλλàs dpaσtnpious duváμeis. Simpl. in Prædic. p. 81. edit. Basil. 1551. · Καὶ δῆλον ὅσα ποτέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα είδη τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορά ἐστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν, περὶ ὧν ἐν ταῖς περὶ ζώων ἱστορίαις διαριθμεῖσθαι εἰώθα Mev: "It is evident, that as are the species of irrational animals in number and in quality, so many and such are the different species in acting agreeably to this [animal] mode of energy; which several species of acting have been usually enumerated in the histories of animals. Simpl. in Præd. p. 81, ut supra. Widely diversified is the share assumed by the subordinate faculties of the human soul, in actions of this character. Sometimes they submit to reason, and are (as becomes them) obedient; at other times they reject her, and proceed of themselves. And hence it is, that actions, produced from causes so peculiarly complicated, derive to themselves the colours of good and evil, and are denominated, in distinction to every other deed of man, actions moral. When Virtue and Pleasure addressed the young Hercules, Virtue supposed him to have a reason that could control his appetites; Pleasure supposed him to have appetites that would bear down his reason. Had he obeyed the last, he had been vicious; as he obeyed the first, he was virtuous. There was a conflict in either case between his better part and his worse; and in that conflict both species of faculties were presumed, his rational faculties, and his irrational. There is a fourth sort of action, where the intellect, operating without passions or affections, stays not within itself, but passes out (as it were) to some external operation. It is thus that nature, considered as an efficient cause, may be called the energy of God, seen in the various productions that replenish and adorn the world. It is thus that art, considered as an efficient cause, may be called the energy of man, which imitates in its operations the plastic power of nature. The last and most excellent sort of action is seen in contemplation; in the pure energy of simple intellect, keeping within itself, and making itself its own object. This is the highest action of which we are susceptible; and by it we imitate the Supreme Being, as far as is consistent with our subordinate nature. It is to this that our great poet alludes, when speaking of his employment, during a state of blindness, he says, Then feed on thoughts, which voluntary move See Xenoph. Mem. 1. ii. c. 1. s. 21. The above species of action is thus de scribed by Simplicius: Τρίτον δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν γένος, τὸ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν ἀπηρίθμηται ὅπερ τοῦ λόγου τὰς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ σύνθετα ποιήσεις ἐπιτροπεύει προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλην, δόξαν τε καὶ σκέψιν, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις παρεχόμενον. Simpl. ut supra. "The genus comprehended under the idea of acting morally, is the third of this order; that genus which presides over the energies of reason with respect to the concrete objects of sense, (that is, which presides in the affairs of common life,) and which furnishes upon occasion deliberate choice, volition, opinion, inquiry, and other energies of the same character.” Simpl. in Præd. p. 80. B. edit. Bas. 1551. We have in this place translated pár Par. Lost, iii. 37. σew, "to act morally," the better to dis- 4 Τούτου δὲ πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, μιμουμέναις τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ παραλειπόμενον ὑπ' αὐταῖς (lege αὐτῆς) ἀναπληρούσαις. Simplic. ut supra. "Of this species of acting the Divinity has a large share; a large share also falls to arts, that imitate nature, and supply what she has omitted." e This highest mode of action (if it may be so called) is thus described by Simplicius in the same comment, p. 80. Τὸ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων οὐσίων ἐπισκοπούμενον ἁπλαῖς νοήσεσιν : "That which, with simple intellections, inquires concerning substances intelligible |