And here, if a digression may be permitted, let us reflect for a moment on the character of old Proteus. Omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum, Πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ ̓ ἐπὶ γαῖαν Georg. iv. Οδυσσ. Δ. 417. What wonder, if this singular deity suggests to us that singular being, which we have been just attempting to describe? The allegory was too obvious to escape the writers of any age, and there are many, we find, by whom it has been adopted. Timaeus calls it τύπος and χώρα; Plato calls it xúpa and spa. Opusc. Myth. p. 544. Plat. Tim. p. 52. Chalcidius elegantly shews, how in this negative manner it attends all the predicaments, and serves for a support to each. Essentia est, ut opinor, cum eam species, &c. See Com. in. Tim. p. 438. To the poets here quoted may be added, Horace Sat. lib. ii. s. 3. v. 73. Ovid. Metam. viii. 730. That great parent of mythology as well as poetry, Homer, not only informs us concerning Proteus, but concerning his daughter Eidothea, who discovered her father's abode. We shall perceive in the explanations which follow, how this fable applies itself to the subject of the present chapter. "Some," says Eustathius, when he comments the passage above cited from Homer, hold "Proteus to be that original matter, which is the receptacle of forms; that, which being in actuality no one of these forms, is yet in capacity all of them; which Proteus (they add) Eidothea, his daughter, is elegantly said to discover, by leading him forth out of capacity into actuality; that is, she is that principle of motion which contrives to make him rush into form, and be moved and actuated." Heraclides Ponticus, having adopted the same method of explaining, subjoins: "That hence it was with good reason, that the formless matter was called Proteus; and that providence, which modified each being with its peculiar form and character, was called Eidothea." The words of Eustathius, in the original, are-Πρωτέα τὴν πρωτόγονον εἶναι ὕλην, τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν δεχάδα, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὖσαν μηδὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, δυνάμει δὲ τὰ πάντα δὴ Πρωτέα καλῶς λέγεται ἡ Εἰδοθέα ἐκφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν προαγωγῆς ἤγουν ἡ κίνησις, ἡ εἰς εἶδος θέειν αὐτὸν, καὶ κινεῖ olai μnxavwμévn. Eustath. in Hom. Odyss. p. 177. edit. Basil. We shall only remark, as we proceed, that the etymology here given of Eidothea, eis eldos béew, "to rush into form," is invented, like many other ancient etymologies, more to explain the word philosophically, than to give us its real origin. It is, perhaps, more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and such appears to have been the common practice of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The words of Heraclides are “QOTE NVλογον, τὴν μὲν ἄμορφον ὕλην Πρωτέα και λεῖσθαι, τὴν δ ̓ εἰδωλοπλαστήσασαν ἕκαστα Пpóvoιav Eidoléav. Heraclid. Pontic. p. 490. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. 8vo. To these Greeks may be subjoined a respectable countryman of our own. Lord Verulam tells us of Proteus, that he had his herd of seals, or sea-calves; that these it was his custom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a cavern, and repose himself. Of this we read the following explanation: "That under the person of Proteus is signified matter, the most ancient of all things, next to the Deity; that the herd of Proteus was nothing else, than the ordinary species of animals, plants, and metals, into which matter appears to diffuse, and, as it were, to consume itself; so that after it has formed and finished those several species, (its task being in a manner complete,) it appears to sleep and be at rest, nor to labour at, attempt, or prepare any species further." De Sapientia Vet. c. 13. The author's own words are, Sub Protei enim persona materia significatur, omnium rerum post Deum antiquissima. Pecus autem, sive grex Protei non aliud videtur esse, quan species ordinaria animalium, plantarum, metallorum, in quibus materia CHAPTER V. CONCERNING FORMAN IMPERFECT DESCRIPTION OF IT. PRIMARY FORMS, UNITED WITH MATTER, MAKE BODY. BODY MATHEMATICAL -BODY PHYSICAL-HOW THEY DIFFER. ESSENTIAL FORMS. TRANSITION TO FORMS OF A CHARACTER SUPERIOR TO THE PASSIVE AND ELEMENTARY. FORM is that elementary constituent in every composite substance, by which it is distinguished and characterized, and known from every other. But to be more explicit. The first and most simple of all extensions is a line. This, when it exists united with a second extension, makes a superficies; and these two, existing together with a third, make a solid. Now this last and complete extension we call the first and simplest form; and when this first and simplest form accedes to the first and simplest matter, the union of the two produces body, which is for that reason defined to be "matter triply extended." And thus we behold the rise of pure and original body. videtur se diffundere, et quasi consumere; adeo ut, postquam istas species effinxerit, et absolverit, (tanquam penso completo,) dormire et quiescere videatur, nec alias amplius species moliri, tentare, aut parare. d See the first note in the preceding chapter, and page 275. • Original body, when we look downwards, has reference to the primary matter, its substratum; when we look upwards, becomes itself a λn, or "matter to other things" to the elements, as commonly called air, earth, water, &c.; and in consequence to all the variety of natural productions. Hence it is, that Ammonius, speaking of the first matter, says, avтn obv, oykw θεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ἄποιον σῶμα: "this [that is, the first matter] being embulked with three extensions, makes the second matter or subject, that is to say, body void of quality. After having shewn how natural qualities and attributes stood in need of such a subject for their existence, he adds, (which is worth remarking,) οὐχ ὅτι ἦν ποτε ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματος, ἢ σῶμα ἄποιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὔτακτον τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν θεωροῦντες φαμὲν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διαιροῦντες ταῦτα, Tà tỷ púσei axúpiora: "not that there ever was in actuality either matter without body, or body without quality; but we say so, as we contemplate the well ordered generation of things, dividing those things in imagination, which are by nature inseparable." Ammon. in Præd. p. 62. Συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά· σῶμα δὲ, τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν μεγέθους δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἓν, γραμμή· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον· τὸ δ ̓ ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο μέγεθος, διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τρὶς Távт? : "Continuous is that, which is divisible into parts infinitely divisible; body is that which is every way divisible. Of extensions, that which is divisible one way, is a line; that which is divisible two ways, is a superficies; that which is divisible three ways, is body; and besides these there is no other extension, because three are all, and thrice [divisible] is every way [divisible.] Aristot. de Cœlo, l. i. c. 1. In support of this last idea, (that the term three implies all,) Aristotle refers to the common practice of his own languageΤὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἀμφὼ λέγομεν, καὶ τοὺς δύο ἀμφοτέρους, πάντα δ ̓ οὐ λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φαμὲν πρῶτον: “We call (says he) two things, or tuo persons, both ; but we do not call them all, it is with regard to three that we first apply this appellation," (viz. the appellation of all.) Arist. in loc. This is true likewise in Latin; and is true also in English. Even the vulgar, with us, would be surprised were they to T It must be remembered, however, that body under this character is something indefinite and vague, and scarcely to be made an object of scientific contemplation. It is necessary to this end, that its extension should be bounded; for as yet we have treated it without such regard. Now the bound or limit of simple body is figure; and thus it is that figure, with regard to body, becomes the next form after extension. In body thus bounded by figure, every other of its attributes being abstracted and withdrawn, we behold that species of body called body mathematical; a name so given it, because the mathematician, as such, considers no other attributes of body, except it be these two primary, its extension and its figure. But though the bounding of body by figure is one step towards rendering it more definite and knowable, yet is not this sufficient for the purposes of nature. It is necessary here, that not only its external should be duly bounded, but that a suitable regard should be likewise had to its internal. This internal adjustment, disposition, or arrangement, (denominate it as you please,) is called organization, and may be considered as the third form, which appertains to body. By its accession we behold the rise of body physical or natural, for every such body is some way or other organized. And thus may we affirm that these three, that is to say, extension, figure, and organization, are the three original forms to body physical or natural; figure having respect to its external, organization to its internal, and extension being common both to one and to the other. It is more than probable, that from the variation in these universal, and, as I may say, primary forms, arise most of those secondary forms usually called qualities sensible, because they are the proper objects of our several sensations. Such are roughness and smoothness, hardness and softness, the tribes of colours, savours and odours, not to mention those powers of character more subtle, the powers electric, magnetic, medicinal, &c. Here therefore we may answer the question, how natural bodies are distinguished. Not a single one among them consists hear any one say, Give me all two, instead matical sciences) is more accurate and cerof Give me both. tain than that of any other body. It is, because of all bodies, mathematical body has the fewest, the most obvious, and the most precise attributes. Hence, too, we may perceive the difference between a mathematician and a natural philosopher. They differ as their subjects differ; as the subject of the first is simple, of the last is complicated; as the attributes of mathematical body are few and known, of physical body are unknown and infinite. Vid. Arist. Phys. 1. ii. c. 2. of materials in chaos, but of materials wrought up after the most exquisite manner, and that conspicuous in their organization, or in their figure, or in both. g As therefore every natural body is distinguished by the differences just described; and as these differences have nothing to do with the original matter, which being everywhere similar, can afford no distinctions at all: may we not hence infer the expediency of essential forms, that every natural substance may be essentially characterized? It is with deference to my contemporaries, that I surmise this assertion. I speak perhaps of spectres, as shocking to some philosophers, as those were to Æneas, which he met in his way to hell: Terribiles visu formæ. Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think these forms self-existent; things which matter may slip off, and fairly leave to themselves, Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicada. Lucr. iv. 56. They rather mean something, which, though differing from matter, can yet never subsist without it; something, which, united with it, helps to produce every composite being; that is to say, in other words, every natural substance in the visible world. It must be remembered however (as we have said before) that it is the form in this union, which is the source of all distinction. It is by this, that the ox is distinguished from the horse, not by that grass on which they subsist, the common matter to both. To which also may be added, that as figures and sensible qualities are the only objects of our sensations, and these all are parts of natural form; so therefore (contrary to the Nowhere, perhaps, is the force of organization more conspicuous, than when we perceive different grafts, upon the same tree, to produce different species of fruit. h Matter and attribute are essentially distinct; yet, like convex and concave, they are by nature inseparable. We have already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes: we now speak as to that of matter. Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν ὕλην τινὰ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν, àλλ' àel μet' èvavTiwσews: "We say, there is a certain matter belonging to all bodies, the objects of sense; a matter, not separable, but ever existing with some contrariety. Soon after : Αρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην ὑποθεμένους εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, τὴν ἀχώριστον μὲν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις : “ First, and for a principle, we lay down matter, which is inseparable from the contraries, and is their subject, or substratum. Arist. de Gen. et Corr. lib. ii. p. 34, 35. edit Sylb. By contraries, in this place, he means the several attributes of matter, such as hot and cold, black and white, moist and dry, &c., which are all of them contrary one to the other, from some or other of which matter is always inseparable. See note the second of this chapter. It is a uniform position in the physics of the old Peripatetics, ὅτι ἀχώριστα τὰ πάθη, "that the affections [of body] are inseparable from it." See Arist. Phys. 1. i. It is one thing to be a cube, another thing to be iron, or silver, or wood, or ivory. The cube is most evidently and certainly no one of these, yet is it absurd and impossible to suppose the cube should ever exist without one of these, or something similar to support See before, page 271. Pages 267, 273. it. i sentiment of the vulgar, who dream of nothing but of matter,) it is form which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, see, or feel; nor is mere matter any thing better, than an obscure imperfect being, knowable only to the reasoning faculty by the two methods already explained, I mean that of analogy, and that of abstraction.* Here therefore we conclude with respect to sensible forms; that is to say, forms immerged in matter, and ever inseparable from it. In these and matter we place the elements of natural substance, and thus finish the first part of the inquiry we proposed. m We are now to engage in speculations of another kind, and from the elements of natural substance to inquire after its efficient cause; that is to say, that cause which associates those elements, and which employs them, when associated, according to their various and peculiar characters. CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING FORM, CONSIDERED AS AN EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE. HARMONY IN NATURE BETWEEN THE LIVING AND THE LIFELESS. OVID, A PHILOSOPHICAL POET. FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF THE ANIMATING PRINCIPLE FROM ITS OPERATIONS, ENERGIES, AND EFFECTS. VIRGIL. THE ACTIVE AND THE PASSIVE PRINCIPLE RUN THROUGH THE UNIVERSE. MIND, REGION OF FORMS. CORPOREAL CONNECTIONS, WHERE NECESSARY, WHERE OBSTRUCTIVE. MEANS AND ENDS-THEIR DIFFERENT PRECEDENCE ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS EMPEDOCLES, LUCRETIUS, PRIOR, GALEN, CICERO, ARISTOTLE, ETC. PROVIDENCE. LET us suppose an artificial substance, for example a musical pipe, and let us suppose to this * See before, p. 271. 1 Elements are τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, "the inherent," or (if I may use the expression)"the in-existing causes," such as matter and form, of which we have been treating. There are other causes, such as the tribe of efficient causes, which cannot be called elements, because they make no part of the substances which they generate or produce. Thus the statuary is no part of his statue; the painter, of his picture. Hence it appears, that all elements are causes; but not all causes, elements. m Aristotle having reduced his three principles of natural productions to two, which two we have treated in this and the preceding chapter, adheres not so strictly to this reduction, but that he still admits the pipe the art of the piper to be three. Thus, in his Metaphysics, he tells us, ὅτι ἀρχαί εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη, “ that the form, the privation, and the matter, are three principles." He calls them elements, because they have no existence, but in the substance to which they belong. To these he adds the efficient cause, which as it exists externally, that is, without the subject, he will not for that reason allow to be an element. Hence he observes, σTE σTOIXEîa μèv τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέσσαρες, “ that the elements were three; the causes and principles were four." His instances are, health, the form; disease, the privation; the human body, the subject. In these three causes we have the elements: add to these causes the fourth, that is, the efficient, the |