must begin where they end, that is to say, from simple terms; because, if it were to begin sooner, it would begin in the middle; and because, if the resolutions did not stop somewhere, there could be no beginning at all. Now as to the subject, whence the disquisition is to begin, (I mean the contemplation of simple terms,) it is obvious it must be widely different from the several subjects that precede it. The preceding subjects, such as theorems, syllogisms, propositions, may all of them be resolved, because they are all of them compound: but terms cannot be resolved, because they are simple or single. The most we can do, as their multitude is large, is to seek after some method, by which they may be classed or arranged; and if different methods of arrangement occur, then to adopt, out of the several, that which appears to be the best. It being therefore adjusted, from what subject we are to begin, (namely, from simple or single terms,) and after what manner we are to begin, (namely, by classing or arranging them,) a further question occurs before we proceed, and that is, What is it that these terms represent? There seem but three classes possible, and these three are either words, or ideas, or things, that is to say, individuals. Now they cannot represent merely words, for then the treatise would be grammatical; nor yet merely ideas, for then the treatise would be metaphysical; nor yet merely things or individuals, for then the treatise would be physical. 66 θεωρία κατέληξε, καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τῆς πράξεως ἀρχή. Πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις. Εἰθ' οὕτω περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ῥημάτων, καὶ προτάσεως, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ερμηνείας· εἶτα περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ, ἐν τοῖς προτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς. εἶθ ̓ οὕτω περὶ ἀποδείξεως, ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς. Ενταῦθα οὖν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας : “ And thus also the philosopher does: being willing to form a demonstration, he says to himself, I am willing to speak concerning demonstration. But, inasmuch as demonstration is a scientific syllogism, it is impossible to say any thing concerning it, without first saying what is a syllogism; nor can we learn what is simply a syllogism, without having first learned what is a proposition: for propositions are certain sentences; and it is a collection of such sentences that forms a syllogism so that without knowing propositions, it is impossible to learn what is a syllogism, because it is out of these that a syllogism is compounded. Further than this, it is impossible to know a proposition, without knowing nouns and verbs, out of which is composed every species of sentence; or to know nouns or verbs without knowing sounds articulate, or simple words, inasmuch as each of these is a sound ar ticulate, having a meaning. It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, to say some thing concerning simple words.” Here, then, ends the theory, and it is this which becomes the beginning of the practice, (that is, from this last part the theory is to be carried into execution.) First, therefore, (with a view to the practical part,) he disserts concerning simple articulate sounds in his Predicaments: after that, concerning nouns, and verbs, and propositions, in his treatise concerning Interpretation: then, concerning syllogism, simply so called, in his first Analytics: and finally, concerning demonstration, in his latter Analytics. And here is the end of the practice, which end (as we have shewn above) was the beginning of the theory. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 16. ed. 8vo. We have made this large extract from Ammonius, not only as it fully explains the subject of this treatise, but as it gives a concise, and yet an elegant view of that celebrated work of Aristotle, his Organon, and of that just and accurate order in which its several parts stand arranged. How, then, shall we decide? Shall we deny that simple terms represent any one of these? Or shall we rather assume the contrary, and say they represent them all? If so, and this be, as it will appear, the more plausible hypothesis, we may affirm of simple terms, (the subject of this inquiry,) that they are words representing things, through the medium of our ideas.k That this, in fact, is their character, may appear from the many logical, metaphysical, and physical theorems, and to these (as man is a part of nature) we may add also ethical speculations, which are occasionally interspersed in the course of this inquiry.' But to return to our subject, the contemplation of simple terms. As they appear to be words, and not only words, but words which represent things through the medium of our ideas, it may not be improper to observe something upon the several objects thus represented, and that with respect both to their nature and to their multitude. As to their nature, (without being too philosophically minute,) it is enough to observe, that some of them are sensible objects, and some of them are intelligible; that the sensible are perceived by our several senses, and make up the tribe of external individuals that the intelligible are more immediately our own, and arise within us, when the mind, by marking what is common to many individuals, forms to itself a species; or, when by marking what is common to many species, it forms to itself a genus. * Ammonius, in his excellent Commentary upon these Predicaments of Aristotle, informs us, there were different sentiments of different philosophers as to the subject, concerning which these predicaments were conversant. Some, as Alexander of Aphrodiséum, confined them wholly to words: others, as Eustathius, wholly to things: a third set, of which was Porphyry, wholly to our thoughts or ideas. Ammonius appears to have supposed that they all erred, and that, not so much in the respective subjects they adopted, as in the restriction or limitation to one subject only. For this reason he immediately subjoins: Οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστι καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος, οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων, οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ ̓ ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα, διὰ μέσων vonμárov: "But those who speak more accurately, of which number Iamblichus is one, say that Aristotle discourses not upon ideas alone, nor upon words alone, nor upon things alone; but that the scope or end of his categories is, concerning words, signify ing things, through the medium of our thoughts or ideas." Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 14. 6. ed. 8vo. 1 Thus Boethius: Hæc quoque nobis de decem prædicamentis inspectio, et in physica Aristotelis doctrina, et in moralis philosophiæ cognitione perutilis est; quod per singula currentibus magis liquebit. Boeth. in Cat. p. 113. edit. fol. Basil. Ammonius speaks to the same purpose in fuller and more general terms: "Ori de χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὸ βιβλίον εἴς τε τὸ θεωρητι κδν φιλοσοφίας μέρος, καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν εδείξαμεν, ἄνευ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν οὐκ ἔστι γνῶναι, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν κοινοτήτων διαλαμβάνει, εἰς ἃ τὰ ὄντα πάντα διαιρεῖται : “ That the book is useful both to the speculative part of philosophy and the practical, is evident from what has been said, if it be true both that demonstration, as we have shewn, cannot be known without simple words, and that the book also treats concerning those common characters or attributes, into which all beings are divided." Ammon. in Præd. p. 16. edit. Venet. 8vo. Nor are these mental productions the mere efforts of art, the ingenious inventions of human sagacity; but, under the original guidance of pure nature, even children in their early days spontaneously fashion them, and spontaneously refer them to individuals as they occur, saying of this individual, it is a horse; of another, it is a dog; of a third, it is a sparrow.m If from the nature of these objects (which we have now supposed to be either sensible or intelligible) we pass to their multitude, we shall find the genera to be fewer than the species, and that from this plain reason, because many species are included within one genus; we shall find also the species to be fewer than the individuals, and that by parity of reason, because many individuals are included within one species. But as for individuals themselves, these we shall find to be truly infinite; and not only infinite, but changing every moment, as the old are incessantly perishing, the new incessantly arising. Yet it is these that compose that universe in which we exist; and without knowing something of these we may be considered as living like the Cimmerians in Homer, If, therefore, all science be something definite and steady, (for without this character it would not merit the name,) how can it possibly bear relation to such a multitude as this; a multitude in character so truly contrary to its own, a multitude everywhere fleeting, everywhere infinite and vague? How indeed should the fleeting be known steadily, or how should the vague and infinite be known definitely?" As this can hardly be supposed, it is for this reason that logic, which is justly called the organ or instrument of the sciences," m See Hermes, b. iii. c. 4. where the doctrine of general or universal ideas is discussed more largely. See also the Εἰσαγωγὴ, or Introduction of Porphyry, where the subject of genus and species is treated in a perspicuous and easy method. This tract is usually prefixed to Aristotle's Logic. " Οδυσσ. Λ. 15. • Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo comprehendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiæ fine concluditur: quare infinitorum scientia nulla est. Boeth. in Præd. p. 113. edit. Bas. Such was the doctrine of Boethius, who, according to the practice of the age in which he lived, united the Platonic and the Peripatetic philosophies. But Aristotle himself taught the same doctrine many centuries before. Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, ᾗ ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἄπει ρον, ἄγνωστον ποσόν τι τὸ δὲ κατ ̓ εἶδος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποιόν τι τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' είδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων, οὕτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν. Arist. Phys. 1. i. p. 12. edit. Sylb. "If therefore infinite, considered as infinite, be unknowable, then that which is infinite in multitude or magnitude is unknowable as to quantity, and that which is infinite in form is unknowable as to quality. But the principles being infinite both in multitude and in quality, it is impossible to know the beings derived out of them. For then it is we conceive that we know any being composite, when we know out of what things and how many things it is compounded." P The Stoics held logic to be a part of philosophy, the Peripatetics held it no more than an organ or instrument; Plato held it to be both, as well a part as an organ. His reasoning, according to Ammonius, was a has for its first employment to reduce infinitude; and this it does by establishing certain definitive arrangements, or classes, to some of which all particulars may be referred, however numerous, however diversified-the past, the present, the future, all alike. And thus we return to classing and arranging, the process already suggested to be the proper one. It remains to inquire, whether there are more methods of arrangement than one; and if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer. But this will be the subject of the following chapter. CHAPTER II. AN A METHOD OF ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED REJECTED, AND WHY. ONE method of arrangement is as follows: The multitude of ideas treasured up in the human mind, and which, bearing reference to things, are expressed by words, may be arranged and circumscribed under the following characters. They all denote either substance or attribute; and substance and attribute may be each of them modified under the different characters of universal and particular, as best befits the purposes of reasoning and science. Thus man is an universal substance; Alexander, à particular one; valour, an universal attribute; the valour of Alexander, a particular one. And hence there arises a quadruple arrangement of terms; an arrangement of them into substance universal, and substance particular; into attribute universal, and attribute particular; to some one of which four, not only our words and our ideas, but the innumerable tribe of individuals may all of them be reduced. follows: Καθάπερ γάρ φησιν ὁ ξέστης διττὸς, ὁ μὲν μετρών, δὲ μετρούμενος, καὶ ὁ μὲν μετρῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς μετρήσεως, δ δὲ μετρούμενος μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ὑγροῦ. ὡσαν τως καὶ ἡ λογικὴ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσα, ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας, συμβι βαζομένη δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι, μέρος ἐστι τῆς piλooopías. "As the quart, says he, is twofold, one that which measures, the other that which is measured; and as that which measures is the organ of mensuration, that which is measured the part of some whole or entire fluid in like manner also, logic, when taken apart from things, is an organ of philosophy; when connected with them, is a part of philosophy." Thus Ammonius on the Categories, p. 8. where we may find also the reasonings both of the Stoics and the Peripatetics. This method may be found in the beginning of Aristotle's Predicaments, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the predicaments themselves. See Aristot. Prædic. p. 23. edit. Sylb. Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένου κ.τ.λ. The Stagirite, in giving this quadruple arrangement, explains himself not by names, but by descriptions. Substance universal he describes as follows: KaÐ ÚTOKELμÉVOv τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δ ̓ οὐδενί ἐστι: attribute particular, év vπokeiμévų μév éOTI, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται : attribute general, Kαð úжоKEĻμÉVOU TE λÉYEται, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν: substances particular, ouтe év úτokeμévy dotiv, oŭte καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται. A large reduction this, yet a reduction which may possibly lead us into another extreme, by rendering that multitude, which we would confine, too limited, too abridged. Suppose, therefore, we were to inquire whether this reduction might not be enlarged, and a second and more perfect method than the last be established. The world, as we see, is filled with various substances. Each of these possesses its proper attributes, and is at the same time encompassed with certain circumstantials. Not to speak of intelligible substances, (which belong rather to metaphysics,) natural substances appear all to be extended; nor that simply, but under a certain external figure, and internal organization. A lion and an oak agree, as they are both extended; yet have they each a figure and organization peculiar. A living lion and a brazen lion may have the same external figure, but within there is a wide difference, from the possession of organization on one side, and the want of it on the other. If then we call the attribute of extension quantity, that of figure and organization quality, we may set down these two (I mean quantity and quality) as the two great essential attributes belonging to every substance, whether natural or artificial. Again: every substance, whether natural or artificial, either from will or from appetite, or, where these are wanting, from such lower causes as its figure or mere quantity has (in an enlarged use of the words) a power to act. Thus it is through will that men study, through appetite that brutes eat, through its figure that the clock goes, and through its quantity that the stone descends. Nor are they only thus capable of acting, but also of being acted upon; and that, too, each of them, according to its respective character. The mind is acted upon by truth, the appetite by pleasure, the clock by a spring, and the stone by gravitation. Thus, then, besides quantity and quality, we have found two other attributes, common to all substances, and these are action and passion. Again: it often happens when substances are not present to us, that we are desirous to know when and where they existed: When, we ask, lived Homer? Where, we ask, stood the ancient Memphis? In the answer to these questions we learn the time and place which circumscribed the existence of these beings. Now as all sensible substances are circumscribed after these manners, hence we may consider the when and the where as two circumstantials that inseparably attend them. And thus have we added two more attributes to the number already established. Further still in contemplating where things exist, we are Those who would see an explanation of those several descriptions, and why Aristotle prefers them to their peculiar names, may consult his Greek commentator, Ammonius, and his Latin one, Boethius, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the subject. |