and groves, and gardens, and plantations; cottages, villages, castles, towns; palaces, temples, and spacious cities. "Nor does thy empire end in subjects thus inanimate. Its power also extends through the various race of animals, who either patiently submit to become thy slaves, or are sure to find thee an irresistible foe. The faithful dog, the patient ox, the generous horse, and the mighty elephant, are content all to receive their instructions from thee, and readily to lend their natural instincts or strength, to perform those offices which thy occasions call for. If there be found any species which are serviceable when dead, thou suggestest the means to investigate and take them. If any be so savage as to refuse being tamed, or of natures fierce enough to venture an attack, thou teachest us to scorn their brutal rage; to meet, repel, pursue, and conquer. "And such, O Art! is thy amazing influence, when thou art employed only on these inferior subjects; on natures inanimate, or, at best, irrational. But whenever thou choosest a subject more noble, and settest to the cultivating of Mind itself, then it is thou becomest truly amiable and divine; the ever-flowing source of those sublimer beauties of which no subject but Mind alone is capable. Then it is thou art enabled to exhibit to mankind the admired tribe of poets and of orators; the sacred train of patriots and of heroes; the godlike list of philosophers and legislators; the forms of virtuous and equal polities, where private welfare is made the same with public; where crowds themselves prove disinterested and brave, and virtue is made a national and popular characteristic. "Hail! sacred source of all these wonders! Thyself instruct me to praise thee worthily, through whom, whatever we do is done with elegance and beauty; without whom, what we do is ever graceless and deformed. Venerable power! By what name shall I address thee? Shall I call thee Ornament of Mind; or art thou more truly Mind itself? It is Mind thou art, most perfect Mind; not rude, untaught, but fair and polished: in such thou dwellest, of such thou art the form; nor is it a thing more possible to separate thee from such, than it would be to separate thee from thy own existence." My good friend was now arrived to a very exalted pitch, and was pursuing his panegyric with great warmth and fluency, when we entered the suburbs, our walk being near finished. The people, as we went along, began to look at us with surprise; which I, who was less engaged, having leisure to observe, thought it was proper to admonish my friend, that he should give over. He immediately ceased reading; put his papers up; and thanked me for stopping him at so seasonable a time. VI. What remained of our discourse passed off with less rapture, and was, indeed, no more than a kind of short recapitulation. 66 He observed to me, that our inquiries had furnished out an answer to four different questions. For thus, said he, if it be asked us, What Art is? We have to answer, It is an habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some effect, according to a system of various and well-approved precepts." If it be asked us, On what subject art operates? We can answer, "On a contingent which is within the reach of the human powers to influence." If it be asked us, For what reason, for the sake of what, art operates? We may reply, "For the sake of some absent good, relative to human life, and attainable by man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed faculties." Lastly, if it be asked, Where it is the operations of art end? We may say, "Either in some energy, or in some work." He added, that if he were not afraid of the imputation of pedantry, he could be almost tempted to say, that we had been considering art, with respect to those four causes, so celebrated once among professors in the schools. By these, upon inquiry, I found that he meant certain causes, called the efficient,' the material, the final, and the formal." r Page 8. • Page 11. * Page 16. " That is to say, τὸ κινήσαν, ἡ Ὕλη, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ Είδος. Thus Seneca, in his 65th epistle: Causam Aristoteles putat tribus modis dici. Prima, inquit, causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici. Secunda, opifex. Tertia, forma quæ unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam statuæ ; nam hanc Aristoteles idos (είδος) vocat. Quarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, propositum totius operis. Quid sit hoc, aperiam. As prima statuæ causa est: nunquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo ea funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda causa, artifex est: non potuisset enim æs illud in habitum statuæ figurari, nisi accessissent peritæ manus. Tertia causa est forma: neque enim statua ista Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, nisi hæc illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est, faciendi propositum: nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. Quid est propositum? Quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit. Vel pecunia est hoc, si venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen ; vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo et hæc causa est, propter quam fit. An non putas inter causas facti operis numerandum, quo remoto factum non esset. Aristotle's own words are as follow: Ενα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος· οἷον, ὁ χαλκός τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος της φιάλης, καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. Αλλον δὲ, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τὶ ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἑν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Ετι, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως· οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας, αἴτιον· καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, τοῦ τέκνου καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. Ετι, ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ υγίεια· διὰ τὶ γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόν τες οὕτως, οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. "In one manner that may be called a cause, out of which, existing as a part of it, any thing is made or compounded. Thus is brass the cause of a statue, silver of a cup, and so also the higher genera, in which these are included, [as metal, the genus including brass and silver; body, the genus including metal, &c. &c.] In another way, the form and exemplar of any thing is its cause; that is to say, in other words, the definition, the detail or narrative of its essence, [that which, characterizing it to be such a particular thing, distinguishes it from all things else,] and of this definition the several higher genera. Thus the cause of the diapason, or octave, is the proportion of two to one; and more generally than that, is number; and is moreover the several parts, out of which this definition is formed. Add to this cause, that other, from whence But here, without further explaining, he begged for the present that we might conclude, being sufficiently, as he said, fatigued with the length of what had passed already. The request was reasonable, I could not but own; and thus ended our conversation, and soon after it our walk. the original principle of change, or of ceasing to change; as, for instance, the person who deliberates, is the cause of that which results from such deliberation; the father is the cause of the son; and, in general, the efficient, of the thing effected; the power changing, of the thing changed. Besides these causes, there is that also which is considered as the end; that is to say, the cause, for the sake of which the thing is A DISCOURSE ON MUSIC, PAINTING, AND POETRY. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. DESIGN AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WHOLE. ALL arts have this in common, that they respect human life. Some contribute to its necessities, as medicine and agriculture; others to its elegance, as music, painting, and poetry. Now, with respect to these two different species, the necessary arts seem to have been prior in time; if it be probable, that * The following extract from a manuscript of Philoponus may help to shew the comparative priority of arts and sciences, by shewing (according to this author) the order of their revival in a new-formed society. Such society he supposes to have arisen from scattered individuals again assembling themselves, after former societies had, by various incidents of war, famine, inundation, and the like, been dissipated and destroyed. Having spoken of the effects of Deucalion's food, he proceeds as follows: Οὗτοι οὖν οἱ περιλειφθέντες, μὴ ἔχοντες ὅθεν ἂν τραφεῖεν, ἐπενόουν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς χρείαν, οἷον τὸ ἀλήθειν μύλαις σῖτον, ἢ τὸ σπείρειν, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο· καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐξευρίσκου σαν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπινενοηκότα. Πάλιν ἐπενόησαν τέχνας, ὡς φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς, ... ὑποθημοσύνῃσιν Αθήνης, οὐ μόνον τὰς μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνάγκῆς ἱσταμένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀστείου προϊούσας· καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν σοφίαν κεκλήκασιν, καὶ τὸν εὑρόντα σοφόν ὡς τὸν σοφὸς ἤραρε τέκτων, Εὐ εἰδὼς σοφίης . . . τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν εὑρημάτων εἰς θεὸν τὴν τούτων ἐπίνοιαν ἀνέφερον. Πάλιν, ἀπέβλεψαν πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἐξεύρον νόμους, καὶ πάντα τὰ συνιστῶντα τὰς πόλεις· καὶ ταύτην πάλιν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν ἐκάλεσαν· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ ἑπτὰ σοφοί, πολιτικὰς τινὰς ἀρετὰς εὑρόντες. Εἶτα λοιπὸν, ὁδῷ προϊόντες, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὴν δημιουργὸν αὐτῶν προῆλθον φύσιν, καὶ ταύτην εἰδικώτερον φυσικὴν ἐκάλεσαν θεωρίαν, καὶ σοφοὺς τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην μετιόντας σκέψιν. Τελευταῖον δ' ἐπ' αὐτὰ λοιπὸν ἔφθασαν τὰ θεῖα, καὶ ὑπερκόσμια, καὶ ἀμετάβλητα παντελῶς, καὶ τὴν τούτων Γνῶσιν κυριωτά την σοφίαν ὠνόμασαν. “ These, therefore, that were thus left, not having whence they could support themselves, began through necessity to contrive things relative to immediate want, such as the grinding of corn by mills, or the sowing it, or something else of like kind; and such contrivance, discovering what was conducive to the necessaries of life, they called wisdom ; and him a wise man, who had been the contriver. “ Again, they contrived arts (as Homer says) By precepts of Minerva; ὑποθημοσύνῃσι δ' Αθήνης εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ διὰ that is, not only those arts that stop at the men consulted how to live and to support themselves, before they began to deliberate how to render life agreeable. Nor is necessity of life, but those also that advance as far as the fair and elegant: and this, too, they called wisdom; and the inventor, a wise man. Thus the poet: The work 'Twas a wise artist fram'd, his wisdom taught By precepts of Minerva. The last words are added, because, from the transcendence of the inventions, they referred their contrivance to a divinity. "Again, they turned their eyes to matters political, and found out laws, and the several things that constitute cities, or civil communities and this contrivance in its turn they called wisdom, and of this sort were those celebrated seven wise men, the inventors of certain virtues political. "After this, still advancing in a road, they proceeded to corporeal substances, and to nature, their efficient cause; and this speculation, by a more specific name, they called natural speculation, and those persons wise, who pursued such inquiries. "Last of all, they attained even to beings divine, supramundane, and wholly unchangeable; and the knowledge of these they named the most excellent wisdom." A few observations on this important passage may not perhaps be improper. Our first observation is, that though we give it from Philoponus, yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken from a work of Aristocles, an ancient Peripatetic, entitled, Пepi iλoσopías, "Concerning Philosophy." Some, indeed, have conjectured, that for Aristocles, we ought to read Aristoteles, because the last published a work under this title, which he quotes himself in his treatise De Anima. Be this as it may, the extract itself is valuable, not only for its matter, but for being the fragment of a treatise now no longer extant. Our next observation is, that by "matters political," in the third paragraph, the author means, not the first associations of mankind, for these were prior to almost every thing else, and were not referable to art, but to the innate impulse of the social principle: he means, on the contrary, those more exquisite and artificial forms, given to societies already established, in order to render them happy, and rescue and preserve them from tyrannic power. Such was the polity given by Lycurgus to the Lacedæmonians, by Solon to the Athenians, by Numa to the Romans, &c. Those great and good men, in meditating their institutions, had the same sentiment with Alcidamas, according to that noble fragment of his, preserved in the scholiast upon Aristotle's Rhetoric, Ελευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα douλov ǹ púσis tetoinkev, “God hath sent forth all men free; nature hath made no man a slave." Our third observation is, that by "the most excellent science," in the last paragraph, is meant the science of causes, and, above all others, of causes efficient and final, as these necessarily imply pervading reason, and superintending wisdom. This science, as men were naturally led to it from the contemplation of effects, which effects were the tribe of beings atural or physical, was, from being thus subsequent to these physical inquiries, called metaphysical; but with a view to itself, and the transcendent eminence of its object, was more properly called ʼn #рúτn piλoσopía, "the first philosophy." Our fourth observation is on the order of these inventions; namely, arts necessary, arts elegant, arts political, science physical, science metaphysical; in all, five habits, or modes of wisdom. The necessary arts it is evident must on all accounts have come first. When these were once established, the transition to the elegant was easy and obvious. Inventions of necessity, by the superadditions of despatch, facility, and the like, soon ripened into inventions of convenience; and again these, having in their very nature a certain beauty and grace, easily suggested inventions of pure and simple elegance. That the legislators, though in rank and genius far superior to all natural philosophers, should come before them in point of time, is owing to the nature of their subject, which had a more immediate connection with man, and human happiness. It was not, indeed, till societies were thoroughly established, and peace had been well secured both internally and externally, that men had leisure, or even inclination, to reflect on the objects round them, or to recognise that vast mansion in which they found themselves existing. Lastly, as the tremendous part of physical events led weak minds, who could not resolve them, into the abyss of dark and dreary superstition; so those of the same kind, which had beauty and order, being in their turn equally striking, and equally objects of admiration, led strong and generous minds into principles the very reverse. They conceived it probable, as their own views were limited, that, even where beauty and order were not to them apparent, they might still in others' views have a most real existence. Further, as these observers could |