ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that mind was coeval with body, yet till body gave it ideas, and awakened its dormant powers, it could at best have been nothing more than a sort of dead capacity; for innate ideas it could not possibly have any. At another time we hear of bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very exility makes them susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrunk into intellect by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as subtle æther, animal spirits, nervous ducts, vibrations, and the like; terms which modern philosophy, upon parting with occult qualities, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place. But the intellectual scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental cause. It is here it looks for the origin of intelligible ideas, even of those which exist in human capacities. For though sensible objects may be the destined medium to awaken the dormant energies of man's understanding, yet are those energies themselves no more contained in sense, than the explosion of a cannon in the spark which gave it fire.° • The following note is taken from a manuscript commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted before, p. 224,) upon the Phædo of Plato; which though perhaps some may object to from inclining to the doctrine of Platonic reminiscence, yet it certainly gives a better account, how far the senses assist in the acquisition of science, than we can find given by vulgar philosophers. Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χείρω καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ ἡ αἰτίαι εἰσὶ τῶν κρειττόνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις ἐξηγήσεσι πείθεσθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ ̓ ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλουκατὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι ̓ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορισάμεθα γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνούμεθα. “ Those things which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the principles or causes of the more excellent; and though we admit the common interpretations, and allow sense to be a principle of science, we must, however, call it a principle, not as if it was the efficient cause, but as it rouses our soul to the recollection of general ideas. According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the sight and hearing we 66 acquire to ourselves philosophy, because we pass from objects of sense to reminiscence, or recollection." 66 And in another passage he observes: Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἄγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐριθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεται ὧν ἔνδον ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τούτους προβάλλεται: “ For inasmuch as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense, it recollects those principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.” Georgius Gemistius, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner: Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ εἴδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσαν ἔσγε ἐπιστήμην τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτοὺς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώ τερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἴσχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ οὖν τελεώτερον τοῦτο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον οὐκ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴσχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μηδαμοῦ ἀλλόθι ἂν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι· οὐ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μηδαμῇ ὄν, τι διανοεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν οὐχὶ μὴ ὄντων ἀλλ ̓ ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ ̓ ἄλλων εἶναι συνθέσεις τινὰς, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν γινομένας. Λείπεσθαι δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρας τινὸς φύσεως πολλῷ ἔτι κρείττονός τε καὶ τελεωτέρας In short, all minds that are, are similar and congenial; and so too are their ideas, or intelligible forms. Were it otherwise, there could be no intercourse between man and man, or (what is more important) between man and God. For what is conversation between man and man? It is a mutual intercourse of speaking and hearing. To the speaker, it is to teach; to the hearer, it is to learn. To the speaker, it is to descend from ideas to words; to the hearer, it is to ascend from words to ideas. If the hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at no ideas, then is he said not to understand; if he ascend to ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said to misunderstand. What then is requisite, that he may be said to understand? That he should ascend to certain ideas, treasured up within himself, correspondent and similar to those within the speaker. The same may be said of a writer and a reader; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid wrote in Greece two thousand years ago. Now, is it not marvellous, there should be so exact an identity of our ideas, if they were only generated from sensible objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in time, distant in place, and no one particular the same with any other? double, sesquialter, &c.) but,in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical lines, angles, figures, &c.; of all which λóyol, or 66 proportions," though we possess in the mind the most clear and precise ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible world. Again: do we allow it possible for God to signify his will to men, or for men to signify their wants to God? In both these cases there must be an identity of ideas, or else nothing is done, either one way or the other. Whence, then, do these common ἀφήκειν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελεώτερον τοῦτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀισθητοῖς λόγων. "Those who suppose ideal forms, say that the soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of science, those proportions which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior perfection or accuracy, the soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is, in fact, not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence anywhere else. For the soul is not formed so as to conceive that which has existence nowhere, since even such opinions as are false, are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere non-beings, but of various real beings, one with another. It remains, therefore, that this perfection, which is superior to the proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the soul from some other nature, which is by many degrees more excellent and perfect." Pleth. de Aristotel. et Platonic. Philosoph. Diff. edit. Paris. 1541. The λόγοι, or 66 proportions," " of which Gemistius here speaks, mean not only those relative proportions of equality and inequality which exist in quantity, (such as To these two authors we may add Boethius, who, after having enumerated many acts of the mind, or intellect, wholly distinct from sensation, and independent of it, at length concludes, Hæc est efficiens magis Præcedit tamen excitans, De Consolat. Philosoph. 1. v. identic ideas come? Those of men, it seems, come all from sensation. And whence come God's ideas? Not, surely, from sensation too for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to body that notable precedence of being prior to the intellection of even God himself. Let them, then, be original; let them be connate and essential to the Divine Mind: if this be true, is it not a fortunate event, that ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects so totally distinct,) should so happily coincide in the same wonderful identity? Had we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a subject? Either all minds have their ideas derived, or all have them original; or some them have them original, and some derived. If all minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, which is itself not mind, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of atheism. If all have them original, then are all minds divine; an hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must one mind (at least) have original ideas, and the rest have them derived. Now, supposing this last, whence are those minds, whose ideas are derived, most likely to derive them? From mind or from body? From mind, a thing homogeneous; or from body, a thing heterogeneous? From mind, such as (from the hypothesis) has original ideas; or from body, which we cannot discover to have any ideas at all?P An examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the doctrine of the Epicurean poet, Corporea natura animum constare, animamque ; or trust the Mantuan bard, when he sings, in divine numbers, Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo Seminibus. But it is now time to quit these speculations. Those who would trace them further, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter. · Νοῦν δὲ οὐδὲν σῶμα γεννᾶ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα νοῦν γεννήσοι; “Nobody produces mind: for how should things de void of mind produce mind ? Sallust. de Diis et Mundo, c. 8. CHAPTER V. SUBORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE. DIFFERENCE OF IDEAS, BOTH IN PARTICULAR MEN AND IN WHOLE NATIONS. DIFFERENT GENIUS OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGES. CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH, THE ORIENTAL, THE LATIN, AND THE GREEK LANGUAGES. SUPERLATIVE EXCELLENCE OF THE LAST. CONCLUSION. ORIGINAL truth having the most intimate connexion with the Supreme Intelligence, may be said (as it were) to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the universe every possible subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent, indeed, its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the sun; but itself neither admits diminution nor change, because the darkness respects only particular percipients. Among these, therefore, we must look for ignorance and error, and for that subordination of intelligence which is their natural consequence. We have daily experience in the works of art, that a partial knowledge will suffice for contemplation, though we know not enough to profess ourselves artists. Much more is this true with respect to nature; and well for mankind is it found to be true, else never could we attain any natural knowledge at all. For if the constitutive proportions of a clock are so subtle, that few conceive them truly but the artist himself; what shall we say to those seminal proportions, which make the essence and Those philosophers, whose ideas of being and knowledge are derived from body and sensation, have a short method to explain the nature of truth. It is a factitious thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance the last of any, being not only subsequent to sensible objects, but even to our sensations of them. According to this hypothesis, there are many truths which have been, and are no longer; others that will be, and have not been yet; and multitudes that possibly may never exist at all. But there are other reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those, I mean, who represent truth, not as the last, but the first of beings; who call it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; attributes that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine that a crude account of the method how they perceive truth was to pass for an ac count of truth itself; as if to describe the road to London could be called a description of that metropolis. For my own part, when I read the detail about sensation and reflection, and am taught the process at large how my ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human soul in the light of a crucible, where truths are produced by a kind of logical chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of natural materials, but are as much creatures of our own as a bolus or elixir. If Milton by his Urania intended to represent truth, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin. Heavenly born! Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd, Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse, Wisdom thy sister; and with her didst play In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd With thy celestial song. Paradise Lost, vii. See Prov. viii. 22, &c. Jer. x. 10. Marc. Antonin. ix. 1. character of every natural subject? Partial views, the imperfections of sense; inattention, idleness, the turbulence of passions; education, local sentiments, opinions, and belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with ideas; some too general, some too partial, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are erroneous, and contrary to truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination. Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν. And thus, by a connexion perhaps little expected, the cause of letters and that of virtue appear to coincide; it being the business of both to examine our ideas, and to amend them by the standard of nature and of truth." In this important work we shall be led to observe, how nations, like single men, have their peculiar ideas; how these peculiar ideas become the genius of their language, since the symbol must of course correspond to its archetype; how the wisest nations, having the most and best ideas, will consequently have the best and most copious languages; how others, whose languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different arts and practices, discover by words to whom they are indebted for things. To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. We Britons in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our multiform language may sufficiently shew. Our terms in polite literature prove, that this came from Greece; our terms in music and painting, that these came from Italy; our phrases in cookery and war, that we learnt these from the French; and our phrases in navigation, that we were taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. These many and very different sources of our language may be the cause why it is so deficient in regularity and analogy. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect, that what we want in elegance we gain in copiousness; in which last respect few languages will be found superior to our own. Let us pass from ourselves to the nations of the East. The eastern world," from the earliest days, has been at all times the How useful to ethic science, and, indeed, to knowledge in general, a grammatical disquisition into the etymology and meaning of words was esteemed by the chief and ablest philosophers, may be seen by consulting Plato in his Cratylus; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 5, 6. Arrian. Εpict. i. 17. ii. 10. Marc. Anton. iii. 11. v. 8. x. 8. * Ηθοῦς χαρακτηρ ἔστι τ ̓ ἀνθρώπου λόyos. Stob. Capiuntur signa haud levia, sed observatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putarit) de ingeniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. vi. 1. Vid. etiam. Quinctil. 1. xi. p. 675. edit. Capperon. Diog. 1. i. p. 58. et Men. Com. Tusc. Disp. v. 16. It is well observed by Muretus, Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quæsierunt. Var. Lect. vi. 1. * Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη οἱ μὲν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν ̓Ασίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομέ νουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, οὐδὲν δυσχε palvovτes. "For the Barbarians, by being more slavish in their manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic government without murmuring or discontent." Arist. Polit. iii. 4. |