thing peculiar; of something common, and belonging to many other things; and of something peculiar, by which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

Hence language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a fountain, or the dashings of a cataract, has in common this, that, like them, it is a sound. But then, on the contrary, it has in peculiar this, that whereas those sounds have no meaning or signification, to language a meaning or signification is essential. Again, language, if compared to the voice of irrational animals, has in common this, that, like them, it has a meaning. But then it has this in peculiar to distinguish it from them, that whereas the meaning of those animal sounds is derived from nature, that of language is derived, not from nature, but from compact.d

From hence it becomes evident, that language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain sounds, having certain meanings; and that of these two principles, the sound is as the matter, common (like other matter) to many different things; the meaning as that peculiar and characteristic form, by which the nature or essence of language becomes complete.

that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxta-position, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate coincidence, complete in the minutest part; that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both matter and form, and these as perfectly united as before the division began: lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the beings which they constitute; the matter being to be found in the world at large; the form, if artificial, pre-existing within the artificer, or if natural, within the Supreme Cause, the sovereign artist of the universe.

Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable substances, the form pre-existing in their immediate generating cause; oak being the parent of oak, lion of lion, man of man, &c. Cicero's account of these principles is as follows:

MATTER.

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. i. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. Has rerum formas appellat ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: cætera nasci occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

d The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their definitions, as well of words as of sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant kaтà σvν0ýênν, “ by compact." See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the words karà σUVOnny, “ad placitum,” or “secundum placitum," and thus explains them in his comment: Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res a natura est, ita quoque a natura veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

CHAPTER II.

UPON THE MATTER, OR COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE.

THE λn, or "matter of language," comes first to be considered; a subject which order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ὕλη, or "matter," is sound; and sound is that sensation peculiar to the sense of hearing, when the air hath felt a percussion adequate to the producing such effect."

As the causes of this percussion are various, so from hence sound derives the variety of its species.

Further, as all these causes are either animal or inanimate, so the two grand species of sounds are likewise animal or inanimate.

There is no peculiar name for sound inanimate; nor even for that of animals, when made by the trampling of their feet, the fluttering of their wings, or any other cause, which is merely accidental. But that which they make by proper organs, in consequence of some sensation or inward impulse, such animal sound is called a voice.

As language therefore implies that sound called human voice, we may perceive that to know the nature and powers of the human voice, is in fact to know the matter or common subject of language.

Now the voice of man, and it should seem of all other animals, is formed by certain organs between the mouth and the lungs, and which organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The lungs furnish air, out of which the voice is formed; and the mouth, when the voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

What these vocal organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by philosophers and anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the mouth, and can therefore (as well as breathing) find a passage through the nose, when the mouth is so far stopped, as to prevent the least utterance. Now pure and simple voice, being thus produced, is (as before

• This appears to be Priscian's meaning when he says of a voice, what is more properly true of sound in general, that it is, suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod proprie auribus accidit. Lib. i. p. 537.

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of sound to an undulation in the air propagated circularly, as when we drop a stone into a cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any:

Ακούειν δὲ, τοῦ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος αέρος πληττομένου σφαιpοειδῶς, εἶτα κυματουμένου, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τοῦ uẞAn@évtos xíðov: “Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitatur lapide." Diog. Laert. vii.

was observed) transmitted to the mouth. Here, then, by means of certain different organs, which do not change its primary qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the form or character of articulation. For articulation is in fact nothing else, than that form or character, acquired to simple voice, by means of the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue, the lips, &c. The voice is not by articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft, (which are its primary qualities,) but it acquires to these characters certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them.f

The simplest of these new characters are those acquired through the mere openings of the mouth, as these openings differ in giving the voice a passage. It is the variety of configurations in these openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several vowels; and hence it is they derive their name, by being thus eminently vocal, and easy to be sounded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate forms, which the mouth makes not by mere openings, but by different contacts of its different parts;

f The several organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of speech, but those very different ones likewise of mastication and respiration ; so frugal is nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in vain.

He that would be informed how much better the parts here mentioned are framed for discourse in man, who is a discursive animal, than they are in other animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his treatise de Animal. Part. lib. ii. c. 17; lib. iii. c. 1. 3. De Anima, lib. ii. c. 8. s. 23, &c.

And here, by the way, if such inquirer be of a genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for ancient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the vanity of his contemporaries, who dream all philosophy to be the invention of their own age, knowing nothing of those ancients still remaining for their perusal, though they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to themselves.

The following account from Ammonius will shew whence the notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish voice from mere sound ; and articulate voice from simple voice.

Καὶ ψόφος μέν ἐστι πληγὴ ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ· φωνὴ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμψυχου γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τοῦ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλουμένῃ

τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώᾳ, ἤτοι τῷ γαργαρεώνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἦχον αἰσθητὸν, κατά τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλουμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, οἷον αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν τὴν διάλεκτον ἀναγκαίων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁπλῶς φωνὴν οὐ πάντως συμBaλλoμérov: "Estque sonus, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo μ

vevrà a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant." Ammon. in lib. De Interpr. p. 25. B.

Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. sect. 626. 630.

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word pwv, to denote sound in general. They defined it therefore to be, rò totov àσontov axons, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the note preceding. Animal sound they defined to be, ἀὴρ, ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος. “ air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse ;” and human or rational sound, they defined, ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπο μένη, “ sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty.” Diog. Laert. vii. 55. 8 Φωνήεντα.

66

P

such, for instance, as it makes by the junction of the two lips, of the tongue with the teeth, of the tongue with the palate, and the like.

Now as all these several contacts, unless some opening of the mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion silence, than to produce a voice; hence it is, that with some such opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the articulations so produced are called consonant, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary vowel.

There are other subordinate distinctions of these primary articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common name of element, inasmuch as every articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their smallest combination they produce a syllable; syllables properly combined produce a word; words properly combined produce a sentence; and sentences properly combined produce an oration or discourse.

And thus it is, that to Η Σύμφωνα.

The Stoic definition of an element is as follows: ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναAVETAL: "an element is that out of which, as their first principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved." Diog. Laert. vii. 176. What Aristotle says upon elements, with respect to the subject here treated, is worth attending to: φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει AUTŵy: "the elements of articulate voice are those things out of which the voice is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the elements themselves being no further divisible into other articulate voices, differing in species from them." Metaph. v. c. 3.

The Egyptians paid divine honours to the inventor of letters, and regulator of language, whom they called Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped under the name of Hermes, and represented commonly by a head alone without other limbs, standing upon a quadrilateral basis. The head itself was that of a beautiful youth, having on it a petasus, or bonnet, adorned with two wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this figure to the 'Epuns λoyos, “the Hermes of language or discourse." He possessed no other part of the human figure but the head,

because no other was deemed requisite to rational communication. Words, at the same time, the medium of this communication, being (as Homer well describes them) жεа πтероÉνта, "winged words," were represented in their velocity by the wings of his bonnet.

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the front of his basis (the usual place for inscriptions) adorned with some old alphabet, and having a veil fung across, by which that alphabet is partly covered. Let a youth be seen drawing off this veil; and a nymph, near the youth, transcribing what she there discovers.

Such a design would easily indicate its meaning. The youth we might imagine to be the genius of man, (naturæ Deus humanæ, as Horace styles him ;) the nymph to be μvnuoσúvn, or “memory;" as much as to insinuate that "man, for the preservation of his deeds and inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to letters; and that memory, being conscious of her own insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an acquisition."

As to Hermes, his history, genealogy, mythology, figure, &c. vid. Platon. Phileb. vol. ii. p. 18. edit. Serran. Diod. Sic. l. i. Horat. od. x. 1. 1. Hesiod. Theog. v. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucyd. vi. 27. et Scholiast. in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. Thesaur. vol. ix. p. 1164.

For the value and importance of princi

about twenty plain elementary sounds, we owe that variety of articulate voices, which have been sufficient to explain the sentiments of so innumerable a multitude, as all the present and past generations of men.

It appears, from what has been said, that the matter or common subject of language is that species of sounds called voices articulate.

What remains to be examined in the following chapter, is language under its characteristic and peculiar form, that is to say, language considered, not with respect to sound, but to meaning.

CHAPTER III.

UPON THE FORM, OR PECULIAR CHARACTER, OF LANGuage.

WHEN to any articulate voice there accedes by compact a meaning or signification, such voice by such accession is then called a word; and many words, possessing their significations (as it were) under the same compact,' unite in constituting a particular language.