ρίτης,

pirns, "the Stagyrite," meant Aristotle; not that there were not many poets beside Homer, and many Stagyrites beside Aristotle, but none equally illustrious for their poetry and philosophy.

It is on a like principle that Aristotle tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν, or, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ȧyalov, that "pleasure is a good," or "the good." The first only makes it a common object of desire, upon a level with many others which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it that supreme and sovereign good, the ultimate scope of all our actions and endeavours.f

But to pursue our subject. It has been said already, that the article has no meaning but when associated to some other word. To what words then may it be associated? To such as require defining, for it is by nature a definitive. And what words are these? Not those which already are as definite as may be. Nor yet those which, being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those which, though indefinite, are yet capable, through the article, of becoming definite.

Upon these principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, o ey, “the I," or ò où, "the thou," because nothing can make those pronouns more definite than they are." The same may be asserted of proper names: and though the Greeks say, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Ξάνθιππη, and the like, yet the article is a mere pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in Greek oi àμpoтépot, or in English, "the both," because these words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them further would be quite superfluous. Thus, if it be said, "I have read both poets,' this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; dvàs éyvwoμévn, “a known duad," as Apollonius expresses himself," when he speaks of this subject. On the contrary, if it be said, "I have read two poets," this may mean any pair out of all that ever existed. And hence this numeral, being in this sense indefinite, (as indeed are all others, as well as itself,) is forced to assume the article, whenever it would become definite. And thus it is, the two in English, and oi dvò denotes Euripides by the phrase & months, once at the end of the seventh book of his Nicomachian Ethics, and again in his Physics, l. ii. 2. Plato, also, in his tenth book of Laws, (p. 901. edit. Serr.) denotes Hesiod after the same manner.

the article doth not associate." 1. ii. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of pronouns, Távη dè— où èidéxovтai apepov. 1. iv. Priscian says the same: Jure igitur apud Græcos prima et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativæ sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. l. xii. p. 938. In the beginning of the same book, he gives the true reason of this: Supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas pronomen.

h Apollon. 1. i. c. 16.

This explains Servius on Æneid. xii. 511, where he tells us that duorum is put for

in Greek, mean nearly the same thing as both or ȧupoтépoi. Hence also it is, that as two, when taken alone, has reference to some primary and indefinite perception, while the article the, has reference to some secondary and definite; hence, I say, the reason why it is bad Greek to say dvò oi avopórol, and bad English to say two the men. Such syntax is in fact a blending of incompatibles; that is to say, of a defined substantive with an undefined attributive. On the contrary, to say in Greek, ȧupoTéρoi oi avoρáπоt, or in English, both the men, is good and allowable, because the substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So, likewise, it is correct to say, oi dvò ȧvoρáπoι, “the two men," because here the article, being placed in the beginning, extends its power as well through substantive as attributive, and equally contributes to define them both.

τὶς οὗτος,

As some of the words above admit of no article, because they are by nature as definite as may be, so there are others which admit it not, because they are not to be defined at all. Of this sort are all interrogatives. If we question about substances, we cannot say, ó rìs OUTOs, "the who is this ;" but rìs ouros, "who is this? The same as to qualities and both kinds of quantity. We say without an article, ποιὸς, ποσοὶ, πήλικος; in English, "what sort of, how many, how great?" The reason is, that the articles ó and the, respect beings already known; interrogatives respect beings about which we are ignorant; for as to what we know, interrogation is superfluous.

In a word, the natural associators with articles are all those common appellatives which denote the several genera and species of beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different article, serve either to explain an individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a recognition, or repeated knowledge."

We shall here subjoin a few instances of the peculiar power of

articles.

Every proposition consists of a subject and a predicate. In English these are distinguished by their position, the subject standing first, the predicate last. "Happiness is pleasure:" here,

amborum. In English or Greck, the article would have done the business, for "the two," or Toiv duoiv, are equivalent to "both" or ȧuporépwv; but not so duorum, because the Latins have no articles to prefix.

The passage in Virgil of which Servius here speaks, is a description of Turnus's killing two brothers, Amycus and Diores; after which, the poet says of him,

. curru abscissa duorum Suspendit capita.

This, literally translated, is, "he hung up on his chariot the heads of two persons, which were cut off;" whereas the sense

happiness is the subject; pleasure, the predicate. If we change their order, and say, "pleasure is happiness;" then pleasure becomes the subject, and happiness the predicate. In Greek, these are distinguished not by any order or position, but by help of the article, which the subject always assumes, and the predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. "Happiness is pleasure," nýdovǹ ʼn evdaιμovía: "pleasure is happiness, ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία: “ fine things are difficult,” χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: “ difficult things are fine,” τὰ χαλεπὰ καλά.

In Greek, it is worth attending, how in the same sentence, the same article, by being prefixed to a different word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example: o IITOλeμaîos yvμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη, “ Ptolemy, having presided over the games, was publicly honoured." The participle yuuvaσiapxnoas has here no other force, than to denote to us the time when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the games. But if, instead of the substantive, we join the participle to the article, and say, ὁ γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then, "the Ptolemy, who presided over the games, was honoured." The participle in this case, being joined to the article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour."

In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the sense is changed by changing of the articles, though we leave every other word of the sentence untouched. "And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the man." In that single the, that dimunitive particle, all the force and efficacy of the reason is contained. By that alone are the premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him who doubts it only change the article, and then see what will become of the prophet and his reasoning. "And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a man." Might not the king well have demanded, upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

But enough of such speculations. The only remark which we shall make on them is this; that "minute change in principles leads to mighty change in effects; so that well are principles entitled to our regard, however in appearance they may be trivial and low."

The articles already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the pronominal articles, such as this, that, any, other, some, all, no, or none, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our chapter of pronouns, where we have

n Apollon. 1. i. c. 33, 34.

• Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἀνηρ. Βασιλ. β'. κεφ. ιβ'. P See b. i. c. 5. p. 137, 8. It seems to have been some view of words, like that

here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin tongue, Noster sermo artis culos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. I. i. c. 4.

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shewn, when they may be taken as pronouns, and when as articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the essence of an article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly articles than any thing else, and as such should be considered in universal grammar. Thus when we say, "this picture I approve, but that I dislike," what do we perform by the help of these definitives, but bring down the common appellative to denote two individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, some men are virtuous, but all men are mortal," what is the natural effect of this all and some, but to define that universality and particularity which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such sentences as, some substances have sensation, others want it ;""choose any way of acting, and some men will find fault," &c. For here, some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different parts of a given whole; some, to denote a definite part; any, to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,

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Nothing can be stronger or more sublime than this antithesis; one act set as equal to many other acts taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is Tu Romane, not Vos Romani) to all other men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of alii to tu.

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of connectives.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING CONNECTIVES, AND FIRST THOSE CALLED CONJUNCTIONS.

CONNECTIVES are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either sentences or words, are called by the

So Scaliger: His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἔλεξεν ὁ δοῦλος) εxpletur a Latinis per is aut ille; is, aut, ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Ad

ditur enim articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus C. Cæsar, is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græce Kaioap & avтокрáтwр. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

different names of conjunctions or prepositions. Of these names, that of the preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the part which it connects. The name of the conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the conjunction first, because it connects not words but sentences. This is conformable to the analysis with which we began this inquiry, and which led us, by parity of reason, to consider sentences themselves before words. Now the definition of a conjunction is as follows: a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence."

¶ Sup. p. 120.

Grammarians have usually considered the conjunction as connecting rather single parts of speech than whole sentences, and that, too, with the addition of like with like, tense with tense, number with number, case with case, &c. This Sanctius justly explodes: Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur-sed conjunctio orationes inter se conjungit. Miner. 1. iii. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, 1. i. c. 18; and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit, (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur,)-sed conjunctio est, quæ conjungit orationes plures. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

in one simple word, nor even of two or more words in one simple sentence; but of two or more simple sentences in one complex sentence, which is considered as one, from that concatenation of meaning effected by the conjunctions. For example, let us take the sentence which follows: "If men are by nature social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the laws of their country." Here are three sentences. 1. "Men are by nature social." 2. "It is man's interest to be just." 3. "It is not ordained by the laws of every country that man should be just." The first two of these sentences are made one by the conjunction if; these, one with the third sentence, by the conjunction though; and the three, thus united, make that owvn) μía onμaVTIKŃ, "that one significant articulate sound," of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same subject: 'O This doctrine of theirs is confirmed by γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὸ πολλά· ὥστε Apollonius, who, in the several places, ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τουναντίον ἔσται τὸ where he mentions the conjunction, always v roλλd: "The conjunction makes many considers it in syntax as connecting sen- one; so that if it be taken away, it is then tences, and not words, though in his works evident on the contrary that one will be now extant he has not given us its defini-many." Rhet. iii. c. 12. His instance of a tion. See l. i. c. 2. p. 14; l. ii. c. 12. p 124; 1. iii. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's definition, as the passage has been corrected by the best critics and manuscripts. A conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιας, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφνκυῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικήν: “an articulate sound, devoid of signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate sound out of several articulate sounds, which are each of them significant.” Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate sound, formed by the conjunction, is not the union of two or more syllables

sentence, divested of its conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, λov, arhτnoa, ¿deóμny, veni, occurri, rogavi, where, by the way, the three sentences, resulting from this dissolution, (for λov, ἀπήντησα, and ἐδεόμην, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect sentences,) prove that these are the proper subjects of the conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's account of the use of this part of speech is elegant: Aid kal TŴv λόγων ὁ μὲν ὕπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, δ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογος ἂν εἴη τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἑνὶ λεγομένῳ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἕνα (lege διὰ τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνῶσθαί