speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c.; as also adverbs of place, made out of prepositions, such as avo and xáтw, from ava and Kaтà, in English upward and downward, from up and down. In some instances the preposition suffers no change, but becomes an adverb by nothing more than its application; as when we say, circa equitat, "he rides about;" prope cecidit, "he was near falling; verum ne post conferas culpam in me, "but do not after lay the blame on me." There are likewise adverbs of interrogation, such as where, whence, whither, how; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their interrogative power, they assume that of a relative, so as even to represent the relative or subjunctive pronoun. Thus Ovid, Et seges est, ubi Troja fuit: translated in our old English ballad, "And corn doth grow, where Troy town stood." That is to say, seges est in eo loco, in quo, &c. "corn groweth in that place, in which," &c.; the power of the relative being implied in the adverb. Thus Terence, Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere, Ubi me excarnufices: where ubi relates to res, and stands for quibus rebus. Heaut. iv. 6. It is in like manner that the relative pronoun, upon occasion, becomes an interrogative, at least in Latin and English. Thus Horace, So Milton, Quem virum aut heroa lyra, vel acri Tibia sumes celebrare, Clio? Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt? The reason of all this is as follows. The pronoun and adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, relatives. Even when they become interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an interrogation, they have reference to a subject, which is antecedent, definite, and known; with an interrogation, to a subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain. Who first seduc'd them? The very question itself supposes a seducer, to which, though unknown, the pronoun who, has a reference. Th' infernal serpent. Here, in the answer, we have the subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the who in the interrogation is (we see) as much a relative, as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all, "it was the infernal serpent who first seduced them." "Sosip. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun, act. ii. sc. 3. N And thus is it that interrogatives and relatives mutually pass into each other. And so much for adverbs, peculiar to verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those which are common to all attributives. We have likewise attempted to explain their general nature, which we have found to consist in being the attributes of attributes. There remains only to add, that adverbs may be derived from almost every part of speech: from prepositions, as when from after we derive afterwards; from participles, and through these from verbs, as when from know we derive knowing, and thence knowingly; from scio, sciens, and thence scienter: from adjectives, as when from virtuous and vicious, we derive virtuously and viciously; from substantives, as when from πίθηκος, “an ape,” we derive πιθήκειον βλέπειν, " to look apishly;" from λéwv, "a lion," λeovTwows, "leoninely:" nay, even from proper names, as when from Socrates and Demosthenes, we derive Socratically and Demosthenically. "It was Socratically reasoned," we say; "it was Demosthenically spoken." Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old grammarians, such as Catiliniter from Catilina, Sisenniter from Sisenna, Tulliane from Tullius, &c. Nor are they thus extensive only in derivation, but in signification also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us, that adverbs may be found in every one of the predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal genera. The Stoics, too, called the adverb by the name of πavồéêтηs, and that from a view to the same multiform nature. Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessa sibi rerum varia potestate. It is thus that Sosipater explains the word," from whose authority we know it to be Stoical. But of this enough. And now having finished these principal parts of speech, the substantive and the attributive, which are significant when alone, we proceed to those auxiliary parts, which are only significant, when associated. But as these make the subject of a book by themselves, we here conclude the first book of this treatise. * Aristotle has KUKλOTIKOS, "Cyclopically, from Κύκλωψ, " a Cyclops.” Eth. Nic. x. 9. y See Prisc. 1. xv. p. 1022. Sos. Charis, 161. edit. Putschii. * Διὸ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιῤῥημάτων γένη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, οὐσίαν, ποιόν, ποσὸν, πρός τι, κ. τ. λ. Gram. Introd. 1. ii. Sosip. Char. p. 175. edit. Putschii. BOOK II. CHAPTER I. CONCERNING DEFINITIVES. WHAT remains of our work is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here as in some historical picture; when the principal figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest. Definitives, the subject of the present chapter, are commonly called by grammarians, "articles," articuli, apopa. They are of two kinds, either those properly and strictly so called, or else the pronominal articles, such as this, that, any, &c. We shall first treat of those articles more strictly so denominated, the reason and use of which may be explained as follows. The visible and individual substances of nature are infinitely more numerous than for each to admit of a particular name. To supply this defect, when any individual occurs which either wants a proper name, or whose proper name is not known, we ascertain it as well as we can by referring it to its species; or if the species be unknown, then at least to some genus. For example: A certain object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of self-motion and sensation. If we know it not as an individual, we refer it to its proper species, and call it dog, or horse, or lion, or the like. If none of these names fit, we go to the genus, and call it animal. But this is not enough. The thing at which we are looking is neither a species nor a genus. What is it then? An individual. Of what kind? Known or unknown? Seen now for the first time, or seen before, and now remembered? It is here we shall discover the use of the two articles, a and the: a respects our primary perception, and denotes individuals as unknown; the respects our secondary perception, and denotes individuals as known. To explain by an example: I see an object pass by which I never saw till now. What do I say? "There goes a beggar with a long beard." The man departs, and returns a week after. What do I say then? "There goes the beggar with the long beard." The article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered. Yet mark the force of this apparently minute change. The individual once vague, is now recognised as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present perception to a like perception already past." See b. i. c. 5. p. 135. The truth is, the articles a and the are both of them definitives, as they circumscribe the latitude of genera and species by reducing them for the most part to denote individuals. The difference, however, between them is this: the article a leaves the individual itself unascertained, whereas the article the ascertains the individual also, and is for that reason the more accurate definitive of the two. It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner in which the article a defines, that the Greeks have no article correspondent to it, but supply its place by a negation of their article o. 0 ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, “the man fell,” ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, “ a man fell," without any thing prefixed, but only the article withdrawn. Even in English, where the article a cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is expressed by the same negation. "Those are the men," means those are individuals of which we possess some previous knowledge. "Those are men," the article apart, means no more than that they are so many vague and uncertain individuals, just as the phrase a man, in the singular, implies one of the same number. But though the Greeks have no article correspondent to the article a, yet nothing can be more nearly related than their o to the article the. O Baoiλevs, "the king;" To Sŵpov, "the βασιλεύς, δῶρον, gift," &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the attributes of the Greek article as they are described by Apollonius, one of the earliest and most acute of the old grammarians now remaining. Ἔστιν οὖν καθὸ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἄρθρων ἡ ἀναφορὰ, ἥ ἐστι προκατειλεγμένου προσώπου παραστατική: "Now the peculiar attribute of the article, as we have shewn elsewhere, is that reference which implies some certain person already mentioned.” Again: Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίστησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, οὗ ἐξαίρετός ἐστιν ἡ ἀναφορά: "For nouns of themselves imply not reference, unless they take to them the article, whose peculiar character is reference." Again: Tò apoрov πроܶεσтŵσаν yvwow Endoî: "The article indicates a pre-established acquaintance."c Β Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριστωδῶς πότε νοούμενα, ἡ τοῦ ἄρθρου παράθεσις ὑπὸ ὁρισμὸν τοῦ προσώπου ἄγει : “ those things which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the article makes to be definite as to their person." Apoll. 1. iv. c. 1. See of the same author, l. i. c. 6, 36. ποιεῖ (τὸ ἄρθρον sc.) δ ̓ ἀναπόλησιν προεγνωσμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ συντάξει· οἷον εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ἄνθρωπος ἧκε, ἄδηλον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. εἰ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. Τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ βούλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἄρθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας : “ the article causes a review within the mind of something known before the texture of the discourse. Thus if any one says, ἄνθρωπος ἧκε, man came,' (which is the same as when we say. in English, a man came,') it is not evident of whom he speaks. But if he says, d avθρωπος ἧκε, ° the man came, then it is evident; for he speaks of some person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the article is expressive of the first and second knowledge together." Theod. Gaza, l. iv. e Apoll. de Synt. 1. i. c. 6, 7. His account of reference is as follows: 'Idíwμa àva His reasoning upon proper names is worth remarking. Proper names (he tells us) often fall into homonymie, that is, different persons often go by the same name. To solve this ambiguity we have recourse to adjectives or epithets. For example, there were two Grecian chiefs who bore the name of Ajax. It was not, therefore, without reason, that Menestheus uses epithets, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other. ̓Αλλὰ περ οἷος ἴτω Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας. "If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, .... Hom. Apollonius proceeds: even epithets themselves are diffused through various subjects, inasmuch as the same adjective may be referred to many substantives. In order, therefore, to render both parts of speech equally definite, that is to say, the adjective as well as the substantive, the adjective itself assumes an article before it, that it may indicate a reference to some single person only, povadikn áva popà, according to the author's own phrase. And thus it is we say, Tpúpov o yраμμатikos, "Trypho the grammarian ;" Τρύφων γραμματικὸς, ̓Απολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, “ Apollodorus the Cyrenean,” &c. The author's conclusion of this section is worth remarking. Δεόντως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ πρόσθεσίς ἐστι τοῦ ἄρθρου, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι. “It is with reason, therefore, that the article is here also added, as it brings the adjective to an individuality as precise as the proper name. 66 d We may carry this reasoning further, and shew how by help of the article even common appellatives come to have the force of proper names, and that unassisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the Athenians, Tλolov meant "ship;" evdeka, "eleven;" and aveρwπоs, "man." Yet add but the article, and Tò Totov, “the ship," meant that particular ship which they sent annually to Delos; oi evdeka," the eleven," meant certain officers of justice; and o aveрwπos, "the man,” meant their public executioner. So in English, city is a name common to many places; and speaker, a name common to many men. Yet if we prefix the article, the city, means our metropolis; and the speaker, a high officer in the British parliament. And thus it is by an easy transition that the article, from denoting reference, comes to denote eminence also; that is to say, from implying an ordinary pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal notoriety. Thus among the Greeks, & πoinτns, "the poet," meant Homer; and ỏ Σrayel φορᾶς προκατειλεγμένου προσώπου δευτέρα yvois: "The peculiar character of reference is the second or repeated knowledge of some person already mentioned." Lib. ii. c. 3. d See Apoll. l. i. c. 12. where by mistake Menelaus is put for Menestheus. e There are so few exceptions to this observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle twice |