the number and person of every substantive, that we may know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal attributes. The same may be said of sex, with respect to adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect beings, male or female, though substances past dispute are alone susceptible of sex. We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining, is the difference of verbs as to their several species, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner. C CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING THE SPECIES OF VERBS, AND THEIR OTHER REMAINING PROPERTIES. ALL verbs, that are strictly so called, denote energies; now, as all energies are attributes, they have reference, of course, to certain energizing substances. Thus it is impossible there should be such energies, as to love, to fly, to wound, &c. if there were not such beings as men, birds, swords, &c. Further, every energy doth not only require an energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some subject. For example: if we say, Brutus loves, we must needs supply, loves Cato, Cassius, Portia, or some one. The sword wounds, i. e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And thus is it, that every energy is necessarily situate between two substantives; an energizer, which It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a grammarian as Sanctius should justly deny genders, or the distinction of sex to adjectives, and yet make persons appertain, not to substantives, but to verbs. His commentator, Perizonius, is much more consistent, who says, At vero si rem recte consideres, ipsis nominibus et pronominibus vel maxime, imo unice inest ipsa persona; et verba se habent in personarum ratione ad nomina plane sicuti adjectiva in ratione generum ad substantiva, quibus solis autor (Sanctius scil. 1. i. c. 7.) et recte genus adscribit, exclusis adjectivis. Sanct. Minerv. 1. i. c. 12. There is, indeed, an exact analogy between the accidents of sex and person. There are but two sexes, that is to say, the male and the female; and but two persons, (or characters essential to discourse,) that is to say, the speaker and the party addressed. The third sex and third person are improperly so called, being, in fact, but negations of the other two. d Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note a of this chapter, p. 163, may consult Letters concerning Mind, an octavo volume, published 1750, the author Mr. John Petvin, vicar of Ilsington in Devon; a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the philosophy both of the ancients and moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth. e We use this word energy, rather than motion, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of genus, which includes within it both motion and its privation. See before, p. 144. is active, and a subject, which is passive. Hence, then, if the energizer leads the sentence, the energy follows its character, and becomes what we call a verb active: thus we say, Brutus amat, "Brutus loves." On the contrary, if the passive subject be principal, it follows the character of this, too, and then becomes what we call a verb passive: thus we say, Portia amatur, "Portia is loved." It is in like manner that the same road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is ascent, with respect to the foot is descent. Since then every energy respects an energizer, or a passive subject; hence the reason why every verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference to some noun for its nominative case.f But to proceed still further from what has been already observed. Brutus loved Portia. Here Brutus is the energizer; loved, the energy; and Portia, the subject. But it might have been, Brutus loved Cato, or Cassius, or the Roman republic; for the energy is referable to subjects infinite. Now, among these infinite subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the energizer also, as when we say Brutus loved himself, slew himself, &c. in such case the energy hath to the same being a double relation, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among the Greeks to that species of verbs called verbs middle; and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the verb still retains its active form, and the passive subject (se or "himself") is expressed like other accusatives. Again in some verbs it happens that the energy always keeps within the energizer, and never passes out to any foreign extraneous subject. Thus when we say, Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth, it is impossible the energy should pass out, (as in the case of those verbs called by the grammarians verbs transitive,) because both the energizer and the passive subject are united in the same person. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting? It is the will and vital powers belonging to Cæsar. And what is the subject, made so to move or sit? It is the body and limbs belonging also to the same Cæsar. It is this, then, forms that species of verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call verbs neuter, as if, indeed, they were void both of action f The doctrine of impersonal verbs has been justly rejected by the best grammarians, both ancient and modern. See Sanct. Min. 1. i. c. 12; l. iii. c. 1; 1. iv. c. 3. Priscian. 1. xviii. p. 1134. Apoll. I. iii. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper nominative supplied to all verbs of this supposed character. 5 Τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργετικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως: “The verbs, called verbs middle, admit a coincidence of the active and passive character." Apollon. 1. iii. c. 7. He that would see this whole doctrine, concerning the power of the middle verb, explained and confirmed with great ingenuity and learning, may consult a small treatise of that able critic, Kuster, entitled De vero Usu Verborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published. and passion, when, perhaps, (like verbs middle,) they may be rather said to imply both. Not, however, to dispute about names, as these neuters in their energizer always discover their passive subject," which other verbs cannot, their passive subjects being infinite; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these neuters to have the subject expressed, as in other verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars that verbs active require an accusative, while neuters require none. Of the above species of verbs, the middle cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. The species of verbs therefore remaining, are the active, the passive, and the neuter, and those seem essential to all languages whatever.i It may be here observed, that even those verbs, called actives, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent accusative, and assume the form of neuters, so as to stand by themselves. This happens when the discourse respects the mere energy or affection only, and has no regard to the subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, οὐκ οἶδεν ἀναγινώσκειν οὗτος, “ this man knows not how to read," speaking only of the energy, in which we suppose him deficient Had the discourse been upon the subjects of reading, we must have added them, ouk οἶδεν ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ομήρου, “ he knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or Cicero," &c. Thus Horace: 66 sidered them under the four following sorts. When a verb, coinciding with the nominative of some noun, made without further help a perfect assertive sentence, as Zwкрáτns πEpiπateî, “ Socrates walketh ;" then as the verb in such case implied the power of a perfect predicate, they called it for that reason κaтnyóρnμα, “a predicable;" or else, from its readiness, ovußaivew, to coincide with its noun in completing the sentence, they called it ouμßaua," a coincider." 66 When a verb was able with a noun to form a perfect assertive sentence, yet could not associate with such noun, but under some oblique case, as Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, Socratem pœnitet: such a verb, from its near approach to just coincidence, and predication, they called παρασύμβαμα οι παραKaтNYÓρημα. When a verb, though regularly coinciding with a noun in its nominative, still required, to complete the sentiment, some other noun under an oblique case, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα, “Plato loveth Dio,” Qui cupit aut metuit, juvat illum sic domus (where without Dio, or some other, the aut res, Ut lippum picta tabulæ .... "He that desires or fears, (not this thing, in particular, nor that, but, in general, he within whose breast these affections prevail,) has the same joy in a house or estate, as the man with bad eyes has in fine pictures." So Cæsar, in his celebrated laconic epistle of Veni, Vidi, Vici, where two actives, we see, follow one neuter in the same detached form as that neuter itself. The glory, it seems, was in the rapid sequel of the events. Conquest came as quick as he could come himself, and look about him. Whom he saw, and whom he conquered, was not the thing of which he boasted. See Apol. 1. iii. c. 31. p. 279. The Stoics, in their logical view of verbs, as making part in propositions, con verb loveth would rest indefinite ;) such verb, from this defect, they called TTOV ouußaua, or Kaтnyóρnμα, "something less than a coincider, or less than a predicable." Lastly, when a verb required two nouns in oblique cases, to render the sentiment complete; as when we say Zwкpάтeι 'AλkıBiddovs μéλei, Tædet me vitæ, or the like; such verb they called ἧττον, or ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα, or ἢ παρακατηγόρημα, “something less than an imperfect coincider, or an imperfect predicable." These were the appellations which they gave to verbs, when employed along with nouns to the forming of propositions. As to the name of pua, or "verb," they denied it to them all, giving it only to the infinitive, as we have shewn already. See page 165. See There remains a remark or two further, and then we quit the subject of verbs. It is true, in general, that the greater part of them denote attributes of energy and motion. But there are some which appear to denote nothing more than a mere simple adjective joined to an assertion. Thus ioáče in Greek, and equalleth" in English, mean nothing more than iσós éσTI, “is equal." So albeo, in Latin, is no more than albus sum. Campique ingentes ossibus albent. Virg. The same may be said of tumeo. Mons tumet, i. e. tumidus est, "is tumid." To express the energy in these instances we must have recourse to the inceptives. nouns. Fluctus uti primo cœpit cum albescere vento. Freta ponti Incipiunt agitata tumescere. 66 Virg. Virg. There are verbs also to be found which are formed out of So that, as in abstract nouns, (such as whiteness from white, goodness from good,) as also in the infinitive modes of verbs, the attributive is converted into a substantive; here the substantive on the contrary is converted into an attributive. Such are Kuvitev, from xúwv, "to act the part of a dog, or be a eynic;” Φιλιππίζειν from Φίλιππος, “ to Philippize, or favour Philip;" Syllaturire, from Sylla, "to meditate acting the same part part as Sylla did." Thus, too, the wise and virtuous emperor, by way of counsel to himself—ὅρα μὴ ἀποκαισαρωθῇς, “ beware thou beest not be-Cæsar'd;" as though he said, "beware, that by being emperor, thou dost not dwindle into a mere Cæsar." like manner one of our own witty poets, Sternhold himself he out-Sternholded. In And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary bishop in the reign of Queen Mary, says of him, that he out-Bonner'd even Bonner himself." And so much for that species of attributes called verbs in the strictest sense. CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THOSE OTHER ATTRIBUTIVES, PARTICIPLES AND ADJECTIVES. THE nature of verbs being understood, that of participles is no way difficult. Every complete verb is expressive of an attribute, of time, and of an assertion. Now if we take away the also Ammon. in lib. de Interpret. p. 37. Apollon de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 8. l. iii. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Theod. Gaz. Gram. l. iv. From the above doctrine it appears, that all verbs neuter are ovμßáμaтa; verbs * Marc. Antonin. 1. vi. sec. 30. assertion, and thus destroy the verb, there will remain the attribute and the time, which make the essence of a participle. Thus take away the assertion from the verb, ypápeɩ, “writeth," and there remains the participle, ypá¶wv, "writing," which (without the assertion) denotes the same attribute, and the same time. After the same manner, by withdrawing the assertion, we discover γράψας in ἔγραψε, γράψων in γράψει, for we choose to refer to the Greek, as being of all languages the most complete, as well in this respect as in others. And so much for participles.' m The nature of verbs and participles being understood, that of adjectives becomes easy. A verb implies (as we have said) both an attribute, and time, and an assertion; a participle only implies an attribute and time; and an adjective only implies an attribute; that is to say, in other words, an adjective has no assertion, and only denotes such an attribute as has not its essence either in motion or its privation. Thus in general the attributes of quantity, quality, and relation, (such as many and few, great and little, black and white, good and bad, double, treble, quadruple, &c.) are all denoted by adjectives. It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those attributes which are wholly foreign to the idea of motion, assume an assertion and appear as verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in albeo, tumeo, iσáłw, and others. These, however, compared to the rest of verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, verbal adjectives. It is in like manner that participles insensibly pass too into adjectives. Thus doctus in Latin, and learned in English, lose their power as participles, and mean a person possessed of an habitual quality. Thus vir eloquens means, not a man now speaking," but a man "who possesses the habit of speaking," whether he speak or no. So when we say in English, "he is a thinking man, an understanding man," we mean, not a person whose mind is in actual m The Latins are defective in this article of participles. Their active verbs ending in or, (commonly called deponents,) have active participles of all times, (such as loquens, locutus, locuturus,) but none of the passive. Their actives ending in o, have participles of the present and future, (such as scribens and scripturus,) but none of the past. On the contrary, their passives have participles of the past, (such as scriptus,) but none of the present or future, unless we admit such as scribendus and docendus for futures, which grammarians controvert. The want of these participles they supply by a periphrasis; for ypávas, they say cum scripsisset; for ypapóuevos, dum scribitur, &c. In English we have sometimes recourse to the same periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same auxiliars, which form our modes and tenses. The English grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its participles of the past, that they all terminate in d, t, or n. This analogy is perhaps liable to as few exceptions as any. Considering, therefore, how little analogy of any kind we have in our language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few traces that may be found. It would be well, therefore, if all writers who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, it was wrote, for it was written; he was drove, for he was driven; I have went, for I have gone, &c.: in all which instances a verb is absurdly used to supply the proper participle, without any necessity from the want of such word. |