As to the imperfectum, it is sometimes employed to denote what is usual and customary. Thus surgebat and scribebat signify, not only "he was rising, he was writing," but upon occasion they signify "he used to rise, he used to write." The reason of this is, that whatever is customary, must be something which has been frequently repeated. But what has been frequently repeated, must needs require an extension of time past, and thus we fall insensibly into the tense here mentioned. Again, we are told by Pliny (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it pendenti titulo, "in a suspensive kind of inscription," and employed for that purpose the tense here mentioned. It was ̓Απελλῆς ἐποίει, Apelles faciebat, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, Polycletus faciebat, and never éπoinσe or fecit. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself that it was once indeed in hand, but no pretension that it was ever finished. It is remarkable that the very manner in which the Latins derive these tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From the passing present come the passing past and future: Scribo, scribebam, scribam. From the perfect present come the perfect past and future: Scripsi, scripseram, scripsero. And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from fero come ferebam and feram; from tuli come tuleram and tulero. We shall conclude by observing, that the order of the tenses, as they stand ranged by the old grammarians, is not a fortuitous order, but is consonant to our perceptions in the recognition of time, according to what we have explained already.' Hence it is that the present tense stands first; then the past tenses; and lastly the future. And now having seen what authorities there are for aorists, or those tenses which denote time indefinitely, and what for tors, who had gone out to see the ship-race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore within. Inruerant Danai, et tectum omne tenebant. "The Greeks had entered and were then possessing the whole house;" as much as to say, "they had entered, and that was over," but their possession continued still. Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. i. The first printers, (who were most of them scholars and critics,) in imitation of the ancient artists, used the same tense. Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of Demosthenes. See before, pages 148-150. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant. Ordo autem (temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem præsens tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoria prædita sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c. those tenses opposed to aorists, which mark it definitely, (such as the inceptive, the middle, and the completive,) we here finish the subject of time and tenses, and proceed to consider the verb in other attributes, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles. CHAPTER VIII. E CONCERNING MODES. We have observed already," that the soul's leading powers are those of perception and those of volition, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all speech or discourse is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain perception or a certain volition. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in a different part or after a different manner, hence, I say, the variety of modes or moods." If we simply declare or indicate something to be or not to be, (whether a perception or volition, it is equally the same,) this constitutes that mode called the declarative or indicative. If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something possible only, and in the number of contingents, this makes that mode which grammarians call the potential, and which becomes on such occasions the leading mode of the sentence. Sed tacitus pasci si posset corvus, haberet Hor. Yet sometimes it is not the leading mode, but only subjoined to the indicative. In such case it is mostly used to denote the end, or final cause; which end, as in human life it is always a contingent, and may never perhaps happen, in despite of all our m See chapter ii. n Gaza defines a mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says is Bouλnua, εἶτ ̓ οὖν πάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαινόμevov, "a volition or affection of the soul, signified through some voice, or sound articulate." Gram. 1. iv. As therefore this is the nature of modes, and modes belong to verbs, hence it is Apollonius observes, Tois ῥήμασιν ἐξαιρέτως παράκειται ἡ ψυχικὴ διά eσis: "the soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to verbs.” De Synt. 1. iii. c. 13. Thus, too, Priscian: Modi sunt diversæ inclinationes animi, quas varia consequitur declinatio verbi. Lib. viii. p. 821. foresight, is therefore expressed most naturally by the mode here mentioned. For example, Hor. Ut jugulent homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. "Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats." Here that they rise, is positively asserted in the declarative or indicative mode; but as to their cutting men's throats, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly soever it may be the end of their rising, it is still but a contingent that may never perhaps happen. This mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by grammarians, not the potential, but the subjunctive. But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some perception informed, or some volition gratified. Hence then new modes of speaking: if we interrogate, it is the interrogative mode; if we require, it is the requisitive. Even the requisitive itself hath its subordinate species: with respect to inferiors, it is an imperative mode; with respect to equals and superiors, it is a precative or optative.° And thus have we established a variety of modes: the indicative or declarative, to assert what we think certain; the potential, for the purposes of whatever we think contingent; the interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us information; and the requisitive, to assist us in the gratification of our volitions. The requisitive too appears under two distinct species, either as it is imperative to inferiors, or precative to superiors. P • It was the confounding of this distine tion that gave rise to a sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with, Sing, Muse, the wrath; when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. Εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιτάττει. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The solution is evident from the division here established, the grammatical form being in both cases the same. P The species of modes in great measure depend on the species of sentences. The Stoics increased the number of sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides those mentioned in chap. ii. note k, p. 122, they had many more, as may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret. p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, 1. vii. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional sentences as included within those which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number; the vocative, the imperative, the interrogative, the precative, and the assertive. There is no mention of a potential sentence, which may be supposed to coincide with the assertive, or indicative. The vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικὸν, *Ω μάκαρ Ατρείδη. Α' γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ. Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν. où wepì navròs, &c. Els Tò wepì 'Epμ. p. 4. As therefore all these several modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify them one to another. And hence those various modes or moods of which we find in common grammar so prolix a detail, and which are, in fact, no more than "so many literal forms, intended to express these natural distinctions." All these modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the soul and its affections. Their peculiarities and distinctions are in part, as follows. The requisitive and interrogative modes are distinguished from the indicative and potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a return, to the two former it is always necessary. If we compare the requisitive mode with the interrogative, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the return, but in other peculiarities. The return to the requisitive, is sometimes made in words, sometimes in deeds. To the request of Dido to Æneas, Boethius's account is as follows. Perfectarum vero orationum partes quinque sunt: deprecativa, ut, Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis, Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma. Imperativa, ut, sist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective quantities, which two methods are called by grammarians the syllabic and the temporal. The Latin, which is but a species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in Vade age, nate, voca Zephyros, et labere pennis. like manner a large portion of those varia Interrogativa, ut, Dic mihi, Damæta, cujum pecus? Vocativa, ut, O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas. Enuntiativa, in qua veritas vel falsitas invenitur, ut, Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis. Boeth. in lib. de Interp. p. 291. The imperative, Go then, thou mightiest, in thy Father's might. Whence, and what art thou, execrable shape? Adam, earth's hallow'd mould, Of God inspir'd. The assertive or enunciative, The Greek language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several modes, and all distinctions of time likewise, by an adequate number of variations in each particular verb. These variations may be found, some at the beginning of the verb, others at its ending, and con The tions, which are chiefly to be found at the ending of its verbs, and but rarely at their beginning. Yet in its deponents and passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the auxiliar, sum. modern languages, which have still fewer of those variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each language the verbs have and am. As to the English tongue, it is so poor in this respect as to admit no variation for modes, and only one for time, which we apply to express an aorist of the past. Thus from write cometh wrote; from give, gave; from speak, spake, &c. Hence, to express time and modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven auxiliars, viz. do, am, have, shall, will, may, and can; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I am writing, I have written; sometimes two together, as, I have been writing, I should have written; sometimes no less than three, as, I might have been lost, He could have been preserved. But for these, and all other speculations relative to the genius of the English language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent treatise of the learned Dr. Lowth, entitled, A short Introduction to English Grammar. a prima dic, hospes, origine nobis Insidias Danaum . . . . . the proper return was in words; that is, in an historical narrative. To the request of the unfortunate chief-date obolum Belisariothe proper return was in a deed; that is, in a charitable relief. But with respect to the interrogative, the return is necessarily made in words alone; in words, which are called a response or answer, and which are always actually or by implication some definitive assertive sentence. Take examples. Whose verses are these? the return is a sentence, These are verses of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy man? the return is a sentence, Brutus was a worthy man. And hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity of this interrogative mode with the indicative, in which last its response or return is mostly made. So near indeed is this affinity, that in these two modes alone the verb retains the same form, nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the addition or absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the tone, or accent." r - Ηγε οὖν προκειμένη δριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τοῦ καλεῖσθαι ὁριστική—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποστρέφει els Tò elvai ópiσTIKh: "The indicative mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of indicative-when it reassumes the assertion, it returns again to its proper character." Apoll. de Synt. 1. iii. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, Introd. Gram. 1. iv. • It may be observed of the interrogative, that as often as the interrogation is simple and definite, the response may be made in almost the same words, by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the truth is either one or the other. For example: Are these verses of Homer? Response: These verses are of Homer. Are those verses of Virgil? Response, Those are not verses of Virgil. And here the artists of language, for the sake of brevity and despatch, have provided two particles, to represent all such responses; Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative. But when the interrogation is complex, as when we say, Are these verses of Homer, or of Virgil? much more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general, Whose are these verses? we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The reason is, that no interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex interrogation will admit of four answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance: Are these verses Homer's or Virgil's? 1. They are Homer's; 2. They are not Homer's; 3. They are Virgil's; 4. They are not Virgil's; we may add, 5. They are of neither. The indefinite interrogations go still further; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance: Whose are these verses? We may answer affirmatively, They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.; or negatively, They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single Yes, or a single No, which particular is meant among infinite possibles? These therefore are interrogations which must be always answered by a sentence. Yet even here custom has consulted for brevity, by returning for answer only the single essential characteristic word, and retrenching by an ellipsis all the rest, which rest the interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus, when we are asked, How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle? we answer in the short monosyllable, Two; whereas, without the ellipsis, the answer would have been, Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle. The ancients distinguished these two M |