However, previously to these, and to every other possible attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be any thing else. For existence may be considered as an universal genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The verbs, therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every proposition, in which they may still be found, either expressed, or by implication; expressed, as when we say, The sun is bright; by implication, as when we say, The sun rises, which means, when resolved, The sun is rising.h

The verbs, is, groweth, becometh, est, fit, vπáρxel ẻσTì, TéλEL, Yiyveтai, are all of them used to express this general genus. The Latins have called them verba substantiva, "verbs substantive, but the Greeks ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικὰ, "verbs of existence;" a name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well attribute, as substance. The principal of those verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the verb eorì, est, is.

Now all existence is either absolute or qualified: absolute, as when we say, B is; qualified, as when we say, B is an animal; B is black, is round, &c.

With respect to this difference, the verb is can by itself express absolute existence, but never the qualified, without subjoining the particular form, because the forms of existence being in number infinite, if the particular form be not expressed, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when is only serves to subjoin some such form, it has little more force than that of a mere assertion. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other verb, by expressing that assertion which is one of their essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, riseth means, is rising; writeth, is writing.

Again as to existence in general, it is either mutable, or immutable mutable, as in the objects of sensation; immutable, as in the objects of intellection and science. Now mutable objects exist all in time, and admit the several distinctions of present, past, and future. But immutable objects know no such distinctions, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

to denote them all. Thus Ammonius, explaining the reason why Aristotle in his tract De Interpretatione calls λevкòs a verb, tells us, nâσav owvhy, kатηуорoυμενον ὅρον ἐν προτασει ποιοῦσαν, ῥῆμα Kaλeiola, "that every sound articulate, that forms the predicate in a proposition, is called a verb," p. 24. edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another oc

casion, is very pertinent to the present. Non declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis. Lib. ii. p. 576. And in another place he says, Non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. Lib. xiii. p. 970.

See Metaphys. Aristot. l. v. c. 7. edit. Du-Vall.

And hence two different significations of the substantive verb is, according as it denotes mutable, or immutable being.

For example, if we say, This orange is ripe, is meaneth, that it existeth so now at this present, in opposition to past time, when it was green, and to future time, when it will be rotten.

But if we say, The diameter of the square is incommensurable with its side, we do not intend by is, that it is incommensurable now, having been formerly commensurable, or being to become so hereafter; on the contrary, we intend that perfection of existence to which time and its distinctions are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this verb, when we say, Truth is, or, God is. The opposition is not of time present to other times, but of necessary existence to all temporary existence whatever. And so much for verbs of existence, commonly called verbs substantive.

We are now to descend to the common herd of attributives, such as black and white, to write, to speak, to walk, &c.; among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper substantive, make, without further help, a perfect assertive sentence; while the rest, though otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise, these are imperfect sentences, though they denote a substance and an attribute. The reason is, that they want an assertion, to shew that such attribute appertains to such substance. We must therefore call in the help of an assertion elsewhere, an is, or a was, to complete the sentence, saying, Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent. On the contrary, when we say, Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the words writeth and walketh imply in their own form not an attribute only, but an assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into is and writing, the other into is and walking.

Now all those attributives which have this complex power of denoting both an attribute and an assertion, make that species of words which grammarians call verbs. If we resolve this complex power into its distinct parts, and take the attribute alone without the assertion, then have we participles. All other attributives, besides the two species before, are included together in the general name of adjectives.

1 Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed tantum in substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, dies est, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod

significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, nunc est. Quare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter est addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum tempus. Boeth. in lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. edit. Serrani.

And thus it is, that all attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives.

Besides the distinctions above mentioned, there are others which deserve notice. Some attributes have their essence in motion; such are to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of motion; such are to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And, lastly, others have it in subjects which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation; such are the attributes of great and little, white and black, wise and foolish, and, in a word, the several quantities and qualities of all things. Now these last are adjectives; those which denote motions, or their privation, are either verbs or participles.

And this circumstance leads to a further distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all motion is in time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But, besides this, all rest or privation of motion implies time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one place for one instant only? So, too, is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. To stop, therefore, or rest, is to be in one place for more than one instant; that is to say, during an extension between two instants, and this of course gives us the idea of time. As therefore motions and their privation imply time as their concomitant, so verbs, which denote them, come to denote time also. And hence the origin and use of tenses, "which are so many different forms assigned to each verb, to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various times in which such meaning may exist." Thus scribit, scripsit, scripserat, and scribet, denote all equally the attribute, to write, while the difference between them is, that they denote writing in different times.

Should it be asked, whether time itself may not become, upon occasion, the verb's principal signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same time may be denoted by different verbs, (as in the words writeth and speaketh,) and different times by the same verb, (as in the words writeth and wrote,) neither of which could happen, were time any thing more than a mere concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives or substantives. Of the

Thus Proclus, in the beginning of his treatise concerning motion: 'Hpeμour tσT τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοπῷ ὂν, καὶ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰ μέρη: “ That thing is at rest, which for a time prior and subsequent is in the same place, both itself, and its parts."

The ancient authors of dialectic or logic have well described this property. The following is part of their definition of

a verb: ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον Xpóvov, "a verb is something, which signifies time over and above,” (for such is the force of the preposition πρός. If it should be asked, Over and above what? It may be answered, Over and above its principal signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing attribute. See Arist. de Interpret. c. 3. together with his commentators Ammonius and Boethius.

adjective kind are timely, yearly, daily, hourly, &c.; of the substantive kind are time, year, day, hour, &c.

The most obvious division of time is into present, past, and future, nor is any language complete whose verbs have not tenses to mark these distinctions. But we may go still further. Time past and future are both infinitely extended. Hence it is that in universal time past we may assume many particular times past, and in universal time future, many particular times future; some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of extension, as does every given line, however minute.

Here, then, we are to seek for the reason which first introduced into language that variety of tenses. It was not, it seems, enough to denote indefinitely (or by aorists) mere present, past, or future, but it was necessary, on many occasions, to define with more precision what kind of past, present, or future. And hence the multiplicity of futures, preterites, and even present tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our ideas.

However, as the knowledge of tenses depends on the theory of time, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCERNING TIME AND TENSES.

TIME and space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the extension of space, and between yesterday and tomorrow the extension of time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once and together, while those of time only exist in transition or succession." Hence, then, we may gain some idea of time, by considering it under the notion of a transient continuity. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of transition go, time is different from space; but as to those of extension and continuity they perfectly coincide. Let us take, for example, such a part of space as a line. In every given line we may assume anywhere a point, and therem See p. 18, note n. To which we may add what is said by Ammonius: ovde yàp ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ κατὰ μόνον τὸ νῦν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. “ Time doth not sub

sist the whole at once, but only in a single now or instant; for it hath its existence in becoming and in ceasing to be.” Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. Β.

fore in every given line there may be assumed infinite points. So in every given time we may assume anywhere a now or instant, and therefore in every given time there may be assumed infinite nows or instants.

Further still: a point is the bound of every finite line, and a now, or instant, of every finite time. But although they are bounds, they are neither of them parts, neither the point of any line, nor the now or instant of any time. If this appear strange, we may remember that the parts of any thing extended are necessarily extended also, it being essential to their character that they should measure their whole. But if a point or now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other points, and infinite other nows, (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest extension,) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

These assertions, therefore, being admitted, and both points and nows being taken as bounds, but not as parts," it will follow, that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line, and the beginning of another, so the same now or instant may be the end of one time and the beginning of another. Let us suppose, for example, the lines A B, BC.

B

A

I say, that the point B is the end of the line A B, and the beginning of the line B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain times, and let B be a now or instant. In such case, I say, that the instant B is the end of the time A B, and the beginning of the time BC. I say likewise of these two times, that with respect to the now or instant, which they include, the first of them is necessarily past time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily future, as being subsequent. As, therefore, every now or instant always exists in time, and without being time, is time's bound; the bound of completion to the past, and the bound of commencement to the future from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the medium of continuity between the past and the future, so as to render time, through all its parts, one entire and perfect whole.°