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speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. He has the plural they, because the subject of discourse is often many

at once.

But though all these pronouns have number, it does not appear either in Greek, or Latin, or any modern language, that those of the first and second person carry the distinctions of sex. The reason seems to be, that the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature and even dress was commonly apparent on both sides.* But this does not hold with respect to the third person, of whose character and distinctions (including sex among the rest) we often know no more than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most languages the third person has its genders, and that even English (which allows its adjectives no genders at all) has in this pronoun the triple distinction of he, she, and it."

Hence, too, we see the reason why a single pronoun to each person, an I to the first, and a thou to the second, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of speech. But it is not so with respect to the third person. The various relations of the various objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many pronouns, such as he, this, that, other, any, some, &c.

It must be confessed, indeed, that all these words do not always appear as pronouns. When they stand by themselves, and represent some noun, (as when we say, This is virtue, or SEIKTIKOS, "give me that,") then are they pronouns. But when they are associated to some noun, (as when we say, this habit is virtue; or deɩKTIKOS, "that man defrauded me,") then as they supply not the place of a noun, but only serve to ascertain one,

* Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit. Priscian. 1. xii. p. 942. See Apoll. de Syntax. 1. ii. c. 7. p. 109.

The utility of this distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose, for example, we should read in history these words: "He caused him to destroy him," and that we were to be informed the he, which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different; that is to say, for a man, for a woman, and for a city, whose names were Alexander, Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the pronoun in this manner, divested of its genders, how would it appear which was destroyed, which was the destroyer, and which the cause that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the genders distinguished; when, instead of the am

biguous sentence, he caused him to destroy him, we are told, with the proper distinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know with certainty what before we could not: that the promoter was the woman; that her instrument was the hero; and that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city.

* Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem persona et secunda singula pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem et secunda persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentes inter se sunt, et demonstrativæ ; tertia vero persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, hic, iste; modo relativa, ut, is, ipse, &c. Priscian. l. xii. p. 933.

they fall rather into the species of definitives or articles. That there is, indeed, a near relation between pronouns and articles, the old grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this: the genuine pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place; the genuine article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as attributives or adjectives."

As to the coalescence of these pronouns, it is as follows. The first or second will, either of them, by themselves, coalesce with the third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good grammar, to say in any language, I am he, Thou art he; but we cannot say, I am thou, nor Thou art I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the speaker to be the subject also of the discourse, as when we say, I am he; or for the person addressed, as when we say, Thou art he. But for the same person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the speaker and the party addressed, this is impossible; and so, therefore, is the coalescence of the first and second person.

And now, perhaps, we have seen enough of pronouns, to perceive how they differ from other substantives. The others are primary, these are their substitutes; a kind of secondary race, which were taken in aid, when, for reasons already mentioned,b

* Τὸ ἄρθρον μετὰ ὀνόματος, καὶ ἡ ἀντωvvula àvт' ovóμaros: "the article stands with a noun, but the pronoun stands for a noun." Apol. 1. i. c. 3. p. 22. Aurà obv τὰ ἄρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτήσews ȧTоσTávтα, Els Thy ÚπOTEтayμévny àvтwvvμíav μetañíπTei: “now articles themselves, when they quit their connexion with nouns, pass into such pronoun as is proper upon the occasion." Ibid. Again, "Oтаν Tо арерoν μn μET' ovoμαтos Tapaλαμβάνηται, ποιήσηται δὲ σύνταξιν ονόματος ἣν προεκτεθείμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε οὐκ ἐγγινόμενον μετ ̓ ὀνόματος δυνάμει ἀντὶ bvóμaтos Tapeλhp0n: "when the article is assumed without the noun, and has (as we explained before) the same syntax which the noun has, it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a pronoun, because it appears without a noun, and yet is in power assumed for one." Ejusd. 1. ii. c. 8. p. 113; 1. i. c. 45. p. 96. Inter pronomina et articulos hoc interest, quod pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut quis, ille, iste: articuli vero cum pronominibus, aut nominibus, aut participiis adjunguntur. Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: Articulis autem pronomina connu

merantes, finitos ea articulos appellabant; ipsos autem articulos, quibus nos caremus, infinitos articulos dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, articulos connumerabant pronominibus, et articularia eos pronomina vocabant, &c. Pris. l. i. p. 574. Varro, speaking of quisque and hic, calls them both articles, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. 1. vii. See also 1. ix. p. 132. Vossius, indeed, in his Analogia, (1. i. c. 1.) opposes this doctrine, because hic has not the same power with the Greek article, δ. But he did not enough attend to the ancient writers on this subject, who considered all words as articles, which being associated to nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain and determine their signification.

b See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no noun, properly so called, implies its own presence. It is therefore to ascertain such presence, that the pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes equivalent to deîis, that is, to pointing or indication by the finger." It is worth remarking in that verse of Persius,

Sed pulchrum est digito monstrari, et dicier,

hic est, how the deigis and the pronoun are intro

the others could not be used. It is, moreover, by means of these, and of articles, which are nearly allied to them, that "language, though in itself only significant of general ideas, is brought down to denote that infinitude of particulars which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter, in a proper place.

As to the three orders of pronouns already mentioned, they may be called prepositive, as may, indeed, all substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is another pronoun, (in Greek os, oσTIs in Latin, Qui; in English, Who, Which, That,) a pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

Suppose I was to say, "Light is a body, Light moves with great celerity." These would apparently be two distinct sentences. Suppose, instead of the second light, I were to place the prepositive pronoun it, and say, Light is a body; it moves with great celerity; the sentences would still be distinct and two.

But if

I add a connective, (as for example an and,) saying, Light is a body, and it moves with great celerity; I then by connexion make the two into one, as by cementing many stones I make one wall.

Now it is in the united powers of a connective and another pronoun, that we may see the force and character of the pronoun here treated. Thus, therefore, if in the place of and it, we substitute that, or which, saying Light is a body, which moves with great celerity; the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may, with just reason, therefore, call this pronoun the subjunctive, because it cannot (like the prepositive) introduce an original sen

duced together, and made to cooperate to the same end.

Sometimes, by virtue of deigis, the pronoun of the third person stands for the first.

Quod si militibus parces, erit hic quoque
Miles.

That is, "I also will be a soldier."

Tibul. 1. ii. el. 6. v. 7. See Vulpius. It may be observed, too, that even in epistolary correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of writing, where the pronouns I and you make their appearance, there is a sort of implied presence, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are, in fact, at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in Apollonius, ràs μèv Tŵv ŏyewv elva deîtes, τὰς δὲ τοῦ νοῦ, “ that some indications are ocular, and some are mental." De Syntaxi, 1. ii. c. 3. p. 104.

The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, “the subjunctive article." Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the πротαкTikov, or true "prepositive article," not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different word, and having a different place in every sentence; but in syntax, he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax, l. i. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds, 80ev dǹ kal οὐ κυρίως ἂν εἴη ἄρθρον ταυτί: “ for these reasons this (meaning the subjunctive) cannot properly be an article." And just before he says, κυρίως γε μὴν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακ Tikóv: "however, properly speaking, it is the prepositive is the article." Gram. Introd. I. iv. The Latins, therefore, have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the pronouns.

tence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other which is previous.d

The application of this subjunctive, like the other pronouns, is universal. It may be the substitute of all kinds of substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the animal, which, &c.; the man, whom, &c.; the ship, which, &c.; Alexander, who, &c.; Bucephalus, that, &c.; virtue, which, &c. &c.

Nay, it may even be the substitute of all the other pronouns, and is of course, therefore, expressive of all three persons. Thus we say, I, who now read, have near finished this chapter; thou, who now readest; he, who now readeth, &c. &c.

And thus is this subjunctive truly a pronoun from its substitution, there being no substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is essentially distinguished from the other pronouns by this peculiar, that it is not only a substitute, but withal a connective.

d Hence we see why the pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the part of some complex sentence, which sentence contains, either expressed or understood, two verbs and two nominatives.

Thus in that verse of Horace,

Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber is one sentence, qui metuens vivit is another. Ille and qui are the two nominatives, erit and vivit the two verbs, and so in all other instances.

The following passage from Apollonius (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew whence the above speculations are taken. Tò úπотактIκὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἁπλοῦν λόγον οὐ παριστάνει κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρελάμβανε το ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε, καὶ οὕτω τό, παρεγένετο ὁ γραμματικὸς, ὡς διελεξάτο, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ (fors. τῷ ὁ γραμματικός παρεγένετο, καὶ διελεξάτο. "The subjunctive article (that is, the pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent

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cedent noun, which is capable of being applied to many subjects, and by connecting to it a new sentence, of necessity assumes a new verb also. And hence it is that the words, the grammarian came, who discoursed,' form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say, 'the grammarian came, and discoursed."" Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French treatise, called Grammaire Generale et Raisonnée, c. 9.

The Latins, in their structure of this subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound nature of part pronoun and part connective, in forming their qui and quis from que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek from καὶ and ὡς, καὶ and δ. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

Homer also expresses the force of this subjunctive, pronoun or article, by help of the prepositive and a connective, exactly consonant to the theory here established. See Iliad, Λ. ver. 270, 553. Ν. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

e Before we quit this subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin tongues the two principal pronouns, that is to say, the first and second person, the ego and the tu, are implied in the very form of the verb itself, ypápw, ypápeis, scribo, scribis,) and are for that reason never expressed, unless it be to mark a contradistinction; such as in Virgil,

Nos patriam fugimus; tu, Tityre, lentus

in umbra

Formosam resonare doces, &c. This, however, is true with respect only to the casus rectus, or nominitive of these pronouns, but not with respect to their oblique cases, which must always be added, because

And now to conclude what we have said concerning substantives. All substantives are either primary or secondary; that is to say, according to a language more familiar and known, are either nouns or pronouns. The nouns denote substances, and those either natural, artificial, or abstract. They moreover denote things either general, or special, or particular. The pronouns, their substitutes, are either prepositive or subjunctive. The prepositive is distinguished into three orders, called the first, the second, and the third person. The subjunctive includes the powers of all those three, having superadded, as of its own, the peculiar force of a connective.

Having done with substantives, we now proceed to attributives.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING ATTRIBUTIVES.

ATTRIBUTIVES are all those principal words, that denote attributes, considered as attributes. Such, for example, are the words black, white, great, little, wise, eloquent, writeth, wrote, writing, &c.

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quired the name of уKλITıkal, that is, “leaning or inclining pronouns." The Greeks, too, had in the first person, ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ, ἐμὲ, for contradistinctives, and uou, pol, uè, for enclitics. And hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ, for παῖδα δὲ μοὶ, on account of the contradistinction which there occurs between the Grecians and Chryses. See Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 3. p. 20; 1. ii. c.

Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab 2. p. 102, 103.
Jove summo.

Thus Homer:

Ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν .

Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην. 'IɅ. A. Where the buîv and the μol stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective verbs, the uîv even leading the whole sentence. In other instances, these pronouns commonly take their place behind the verb, as may be seen in examples everywhere obvious. The Greek language went further still. When the oblique case of these pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονουμέναι, οι pronouns uprightly accented." When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the verb, but even gave it their accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they ac

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This diversity between the contradis tinctive pronouns and the enclitic, is not unknown even to the English tongue. When we say, Give me content, the me in this case is a perfect enclitic. But when we say, Give me content, Give him his thousands, the me and him are no enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an accent of their own, and so become the true ὀρθοτονουμέναι.

See before, p. 128.

g In the above list of words are included what grammarians called adjectives, verbs, and participles, inasmuch as all of them equally denote the attributes of substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the predicates in a proposition, (being all predicated of some subject or substance, Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.) hence I say the appellation pñua or verb is employed by logicians in an extended sense

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