"Me time hath bent, that sorry artist, he That surely makes, whate'er he handles, worse.' So, too, Shakspeare, speaking likewise of time: ORL. Whom doth he gallop withal? As you like it. The Greek Oávatos or aïdns, and the English death, seem, from the same irresistible power, to have been considered as masculine. Even the vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a female death they would treat as ridiculous." Take a few examples of the masculine death. Αἱ δὲ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀήδονες ᾗσιν ὁ πάντων "Yet thy sweet warbling strains Still live immortal, nor on them shall death In the Alcestis of Euripides, OávaTos, or "Death," is one of the persons of the drama: the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between him and Apollo; and toward its end there is a fight between him and Hercules, in which Hercules is conqueror, and rescues Alcestis from his hands. It is well known, too, that sleep and death are made brothers by Homer. It was to this old Gorgias elegantly alluded, when, at the extremity of a long life, he lay slumbering on his deathbed. A friend asked him, "How he did?" "Sleep (replied the old man) is just upon delivering me over to the care of his brother."n Thus Shakspeare, speaking of life: So Milton: Merely thou art Death's fool; Dire was the tossing, deep the groans; Despair Meas. for Meas. Par. Lost, xi. 489. " The Supreme Being (God, eòs, Deus, Dieu, &c.) is in all languages masculine, inasmuch as the masculine sex is the superior and more excellent; and as he is the Creator of all, the Father of gods and men. Sometimes, indeed, we meet with such words as Tò IIρwтov, Tò Oetov, Numen, Deity, (which last we English join to a neuter, saying Deity itself;) sometimes, η Ηδη με ὁ ὕπνος ἄρχεται παρακατατί θεσθαι τ' Αδελφῷ. Stob. Εcl. p. 600. m Well, therefore, did Milton, in his Paradise Lost, not only adopt death as a person, but consider him as masculine: in which he was so far from introducing a phantom of his own, or from giving it a gender not supported by custom, that perhaps he had as much the sanction of national opinion for his masculine death, as the ancient poets had for many of their deities. I say, we meet with these neuters. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this priority is better characterized and expressed by a negation, than by any of those distinctions which are co-ordinate with some opposite; as male, for example, is co-ordinate with female, right with left, &c. &c. P Virtue (aper, virtus) as well as most of its species, are all feminine, perhaps from their beauty and amiable appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt. Abash'd the devil stood, And felt how awful goodness is, and saw Par. Lost, iv. 846. This being allowed, vice (xaxía) becomes feminine of course, as being, in the ovσToixía, or "co-ordination of things," virtue's natural opposite. συστοιχία, The fancies, caprices, and fickle changes of fortune would appear but awkwardly under a character that was male: but taken together, they make a very natural female; which has no small resemblance to the coquette of a modern comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different beaus succeed to her good graces. Transmutat incertos honores, Hor. Why the furies were made female is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess than male passions, and that the furies were to be represented as things superlatively outrageous. Talibus Alecto dictis exarsit in iras. At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus: P Thus Ammonius, speaking on the same subject: Τὸ πρῶτον λέγομεν, ἐφ ̓ ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἀῤῥενωπὸν, ἢ θυληπρεπή (lege θηλυπρεπή) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄρῥενι τὸ θῆλυ σύστοικον· τὸ (lege τῷ δὲ πάντῃ, ἁπλῶς αἰτιῷ σύστοιχον οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς τὸν Θεὸν ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς] τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὑφειμένου προτιμῶντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. Primum dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari fœmininum est. Causæ autem omnino absolutæ ac simplici nihil est conjugatum. Æn. vii. 455. r Immo vero cum Deum masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submisso atque humili præferentes. Ammon. in lib. de Interpr. p. 30. Β. Οὐ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρώτῳ οὐδέν. Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb. 9 They are both represented as females by Xenophon, in the celebrated story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. See Memorab. 1. ii. c. 1. As to the συστοιχία here mentioned, thus Varro: Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem. Ling. Lat. 1. iv. See also Arist. Metaph. i. c. 5, and Ecclesiasticus, chap. xii. ver. 24. De The words above mentioned, time, death, He that would see more on this subject, may consult Ammonius the Peripatetic, in his Commentary on the treatise De Interpretatione, where the subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such speculations are at best but conjectures, they should therefore be received with candour, rather than scrutinized with rigour. Varro's words, on a subject near akin, are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. Non mediocres enim tenebræ in silva, ubi hæc captanda; neque eo, quo pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ ; neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt.s To conclude this chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both number and gender appertain to words, because, in the first place, they appertain to things; that is to say, because substances are many, and have either sex or no sex; therefore substantives have number, and are masculine, feminine, or neuter. There is, however, this difference between the two attributes: number in strictness descends no lower than to the last rank of species: gender, on the contrary, stops not fortune, virtue, &c. in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern languages, though they are diversified with genders in the manner described, yet never vary the gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances where the gender is doubtful. We cannot say apetǹ or å åpeτǹ, “ hæc virtus," or "hic virtus," "la vertu," or "le vertu," and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in English. We in our own language say, Virtue is its own reward, or Virtue is her own reward; Time maintains its wonted pace, or Time maintains his wonted pace. There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the distinction between the severe or logical style, and the ornamental or rhetorical. For thus, when we speak of the above words, and of all others naturally devoid of sex, as neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes a logical inquiry. When we give them sex, by making them masculine or feminine, they are from thenceforth personified; are a kind of intelligent beings, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of rhe toric or of poetry. Thus Milton: The thunder, Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage, Perhaps hath spent his shafts. Par. Lost, i. 174. The poet, having just before called the hail and thunder, "God's ministers of vengeance," and so personified them, had he afterwards said its shafts for his shafts, would have destroyed his own image, and approached withal so much nearer to The following passage is from the same poem: In this place his hand is clearly preferable either to her's or it's, by immediately referring us to God himself, the avenger. I shall only give one instance more, and quit this subject. At his command th' up-rooted hills retir'd See also ver. 54, 55, of the same book. Here all things are personified; the hills hear, the valleys smile, and the face of heaven is renewed. Suppose, then, the poet had been necessitated by the laws of his language to have said, Each hill retir'd to its place, Heaven renew'd its wonted face; how prosaic and lifeless would these neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the prosopopeia which he was aiming to establish! In this, therefore, he was happy, that the language in which he wrote imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a writer to impose it on himself. It were to be wished his correctors had been as wise on their parts. De Ling. Lat. 1. iv. The reason why number goes no lower is, that it does not naturally appertain to individuals; the cause of which see before, p. 128. here, but descends to every individual, however diversified. And so much for substantives, properly so called. CHAPTER V. CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVES OF THE SECONDARY ORDER. We are now to proceed to a secondary race of substantives, a race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose nature may be explained in the following manner. Every object which presents itself to the senses or the intellect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before. In the former case it is called an object, TŶS TOWNS YVWσews, "of the first knowledge," or acquaintance;" in the latter it is called an object, TĤs dEUTépas yvoσews, "of the second knowledge," or acquaintance. Now as all conversation passes between particulars or individuals, these will often happen to be reciprocally objects Ts πрwτηs vσews, that is to say, "till that instant unacquainted with each other." What then is to be done? How shall the speaker address the other, when he knows not his name? or how explain himself by his own name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been 4eîgis, that is, "pointing, or indication by the finger or hand," some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that action which naturally attends our speaking. But the authors of language were not content with this. They invented a race of words to supply this pointing; which words, as they always stood for substantives or nouns, were characterized by the name of ȧvτwvvμíaι, or "pronouns." These, also, they distinguished by three several sorts, calling them pronouns of the first, the second, and the third person, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows. V Suppose the parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither name nor countenance on either side known, and the "See Apoll. de Syntaxi, 1. i. c. 16. p. 49; L. ii. c. 3. p. 103. Thus Priscian: Interest autem inter demonstrationem et relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, primam cognitionem ostendit; qnis facit? Ego: relatio vero secundum cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de que jam dixit. Lib. xii. p. 936. edit. Putschii. ν Ἐκεῖνο οὖν ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δεῖξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζομένον Apoll. de Synt. I. ii. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of individuals, that he does not say they supply the place of any noun, but that of the proper name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. Pronomen est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. 1. xii. See also Apoll. l. ii. c. 9. p. 117, 118. subject of the conversation to be the speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of pointing by a word of equal power, they furnished the speaker with the pronoun I. I write, I say, I desire, &c. and as the speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called, for that reason, the pronoun of the first person. Again, suppose the subject of the conversation to be the party addressed. Here, for similar reasons, they invented the pronoun thou. Thou writest, thou walkest, &c.: and as the party addressed is next in dignity to the speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse, this pronoun they therefore called the pronoun of the second person. Lastly, suppose the subject of conversation neither the speaker nor the party addressed, but some third object, different from both. Here they provided another pronoun. He, she, or it; which, in distinction to the two former, was called the pronoun of the third person. And thus it was that pronouns came to be distinguished by their respective persons." As to number, the pronoun of each person has it: I has the plural we, because there may be many speakers at once of the same sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the sentiment of many. Thou has the plural you, because a w The description of the different persons here given is taken from Priscian, who took it from Apollonius. Personæ pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; secunda, cum de ea pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; tertia, cum de ea, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit sermonem. L. xii. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same distinctions. Πρῶτον (πρόσωπον sc.) ᾧ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φρά ζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερον, ᾧ περὶ τοῦ, πρὸς ἐν ὁ λόγος τρίτον, ᾧ περὶ ἑτέρου. Gaz. Gram. 1. iv. p. 152. This account of persons is far preferable to the common one, which makes the first the speaker, the second the party addressed, and the third the subject. For though the first and second be as commonly described, one the speaker, the other the party addressed; yet till they become subjects of the discourse they have no existence. Again, as to the third person's being the subject, this is a character which it shares in common with both the other persons, and which can never, therefore, be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When Æneas begins the narrative of his adventures, the second person immediately appears, because he makes Dido, whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his discourse. Infandum, regina, jubes, renovare do lorem. From henceforward, for fifteen hundred verses, (though she be all that time the party addressed,) we hear nothing further of this second person, a variety of other subjects filling up the narrative. In the mean time, the first person may be seen everywhere, because the speaker every where is himself the subject. They were indeed events, as he says himself, Quæque ipse miserrima vidi, Et quorum pars magna fui. Not that the second person does not often occur in the course of this narrative; but then it is always by a figure of speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many third persons, are converted into second persons by being introduced as present. The real second person (Dido) is never once hinted. Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Euclid, we find neither first person nor second in any part of the whole work. The reason is, that neither speaker nor party addressed (in which light we may always view the writer and his reader) can possibly become the subject of pure mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another. |