It is concerning Alfenus; who, (if you remember,) he tells us, though his tools were laid aside, and his shop shut up, was still an artist as much as ever: Alfenus vafer omni Abjecto instrumento artis clausaque taberna, I remember, said I, the passage; but to what purpose is it quoted?-Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of art, that it should be man actually becoming a cause; but that it was enough, if he had the power or capacity of so becoming.-Why then, said I, did you not settle it so at first? Because, replied he, faculties, powers, capacities, (call them as you will,) are in themselves, abstract from action, but obscure and hidden things. On the contrary, energies and operations lie open to the senses,d and cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence, therefore, when first we treated of art, we chose to treat of it as of a thing only in energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat further.-Repeat, then, said I, if you please, the alteration which you have made.-At first, answered he, we reasoned upon art, as if it was only man actually becoming a cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a power in man of becoming such cause; and that, though he be not actually in the exercise of such a power.—I told him, his amendment appeared to be just. There is, too, another alteration, added he, which, for the sake of accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the epithet, "intentional or voluntary."-And what, said I, is that? We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary, that all art should be under the guidance of intention or volition, so that no man acting by compulsion, or by chance, should be called an artist. We have.-Now though this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must limit this intention or volition to a peculiar kind. For were every little fancy, which we may work up into habit, a sufficient foundation to constitute an art, we should make art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest trick of a common juggler might, in such case, entitle from the ship, the musician from the instrument. For to these subjects though those artists are principles of motion and rest, yet do they in no sense participate with them in vital sympathy and union. · Εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὶ ἕκαστον τούτων, οἷον τὶ τὸ νοητικὸν, ἢ τὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, πρότερον ἐπισκεπτέον, τὶ τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πρότεραι γὰρ καὶ σαφέστεραι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεών εἰσι αἱ ἐνέργειαι. προεντυγχάνομεν γὰρ αὐταῖς, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τούτων ervooûμev. "If we are to explain what each of these things are, as for instance, what the intelligent principle, what the sensitive, we must first inquire what it is to think, what to see, hear, and use the senses. For with respect to us men, the energies are prior and more evident than the powers, because it is in the energies we are first conversant, and comprehend the powers from them.” Themist. in lib. ii. de Anima, p. 76. ed. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. ii. 4. a man to the character of an artist.-I confessed, that without some limitation, this might be the consequence. But how limit intentions to a kind or species?-What think you, replied he, if we were to do it, by the number and dignity of the precepts, which go to the directing of our intentions?—You must explain, said I; for your meaning is obscure.-Are there not precepts, replied he, in agriculture, about ploughing and sowing? Are there not precepts in architecture, about orders and proportions? Are there not the same in medicine, in navigation, and the rest? -There are. And what is your opinion of these several precepts? Are they arbitrary and capricious, or rational and steady? Are they the inventions of a day, or well-approved by long experience? I told him, I should consider them for the most part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long experience. -And what, continued he, shall we say to their number? Are they few? Or are they not rather so numerous, that in every particular art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due attendance and application?-I replied, it seemed so.-Suppose then we were to pronounce, that to every art there was a system of such various and well-approved precepts: should we err?No, certainly. And suppose we should say, that the intention of every artist, in his several art, was directed by such a system: would you allow this? Surely.And will not this limiting of intentions to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish art from any thing else which may resemble it? in other words, is it likely, under this distinction, to be confounded with other habits of a trifling, capricious, and inferior kind?—I replied, I thought not. Let us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said together. We have already agreed, that the power of acting after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute art, without the actually operating agreeably to that power. And we have now further held the intentions of every artist to be directed by a system of various and well-approved precepts. Besides all this, we settled it before, that all art was founded in habit; and was peculiar to man; and was seen by becoming the cause of some effect. It should seem, then, that the whole idea of art was this, an habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some e Vid. Plat. in Min. vol. ii. p. 316, 17. edit. Serran. et in Gorgia, vol. i. p. 465. A. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πράγμα. As to those low habits here mentioned, from which we distinguish art by the number and dignity of its precepts, they fall, in general, under the denomination of paraloTEXvía, of which Quintilian gives the following account. Ματαιοτεχνία quoque est quædam, id est, supervacua artis imitatio, quæ nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, sed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex spatio distante missa, in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat: quem, cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur ejusdem leguminis modio. Quod quidem præmium fuit illo opere dignissimum. Inst. Orat. l. ii. c. 20. effect, according to a system of various and well-approved precepts." I replied, that his account appeared to be probable and just. II. And now, then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have settled between us what we believe art to be; shall we go a little further, or is your patience at an end?-Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked so leisurely, that much remains of our way; and I can think of no method how we may better amuse ourselves. f The Peripatetic definition of art is is μetà λóyou àλnloûs tointikh: "an efficient habit, joined with sound and true reason." Arist. Ethic. 1. vi. c. 4. The Stoic definition, as we find it in Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos, p. 392, is, Σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὶ τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βιῷ. Thus translated by Cicero in Diodemes de Grammat. 1. ii. Ars est perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium. And again by Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 1. ii. c. 18. Artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ. The same definition is also alluded to in the Academics of Cicero, l. ii. c. 7, where it is said, Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat ? There is a third definition of art cited by Quintilian in the same place, and ascribed by him to Cleanthes: Ars est potestas via (id est, ordine) efficiens. The Greek, from which this Latin definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophieal: the words are, Εξις ὁδῷ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας: which may be rendered, "an habit, which proceeds in a road or method, having a sense, withal, of what it is about." The last character distinguishes art from the natural energies of all things insensitive, which, though they proceed methodically, yet want a sense of what they are doing. Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic. p. 20. Now if we compare these definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. “The habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some effect," is the same as "Eis TOINTIKǹ in the Peripatetic definition. "According to a system of various and well-approved precepts," is the same as μετὰ λόγου aλneous. For sound and true reason must needs be the basis of all such precepts. Again, as to the second definition; the words ZvσTημa kатαλý↓еwν [a system of comprehensions, or of certain and evident truths] correspond to the latter part of the definition in the Dialogue," according to a system of various and well-approved precepts." The word éyyeyvuvao μévwv [that is to say, worked in by habit and exercise] corresponds to the first part, that "art is a cause founded in habit." And the rest [Tpòs T TÉλOS, &c. that is to say, a system which has respect to some useful and serviceable end or purpose in human life,” shews the system here mentioned to regard practice and action, not theory and speculation. And thus does it correspond with the definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that art is an habitual power, not of merely contemplating and knowing, but of becoming the cause of some effect. It is not, indeed, expressed in the Dialogue, that this effect has respect to the utility of human life, because this latter circumstance is reserved to the definition of the final cause of art, given page 16. As to the third definition of art, potestas via efficiens, "a power operating methodically," it may be observed, that by being called an operating power, it is distinguished from powers purely speculative; and as it is said to operate methodically, or in a road and regular process, it is distinguished from chance as well as blind necessity. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this definition, whether the power therein mentioned be original and natural, or secondary and habitual, because powers of either sort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to distinguish so far, but took art in that larger and more general sense, adopted sometimes by the Stoics; as when they describe Nature herself to be a rup τεχνικὸν ὅδῳ βαδίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, “ an artificial fire, proceeding methodically to production or creation." For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that nature was a fire, which had learnt by habit so to operate. On the contrary, by "artificial," it is probable they intended no more than some active efficient principle, working with reason, order, and method; of which principle they considered fire to be the properest vehicle, as being of all bodies the most subtle, and that into which the rest are all ultimately resolvable. Vide Diog. Laert. 1. vii. s. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. ii. c. 22. 66 My friend, upon this, proceeded with saying, that if art were a cause, (as we had agreed it was,) it must be the cause of something. Allow it, said I.-And if it be the cause of something, it must have a subject to operate on. For every agent has need of some patient: the smith of his iron, the carpenter of his wood, the statuary of his marble, and the pilot of his ship. -I answered, it was true.-If, then, said he, the subjects of particular arts be thus evident, what idea shall we form of that universal subject which is common to all art?-At this question, it must be confessed, I was a little embarrassed. This induced him to ask me, how many sorts of subjects I allowed of? Here I could not help hesitating again. There is nothing, continued he, so difficult in the question. You must needs perceive, that all natures whatever can be but either contingent or necessary.-This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you.-Not comprehend me! said he'; then answer me a question: can you conceive any medium between motion and no-motion, between change and no-change?-I replied, I could not.-If not, can you conceive any thing in the whole order of being, which must not be either liable to these, or not liable?-Nothing.-Call those things, therefore, said he, which are liable to change and motion, contingent natures; and those which are not liable, necessary natures: and thus you have a division, in which all things are included.-We have so, said I. In which, therefore, said he, of these natures shall we seek for this common subject of art?—To this, I told him, I was unable to answer.-Reflect, said he, a little. We have found art to be a cause.-We have.-And is it not essential to every cause to operate? or can it be a cause, and be the cause of nothing? Impossible.-Wherever, therefore, there is cause, there is necessarily implied some operation.-There is.-And can there possibly be operation, without motion and change?— There cannot. But change and motion must needs be incompatible with what is necessary and immutable.-They must.So, therefore, is cause. It must.-And so, therefore, art.-It must.-Truth, therefore, said he, and knowledge; principles and demonstrations; the general and intellectual essences of things; in short, the whole immutable and necessary nature is no part of it reducible to a subject of art.-It seems so, said I. If, therefore, art, said he, have nothing to do with the steady, abstract, and necessary nature, it can have only to do with the transient, the particular, and contingent one.-It is true, said I; for there is no other left.-And shall we then say, replied he, it has to do with all contingent natures existing in the universe? -For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary.-What think you, said he, of those contingents of higher order? such as the grand planetary system; the succession of the seasons; the regular and uniform course of all superior natures in the universe? Has art any ability to intermeddle here?—No, certainly, said I.-These superior contingents, then, which move without interruption, are, it seems, above it.-They are.-And shall we say the same of those of lower sort; those, whose course we see often interrupted; those, which the strength and cunning of man are able to influence and control?-Give instances, said I, of what you mean.—I mean, said he, earth, water, air, fire, stones, trees, animals, men themselves. Are these contingents within the reach of art, or has art here no influence?—I should think, said I, a very great one. If this, continued he, be true, it should seem that the common or universal subject of art was, all those contingent natures which lie within the reach of the human powers to influence. I acknowledge, said I, it appears so. The cause here treated is the material, the Ὕλη, or Ὑποκείμενον, οι τὸ ἐξ οὗ γινεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος. Of a contingent we have the following definition : Λέγω δ ̓ ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δ ̓ ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ ̓ ἀδύνατον. "I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such supposition." Arist. Anal. prior. l. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. 1. iii. s. 10. That this is true in works of art, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given fragment of such a rock should assume the figure of Hercules: but there follows nothing impossible, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason that the subject of art is in the Dialogue called "a contingent." But, however, to explain the whole of what is said in this place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter considerations. The Peripatetics held the end or aim of their philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the apx, the "primary and creative principle of all things." They pursued this inquiry, when they reasoned analytically, that is to say, upwards, by beginning their contemplation from those things which are to us first in the order of our comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is truly first in the real order of beings. Ammon. eis E. pwv. p. 36. The first and original objects of our comprehension are those nearer and more immediate, viz. the objects of sense, with which we are surrounded on every side. These objects we perceive to be all in motion; and the motions are multiform, various, and often opposite to each other. The consequences of this we perpetually behold. By such motions we see, that not only the mere local site of these beings is changed, but their very bulk, and' figure, and qualities; nay, more than this, even the beings themselves are made to separate and perish, while new beings arise from the re-assemblage of the scattered parts, which parts different motions can as well bring together, as disunite. The beings or objects of the character here described, the Peripatetics denoted under the common appellation of the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτὰ, "the beings moving and corruptible." From these moving and perishable objects they passed to those sublimer and more transcendent objects of sense, which they saw adorn the heavens. Here, likewise, they discovered motion; but then this motion was uniform and constant ; affecting not the beings moved, save in the relation of local site. As, therefore, they beheld no change in the form and essence of these beings, they deemed them (upon their hypothesis) incorruptible, and out of them established another class of beings, that is to say, the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, "the beings moving and incorruptible." From these sublimer objects of sense they passed to objects of pure intellect; to bodies devoid of all motion, and of all quality, save that inseparable one of figure; such bodies, for instance, as the cube, the sphere, and the rest of bodies mathematical. From mathematical bodies, and the truths resulting from them, they passed to the contemplation of truth in general; to the soul, and its powers both of intuition and syllogization; to being universal, and above both time and place; and thus, at last, to that supreme cause, the great principle of the whole, which is ever the same, immutable and eternal. The several objects of this intellectual comprehension they styled, not merely ἄφθαρτα, but ἄφθαρτα καὶ ἀκί νητα, beings incorruptible and immoveable." Vid. inf. note r. |