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words, is a conjunction. This confusion of sounds serves to embarrass style. Much better, sure, to have said, the idea of any thing which is new or uncommon that he might encourage. The expression with which the sentence concludes, a motive to put us upon fresh discoveries, is flat, and, in some degree, improper. He should have said, put us upon making fresh discoveries; or rather, serves as a motive inciting us to make fresh discoveries.

'He has made every thing that is beautiful in our own species, pleasant, that all creatures might be tempted to multiply their kind, and fill the world with inhabitants; for, 'tis very remarkable, that, wherever nature is crost in the production of a monster, (the result of any unnatural mixture) the breed is incapable of propagating its likeness, and of founding a new order of creatures; so that, unless all animals were allured by the beauty of their own species, generation would be at an end, and the earth unpeopled.'

Here we must, however reluctantly, return to the employment of censure: for this is among the worst sentences our author ever wrote; and contains a variety of blemishes. Taken as a whole, it is extremely deficient in unity. Instead of a complete proposition, it contains a sort of chain of reasoning, the links of which are so ill put together, that it is with difficulty we can trace the connexion; and, unless we take the trouble of perusing it several times, it will leave nothing on the mind but an indistinct and obscure impression.

Besides this general fault, respecting the meaning, it contains some great inaccuracies in language. First, God's having made every thing which is beautiful in our species, (that is, in the human species) pleasant, is certainly no motive for all creatures, for beasts, and birds, and fishes, to multiply their kind. What the author meant to say, though he has expressed himself in so erroneous a manner, undoubtedly was, 'In all the different orders of creatures, he has made every thing, which is beautiful in their own species, pleasant, that all creatures might be tempted to multiply their kind.' The second member of the sentence is still worse. For it is very remarkable, that wherever nature is crost in the production of a monster, &c. The reason which he here gives, for the preceding assertion, intimated by the casual particle for, is far from being obvious. The connexion of thought is not readily apparent, and would have re quired an intermediate step, to render it distinct. But what does he mean, by nature being crost in the production of a monster? One might understand him to mean, 'disappointed in its intention of producing a monster,' as when we say, one is crost in his pursuits, we mean, that he is disappointed in accomplishing the end which he intended. Had he said, crost by the production of a monster, the sense would have been more intelligible. But the proper rectification of the expression would be to insert the adverb as, before the preposition in, after this manner; wherever nature is crost, as in the production of a monster. The insertion of this particle as, throws so much light on the construction of this member of the sentence, that I am very much inclined to believe, it had stood thus originally, in our author's manuscript; and that the present reading is a typographi

cal error, which, having crept into the first edition of the Spectator, ran through all the subsequent ones.

In the last place, he has made every thing that is beautiful, in all other objects, pleasant, or rather has made so many objects appear beautiful, that he might render the whole creation more gay and delightful. He has given almost every thing about us the power of raising an agreeable idea in the imagination; so that it is impossible for us to behold his works with coldness or indifference, and to survey so many beauties without a secret satisfaction and complacency.'

The idea, here, is so just, and the language so clear, flowing, and agreeable, that, to remark any diffuseness which may be attributed to these sentences, would be justly esteemed hypercritical.

'Things would make but a poor appearance to the eye, if we saw them only in their proper figures and motions: and what reason can we assign for their exciting in us, many of those ideas which are different from any thing that exists in the objects themselves, (for such are light and colours,) were it not to add supernumerary ornaments to the universe, and make it more agreeable to the imagination?'

Our author is now entering on a theory, which he is about to illustrate, if not with much philosophical accuracy, yet, with great beauty of fancy, and glow of expression. A strong instance of his want of accuracy, appears in the manner in which he opens the subject. For what meaning is there in things exciting in us many of those ideas which are different from any thing that exists in the objects? No one, sure, ever imagined that our ideas exist in the objects. Ideas, it is agreed on all hands, can exist no where but in the mind. What Mr. Locke's philosophy teaches, and what our author should have said, is,exciting inus many ideas of qualities which are different from any thing that exists in the objects. The ungraceful parenthesis which follows, for such are light and colours, had far better have been avoided, and incorporated with the rest of the sentence, in this manner; 'exciting in us many ideas of qualities, such as light and colours, which are different from any thing that exists in the objects.' 'We are every where entertained with pleasing shows and apparitions. We discover imaginary glories in the heavens and in the earth, and see some of this visionary beauty poured out upon the whole creation; but what a rough unsightly sketch of nature should we be entertained with, did all her colouring disappear, and the several distinctions of light and shade vanish? In short, our souls are delightfully lost and bewildered in a pleasing delusion; and we walk about like the enchanted hero of a romance, who sees beautiful castles, woods, and meadows; and, at the same time, hears the warbling of birds, and the purling of streams; but, upon the finishing of some secret spell, the fantastic scene breaks up, and the disconsolate knight finds himself on a barren heath, or in a solitary desert.'

After having been obliged to point out several inaccuracies, I return with much more pleasure to the display of beauties, for

which we have now full scope; for these two sentences are such as do the highest honour to Mr. Addison's talents as a writer. Warmed with the idea he had laid hold of, his delicate sensibility to the beauty of nature, is finely displayed in the illustration of it. The style is flowing and full, without being too diffuse. It is flowery, but not gaudy; elevated, but not ostentatious.

Amidst this blaze of beauties, it is necessary for us to remark one or two inaccuracies. When it is said, towards the close of the first of those sentences, what a rough unsightly sketch of nature should we be entertained with, the preposition with should have been placed at the beginning, rather than at the end of this member; and the word entertained, is both improperly applied here, and carelessly repeated from the former part of the sentence. It was there employed according to its more common use, as relating to agreeable objects. We are every where entertained with pleasing shows. Here it would have been more proper to have changed the phrase, and said, with what a rough unsightly sketch of nature should we be presented. At the close of the second sentence, where it is said, the fantastic scene breaks up, the expression is lively, but not altogether justifiable. An assembly breaks up; a scene closes or disappears. Excepting these two slight inaccuracies, the style, here, is not only correct, but perfectly elegant. The most striking beauty of the passage arises from the happy simile which the author employs, and the fine illustration which it gives to the thought. The enchanted hero, the beautiful castles, the fantastic scene, the secret spell, the disconsolate knight, are terms chosen with the utmost felicity, and strongly recall all those romantic ideas with which he intended to amuse our imagination. Few authors are more successful in their imagery than Mr. Addison; and few passages in his works, or in those of any author, are more beautiful and picturesque than that on which we have been commenting.

It is not improbable, that something like this may be the state of the soul after its first separation, in respect of the images it will receive from matter; though, indeed, the ideas of colours are so pleasing and beautiful in the imagination, that it is possible the soul will not be deprived of them, but, perhaps, find them excited by some other occasional cause, as they are at present, by the different impressions of the subtile matter on the organ of the sight.'

As all human things, after having attained the summit, begin to decline, we must acknowledge that, in this sentence, there is a sensible falling off from the beauty of what went before. It is broken and deficient in unity. Its parts are not sufficiently compacted. It contains, besides, some faulty expressions. When it is said, something like this may be the state of the soul, to the pronoun this, there is no determined antecedent; it refers to the general import of the preceding description, which, as I have several times remarked, always rendered style clumsy and inelegant, if not obscurethe state of the soul after its first separation, appears to be an incomplete phrase, and first, seems an useless, and even an improper

word. More distinct if he had said,state of the soul immediately on its separation from the body. The adverb perhaps, is redundant, after having just before said, it is possible.

I have here supposed, that my reader is acquainted with that great modern discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the inquirers into natural philosophy: namely, that light and colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter. As this is a truth which has been proved incontestably by many modern philosophers, and is, indeed, one of the finest speculations in that science, if the English reader would see the notion explained at large, he may find it in the eighth chapter of the second book of Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.'

In these two concluding sentences, the author, hastening to finish, appears to write rather carelessly. In the first of them, a manifest tautology occurs, when he speaks of what is universally acknowledged by all inquirers. In the second, when he calis a truth which has been incontestably proved; first, a speculation, and afterwards a notion, the language surely is not very accurate. When he adds, one of the finest speculations in that science, it does not, at first, appear what science he means. One would imagine, he meant to refer to modern philosophers; for natural philosophy (to which, doubtless, he refers) stands at much too great a distance to be the proper or obvious antecedent to the pronoun that. The circumstance towards the close, if the English reader would see the notion explained at large, he may find it, is properly taken notice of by the author of the Elements of Criticism, as wrongly arranged, and is rectified thus: the English reader, if he would see the notion explained at large, may find it, &c.

In concluding the examination of this paper, we may observe, that though not a very long one, it exhibits a striking view both of the beauties, and the defects, of Mr. Addison's style. It contains some of the best, and some of the worst sentences, that are to be found in his works. But upon the whole, it is an agreeable and elegant essay.

LECTURE XXIII.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE IN No. 414 OF THE SPECTATOR.

'If we consider the works of nature and art, as they are qualified to entertain the imagination, we shall find the last very defective in comparison of the former; for though they may sometimes appea. as beautiful or strange, they can have nothing in them of that vast ness and immensity which afford so great an entertainment to the mind of the beholder.'

I had occasion formerly to observe, that an introductory sentence should always be short and simple, and contain no more matter than

This sentence leads to a re

is necessary for opening the subject. petition of this observation, as it contains both an assertion and the proof of that assertion; two things which, for the most part, but espe cially at first setting out, are with more advantage kept separate. It would certainly have been better, if this sentence had contained only the assertion, ending with the word former; and if a new one. had then begun, entering on the proofs of nature's superiority over art, which is the subject continued to the end of the paragraph. The proper division of the period I shall point out, after having first made a few observations which occur on different parts of it.

If we consider the works. Perhaps it might have been preferable, if our author had begun with saying, when we consider the works. Discourse ought always to begin, when it is possible, with a clear proposition. The if, which is here employed, converts the sentence into a supposition, which is always in some degree entangling, and proper to be used only when the course of reasoning renders it necessary. As this observation however may, perhaps, be considered as over-refined, and as the sense would have remained the same in either form of expression, I do not mean to charge our author with any error on this account. We cannot absolve him from inaccuracy in what immediately follows-the works of nature and art. It is the scope of the author throughout this whole paper, to compare nature and art together, and to oppose them in several views to each other. Certainly, therefore, in the beginning, he ought to have kept them as distinct as possible, by interposing the preposition, and saying, the works of nature and of art. As the words stand at present, they would lead us to think that he is going to treat of these works, not as contrasted, but as connected; as united in forming one whole. When I speak of body and soul as united in the human nature, I would interpose neither article nor preposition between them; Man is compounded of soul and body.' But the case is altered, if I mean to distinguish them from each other; then I represent them as separate, and say, 'I am to treat of the interests of the soul, and of the body.'

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Though they may sometimes appear as beautiful or strange. I cannot help considering this as a loose member of the period. It does not clearly appear at first what the antecedent is to they. In reading onwards, we see the works of art to be meant; but from the structure of the sentence, they might be understood to refer to the former, as well as to the last. In what follows, there is a greater ambiguitymay sometimes appear as beautiful or strange. It is very doubtful in what sense we are to understand as, in this passage. For, according as it is accented in reading, it may signify, that they appear equally beautiful or strange, to wit, with the works of nature; and then it has the force of the Latin tam: or it may signify no more than that they appear in the light of beautiful and strange; and then it has the force of the Latin tanquam, without importing any comparison. An expression so ambiguous, is always faulty; and it is doubly so here; because, if the author intended the former sense, and meant (as seems most probable) to employ as for a mark of comparison, it was

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