immediately involve the world in confufion and diftrefs; but which duty ought to be moft efteemed, we may continue to debate, without inconvenience, fo all be diligently performed as there is opportunity or need: for upon practice, not upon opinion, depends the happinefs of mankind; and controverfies, merely fpeculative, are of finall importance in themselves, however they may have fometimes heated a difputant, or provoked a faction.

Of the divine author of our religion it is impoffible to peruse the evangelical hiftories, without obferving how little he favoured the vanity of inquifitiveness; how much more rarely he condefcended to fatisfy curiofity, than to relieve diftrefs; and how much he defired that his followers fhould rather excel in goodness than in knowledge. His precepts tend immediately to the rectification of the moral principles, and the direction of daily conduct, without oftentation, without art, at once irrefragable and plain, fuch as well-meaning fimplicity may readily conceive, and of which we cannot mistake the meaning, but when we are afraid to find it.

The measure of juftice prefcribed to us, in our tranfactions with others, is remarkably clear and comprehenfive: Whatfoever ye would that men fhould do unto you, even fo do unto them. A law by which every claim of right may be immediately adjufted, as far as the private confcience requires to be informed; a law, of which every man may find the expofition in his own breaft, and which may always be obferved without any other qualifications than honefty of intention, and purity of will.

Over this law, indeed, fome fons of fophiftry have been fubtle enough to throw mifts, which have darkened their own eyes. To perplex this univerfal principle, they have enquired whether a man, confcious to himself of unreasonable wifhes, be bound to gratify them in another. But furely there needed no long deliberation to conclude, that the defires, which are to be confidered by us as the measure of right, must be such as we approve, and that we ought to pay no regard to those expectations in others which we condemn in ourfelves, and which, however they may intrude upon our imagination, we know it our duty to refift and fupprefs.

The difficulty of

One of the most celebrated cafes which have been produced as requiring fome fkill in the direction of confcience to adapt them to this great rule, is that of a criminal afking mercy of his judge, who cannot but know, that if he was in the state of the fupplicant, he should defire that pardon which he now denies. this fophifm will vanifh, if we remember that the parties are, in reality, on one fide the criminal, and on the other the community, of which the magiftrate is only the minifter, and by which he is intrufted with the publick fafety. The magiftrate, therefore, in pardoning a man unworthy of pardon, betrays the truft with which he is invefted, gives away what is not his own, and, apparently, does to others what he would not that others fhould do to him. Even the community, whofe right is ftill greater to arbitrary grants of mercy, is bound by those laws which regard the great republick of mankind, and cannot jufuty fuch forbearance as may promote wickedness,

wickedness, and leffen the general confidence and fecurity in which all have an equal intereft, and which all are therefore bound to maintain. For this reason the ftate has not a right to erect a general. fanctuary for fugitives, or give protection to fuch as have forfeited their lives by crimes against the laws of common morality equally acknowledged by all nations, because no people can, without infraction of the univerfal league of focial beings, incite, by profpects of impunity and fafety, thofe practices in another dominion, which they would themfelves punish in their own.

One occafion of uncertainty and hesitation, in those by whom this great rule has been commented and dilated, is the confufion of what the exacter cafuifts are careful to diftinguish, debts of justice and debts of charity. The immediate and primary intention of this precept, is to establish a rule of juftice, and I know not whether invention, or fophistry, can start a fingle difficulty to retard its application, when it is thus expreffed and explained, let every man allow the claim of right in another, which he fhould think himself entitled to make in the like circumftances.

The difcharge of the debts of charity, or duties which we owe to others, not merely as required by justice, but as dictated by benevolence, admits in its own nature greater complication of circumstances, and greater latitude of choice. Justice is indifpenfably and univerfally neceffary, and what is neceffary muft always be limited, uniform, and diftinct. But beneficence, though in general equally enjoined by our religion, and equally needful to the conciliation of the divine favour, is

yet, for the moft part, with regard to its fingle acts, elective and voluntary. We may certainly, without injury to our fellow-beings, allow in the diftribution of kindness fomething to our affections, and change the meafure of our liberality according to our opinions and profpects, our hopes and fears. This rule therefore is not equally determinate and abfolute with refpect to offices of kindness, and acts of liberality, becaufe liberality and kindness, abfolutely determined, would lofe their nature; for how could we be called tender, or charitable, for giving that which we are positively forbidden to withhold?

Yet even in adjusting the extent of our beneficence no other measure can be taken than this precept affords us, for we can only know what others fuffer or want, by confidering how we fhould be affected in the fame ftate; nor can we proportion our affiftance by any other rule than that of doing what we fhould then expect from others. It indeed generally happens that the giver and receiver differ in their opinions of generofity; the fame partiality to his own intereft inclines one to large expectations, and the other to fparing diftributions. Perhaps the infirmity of human nature will scarcely fuffer a man groaning under the preffure of diftrefs, to judge rightly of the kindness of his friends, or think they have done enough till his deliverance is completed; not therefore what we might wifh, but what we could demand from others, we are obliged to grant, fince, though we can easily know how much we might claim, it is impoffibe to determine what we hould hope.

But

But in all enquiries concerning the practice of voluntary and occafional virtues, it is fafeft for minds not opprefled with fuperftitious fears to determine against their own inclinations, and fecure themselves from deficiency, by doing more than they believe ftrictly neceflary. For of this every man may be certain, that, if he were to exchange conditions with his dependent, he fhould expect more than, with the utmoft exertion of his ardour, he now will prevail upon himself to perform; and when reafon has no fettled rule, and our paffions are ftriving to mislead us, it is furely the part of a wife man to err on the fide of fafety.

NUMB. 82. SATURDAY, December 29, 1750.

Omnia Caftor emit, fic fiet ut omnia vendat.

Who buys without discretion, buys to fell.

SIR,

IT

To the RAMBLER.

MART

T will not be neceffary to folicit your good-will by any formal preface, when I have informed you, that I have long been known as the most laborious and zealous virtuofo that the prefent age has had the honour of producing, and that inconveniencies have been brought upon me by an unextinguishable ardour of curiofity, and an unfhaken perfeverance in the acquisition of the productions of art and nature.

It was observed, from my entrance into the world, that I had fomething uncommon in my dif

poiition,