preceptor in this refpect is like the inclofer of uncultivated land; his first crops are not valued for their intrinfic excellence; they are fown that the land may be brought into order. The fprings of the mind, like the joints of the body, are apt to grow ftiff for want of employment. They must be exercifed in various directions and with unabating perfeverance. In a word, the firft leffon of a judicious education is, Learn to think, to difcriminate, to remember and to enquire *.

* Conjectures refpecting the ftudies to be cultivated in youth, not fo much for their own fake, as for that of the habits they produce, are ftated in Effay VI.

ESSAY

ESSAY II.

OF THE UTILITY OF TALENTS.

DOUBTS have fometimes been suggested

1

as to the defirableness of talents. "Give to a child," it has frequently been faid, "good fenfe and a virtuous propensity; I defire no more. Talents are often rather an injury than a benefit to their poffeffor. They are a fort of ignis fatuus leading us aftray; a fever of the mind incompatible with the fober dictates of prudence. They tempt a man to the perpetration of bold, bad deeds; and qualify him rather to excite the admiration, than promote the interests of fociety."

*

This may be affirmed to be a popular doctrine; yet where almoft is the affectionate parent who would seriously say, "Take care that my

child do not turn out a lad of too much capacity ?"

The capacity which it is in the power of education to bestow, muft confift principally in information. Is it to be feared that a man fhould know too much for his happiness? Knowledge. for the most part confifts in added means of pleasure

B 4

pleatre or enjoyment, and added dibemment to felett thofe means.

It mud probably be partial, not extentive, information, that is calculated to lead us atray. The slight of knowledge bewilders, and infiles a falfe confidence; its clear and perfect day muft exhibh things in their true colours and dimenfions. The proper cure of miltake, mult be to afford me more information; not to take away that which I have.

Talents in general, notwithstanding the exception mentioned in the outfet, hold a higher eftimation among mankind, than virtues. There are few men who had not rather you should fay of them, that they are knaves, than that they are fools. But folly and wifdom are to a great degree relative terms. He who paffes for the oracle of an obfcure club, would perhaps appear ignorant and confufed and vapid and tedious in a circle of men of genius. The only complete protection against the appellation of fool, is to be the poffeffor of uncommon capacity. A felf-fatisfied, half-witted fellow, is the moft ridiculous of all things.

- The decifion of common fame, in favour of talents in preference to virtues, is not fo abfurd as has fometimes been imagined. Talents are the inftruments of ufefulness. He that has them,

is capable of producing uncommon benefit; he that has them not, is deftitute even of the power, A tool with a fine edge may do mischief; but a tool that neither has an edge nor can receive it, is merely lumber.

Again; the virtues of a weak and ignorant man scarcely deserve the name. They poffefs it by way of courtefy only. I call fuch a man good, fomewhat in the fame way as I would call my dog good. My dog feems attached to me; but change his condition, and he would be as much attached to the ftupideft dunce, or the most cankered villain. His attachment has no discrimination in it; it is merely the creature of habit.

Juft fo human virtues without difcrimination, are no virtues. The weak man neither knows whom he ought to approve nor whom to disapprove. Dazzled by the luftre of uncommon excellence, he is frequently one of the first to defame it. He wishes me well. But he does not know how to benefit mc. He does not know what benefit is. He does not understand the nature of happiness or good. He cannot therefore be very zealous to promote it. He applies as much ardour to the thought of giving me a trinket, as to the thought of giving me liberty, magnanimity and independence.

The

There is a further reafon for this.

Virtue is

effential to individual happiness. There is no tranfport equal to that of the performance of virtue. All other happiness, which is not connected with felf-approbation and fympathy, is unfatisfactory and frigid.

To make a man virtuous we must make him wife. All virtue is a compromife between oppofite motives and inducements. The man of genuine virtue, is a man of vigorous comprehenfion and long views. He who would be eminently useful, must be eminently inftructed. He must be endowed with a fagacious judgment and an ardent zeal.

The argument in favour of wifdom or a cultivated intellect, like the argument in favour of virtue, when clofely confidered, shows itself to be twofold. Wifdom is not only directly a means to virtue; it is alfo directly a means to happiness. The man of enlightened understanding and perfevering ardour, has many fources of enjoyment which the ignorant man cannot reach; and it may at least be fufpected that these sources are more exquifite, more folid, more durable and more conftantly acceffible, than any which the wife man and the ignorant man poffefs in common.

Thus it appears that there are three leading

objects