deepest dye, with things, injudicious perhaps and cenfurable, but which were the mere fallies of thoughtless levity.

It has been already feen that, werę we in a ftate of fufficient improvement, the moft perfect fincerity in our language refpecting the characters of men, would be practicable. It is not at prefent however to be expected, whether we confider it as it relates to the speaker, or to the perfon who, in his abfence, happens to be the fubject of difcourfe.

It has fometimes been laid down as a rule, that we ought never to fpeak ill of a perfon in his abfence, But this is ridiculous. Characters, in order to be fufficiently understood, ought pertinaciously to be difcuffed. There is no duty more clear and unquestionable, than that I ought to endeavour to enlighten my neighbour respecting the character of another, and to guard him againft the ill effect of his vices and infirmities. The error therefore does not lie in my fpeaking ill of a perfon in his abfence.

There is scarcely any speaker so careful of his words, as never to indulge in wanton fallies, in defcanting on the infirmities of another. There is fcarcely any speaker who, in fuch cafes, does not occafionally indulge in invective, and defcribe the vices of another with that anger and unkindness,

unkindness, which an exalted humanity would teach him to regard as an infult. Thefe fallies and this invective are cenfurable in whatever way they are confidered; but they not seldom change their character and become atrocious, when related to the perfon who is the fubject of them.

Again; as the fpeaker is frail and imperfect, fo alfo is the perfon whose errors are the subject of difcourfe. There are few men at prefent who can endure to have their errors detailed to them in a plain and unvarnished manner. Yet it is my duty, fo far as opportunity ferves, to acquaint them with their errors. The medium I fhall obferve, will be to endeavour by every obvious method to render my tale palatable to them; and particularly to accompany it with proofs of kindness, which probably I little thought of when I fpoke of their faults in their absence. Though the fubject be the fame, my ftyle of treating it will therefore be confiderably different.

From thefe obfervations it appears that politeness, properly confidered, is no enemy to admonition. There is indeed a weak and halfwitted humanity, that refufes to incur the poffibility of inflicting pain upon its neighbour, where it can be avoided; and would rather allow him to incur the most serious inconvenience, than

rifk the appearing to his recollection an ungracious monitor. But it is the office of virtue, to view pleasure and pain in a more comprehenfive way, and to prefer for another, as for one's felf, the lefs evil to the greater. True politeness is a branch of virtue; and the corner-ftone upon which it refts, is, in the minuter and continually recurring incidents of human life, to seek to secure to its neighbour the greatest sum of pleafurable fenfation, with the leaft balance of painful.

Why is admonition fo frequently unpalatable? Not fo much, as lord Shaftesbury has well obferved, because few people know how to take advice, as because still fewer know how to give it. The monitor ufually affumes the tone of a mafter. At this ufurpation human independence reasonably spurns. The countenance compofed to unusual gravity, and a peculiar folemnity of voice fitted to the occafion, cannot fail to alarm and revolt every man of an ingenuous temper. Why this parade, this triumphal entry as if into a conquered province? Why treat a moral or a practical truth, in a way fo different from truths of any other kind? There is a difference of opinion between me and the perfon whofe conduct I apprehend to be imprudent or erroneous. Why

* Characteristics, Vol. I, Effay III.

not

not difcufs this difference upon equal terms? Why not fuppofe that I may be ignorant of a part of the queftion? Why not, as is reasonable, offer what occurs to me, rather as a hint for enquiry, than as a decifion emanating from an oracle of truth? Why not truft rather to the reafon of the cafe, than to the arts or the paffion with which I may inforce it?

"But I wish to leave a ferious impreffion." Am I so ignorant as to fuppofe that a large, fober and bland view of the fubject, will not produce this effect? Do I imagine that a greater impreffion ought to be produced, than can thus be produced

It may further be objected," I am perfectly fure of the grounds upon which I proceed; why. fhould I be expected to play the hypocrite, and pretend to be uncertain?" To this it can only be anfwered, It ought not to be expected from you fince you fhow yourself thus ignorant of the first principles of morality and reafon. The first principle of reason, and that which ought particularly to modify my practical judgments, is, that I fhould diftruft myfelf and the completeness information, both in point of argument

of

my

and fact... 'N & M

It is fcarcely neceffary in this place to enter a caveat against mifapprehenfion, under the form

of an eulogium upon the virtue of fincerity. Without habits of entire, unqualified fincerity, the human character can never be raised to its true eminence. It gives what nothing else can fo effectually give, an affured, unembarraffed and ingenuous manner. It is the true progenitor of contentment, and of the complacency with which a virtuous man. fhould be able to advert to his modes of proceeding. Infincerity corrupts and empoisons the foul of the actor, and is of pernicious example to every fpectator.

Yet fincerity ought not to be practifed folely for its own fake. The man who thinks only how to preferve his fincerity, is a glaringly imperfect character. He feels not for the suffering, and fympathifes not in the deliverance of others, but is actuated folely by a selfish and cold-hearted pride. He cares not whom he infults, nor whom he injures. There is nothing against which it behoves a well-intentioned man to be more upon his guard, than the mistaking a part for the whole, or the fubftituting a branch of the tree of beneficence, for the root from which it is derived.

Politenefs however, as has abundantly appeared, is, in its genuine fenfe, feldom or never at variance with fincerity. Sincerity in its principle, is nearer, and in more direct communication with, the root of virtue, utility, than po

litenefs