is not governed by this rule, will appear harsh and strained, and be disrelished by every one of taste. Hence the beauty of inversion when happily conducted; the beauty, not of an end, but of means, as furnishing opportunity for numberless ornaments that find no place in a natural style: hence the force, the elevation, the harmony, the cadence, of some compositions: hence the manifold beauties of the Greek and Roman tongues, of which living languages afford but faint imitations. SECTION III. Beauty of Language from a Resemblance between Sound and Signification. A RESEMBLANCE between the sound of certain words and their signification, is a beauty that has escaped no critical writer, and yet is not handled with accuracy by any of them. They have probably been of opinion, that a beauty so obvious to the feeling, requires no explanation. This is an error; and to avoid it, I shall give examples of the various resemblances between sound and signification, accompanied with an endeavour to explain why such resemblances are beautiful. I begin with examples where the resemblance between the sound and signification is the most entire; and next examples where the resemblance is less and less so. There being frequently a strong resemblance of one sound to another, it will not be surprising to find an articulate sound resembling one that is not articulate thus the sound of a bow-string is imitated by the words that express it: -The string let fly, Twang'd short and sharp, like the shrill swallow's cry. Odyssey, xxi. 449. The sound of felling trees in a wood: Loud sounds the axe, redoubling strokes on strokes, Iliad, xxiii. 144. But when loud surges lash the sounding shore, Dire Scylla there a scene of horror forms, Pope, No person can be at a loss about the cause of this beauty? it is obviously that of imitation. That there is any other natural resemblance of sound to signification, must not be taken for granted. There is no resemblance of sound to motion, nor of sound to sentiment. We are however apt to be deceived by artful pronunciation; the same passage may be pronounced in many different tones, elevated or humble, sweet or harsh, brisk or melancholy, so as to accord with the thought or sentiment; such concord must be distinguished from that concord between sound and sense, which is perceived in some expressions independent of artful pronunciation: the latter is the poet's work ; the former must be attributed to the reader. Another thing contributes still more to the deceit in language, sound and sense being intimately connected, the properties of the one are readily communicated to the other; for example, the quality of grandeur, of sweetness, or of melancholy, though belonging to the thought solely, is transferred to the words, which by that means resemble in appearance the thought that is expressed by them.* * See Chapter II. part. i. seɔt. 5. I have great reason to recommend these observations to the reader, considering how inaccurately the present subject is handled by critics; not one of them distinguishes the natural resemblance of sound and signification, from the artificial resemblances now described: witness Vida in particular, who in a very long passage has given very few examples but what are of the latter kind.* That there may be a resemblance of articulate sounds to some that are not articulate, is self-evident; and that in fact there exists such resemblances successfully employed by writers of genius, is clear from the foregoing examples, and from many others that might be given. But we may safely pronounce, that this natural resemblance can be carried no farther; the objects of the different senses, differ so widely from each other, as to exclude any resemblance: sound in particular, whether articulate or inarticulate, resembles not in any degree taste, smell or motion: and as little can it resemble any internal sentiment, feeling or emotion. But must we then admit, that nothing but sound can be imitated by sound. Taking imitation in its proper sense, as importing a resemblance between two objects, the proposition must be admitted; and yet in many passages that are not descriptive of sound, every one must be sensible of a peculiar concord between the sound of the words and their meaning. As there can be no doubt of the fact, what remains is to enquire into its cause. Resembling causes may produce effects that have no resemblance; and causes that have no resemblance may produce resembling effects. A magnificent building, for example, resembles not in any degree an heroic action; and yet the emotions they produce, are concordant, and bear a resemblance * Poet, L. iii. 365-454. to each other. We are still more sensible of this resemblance in a song, when the music is properly adapted to the sentiment: there is no resemblance between thought and sound; but there is the strongest resemblance between the emotion raised by music tender and pathetic, and that raised by the complaint of an unsuccessful lover. Applying this observation to the present subject, it appears, that in some instances, the sound even of a single word makes an impression resembling that which is made by the thing it signifies: witness the word running, composed of two short syllables; and more remarkably the words rapidity, impetuosity, precipitation. Brutal manners produce in the spectator an emotion not unlike what is produced by a harsh and rough sound; and hence the beauty of the figurative expression rugged manners. Again, the word little, being pronounced with a very small apperture of the mouth, has a weak and faint sound, which makes an impression resembling that made by a diminutive object. This resemblance of effect is still more remarkable where a number of words are connected in a period: words pronounced in succession make often a strong impression; and when this impression happens to accord with that made by the sense, we are sensible of a complex emotion, peculiarly pleasant; one proceeding from the sentiment, and one from the inelody or sound of the words. But the chief pleasure proceeds from having these two concordant emotions combined in perfect harmony, and carried on in the mind to a full close.* Except in the single case where sound is described, all the examples given by critics of sense being imitated in sound, resolve into a resemblance of effects: emotions raised by sound and signification may have a See Chapter II, Part iv. resemblance; but sound itself cannot have a resemblance to any thing but sound. Proceeding now to particulars, and beginning with those cases where the emotions have the strongest resemblance, I observe, first, That by a number of syllables in succession, an emotion is sometimes raised extremely similar to that raised by successive motion; which may be evident even to those who are defective in taste, from the following fact, that the term movement in all languages is equally applied to both. In this manner, successive motion, such as walking, running, galloping can be imitated by a succession of long or short syllables, or by a due mixture of both. For example, slow motion may be justly imitated in a verse where long syllables prevail; especially when aided by a slow pronunciation. Illi inter sese magna vi brachia tollunt. Georg. iv. 174. On the other hand, swift motion is imitated by a succession of short syllables: Quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum. Again: Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas. Thirdly, A line composed of monosyllables, makes an impression, by the frequency of its pauses, similar to what is made by laborious interrupted motion; With many a weary step, and many a groan, Odyssey, xi. 736. First march the heavy mules securely slow; Iliad, xxiii. 138. Fourthly, The impression made by rough sounds in succession, resembles that made by rough or tu |