LETTER LXII. SELIM, TO MIRZA AT ISPAHAN. HE methods purfued by Charles FROM LONDON, hufinels, who pretended to any sense of The Second, in the conduct of his honour, or regard to decency. government, were in many respects different from his father's, though the purpofe of both was much the fame. The father always bullied his parliaments; the fon endeavoured to corrupt them : the father obftinately refufed to change his minifters, because he really esteemed them as honeft men; the fon very eafily changed his, because he thought they were all alike dishonest, and that his defigns might as well be carried on by one knave as by another: the father was a tool of the clergy, and a perfecutor, out of zeal for his religion; the fon was almost indifferent to religion, but ferved the paffions of his clergy against the diffenters from motives of policy: the father defired to be abfolute at home, but to make the nation refpectable abroad; the fon affifted the King of France in his invafions on the liberties of Europe, that, by his help, he might mafter thofe of England; nay, he was even a penfioner to France, and, by fo vile a prostitution of his dignity, fet an example to the nobility of his realm, to fell their honour likewife for a penfion; an example, the ill effects of which have been felt too fenfibly ever since. Yet, with all thefe vices and imperfections in the character of Charles the Second, there was fomething fo bewitching in his behaviour, that the charms of it prevailed on many to connive at the faults of his government: and, indeed, nothing can be fo hurtful to a country, which has liberties to defend, as a prince who knows how at the fame time to make himself defpotick and agreeable: this was eminently the talent of Charles the Second; and, what is moft furprizing, he poffeffed it without any great depth of understanding. But the principal inftrument of his bad intentions, was a general depravity of manners, with which he took pains to infect his court, and they the nation, All virtues, both publick and private, were openly ridiculed; and none were allowed to have any talents for wit or The king made great ufe of thefe new notions; and they proved very pernicious to the freedom, as well as morals, of his fubjects: but an indolence, natural to his temper, was fome check to his defigns; and, fond as he was of arbitrary power, he did not purfue it any farther than was confultent with his pleasure and repose. His brother, who bore a great fway in his government, had changed his religion abroad, as the king himself had alfo done: but with this difference, that the latter retained almost as little of that which he embraced, as of that which he forfook; whereas the former was a bigot to popery, and known to be such, while the change of the king was a fecret to moft of his fubjects. The fear of a popish fucceffor raifed great difcontent, and great diforders in the nation: the Houfe of Commons paffed a bill for excluding that prince from the crown, founded undoubtedly in juftice and reafon; but the firmness of the king in that fingle point, the complaifance of the lords, the jealoufy the church entertained of the diffenters, the fcruples of thofe who thought hereditary right divine and indefeasible, and, above all, the fear of being involved in a new civil war, which alarmed many well-meaning people, from a mixture of faction that had difcovered itself in fome of the characters, and in fome of the measures, by which the national caufe was then carried on, frustrated the attempt to change the fucceffion, as the obftinacy of thole engaged in that attempt did all expedients to limit the fucceffor. The unhappy advantages all this gave to the king made him a great deal more abfolute in the last years of his reign than in all the foregoing ones; and, upon his demife, brought his bro ther in peace and triumph to the throne. He had not been long feated there, before he convinced the moft attached to his party, that the apprehenfions conceived of him, and the defign of excluding him, had been too jutt. All that that the fpirit of bigotry could add to a temper in itself barsh and violent, appeared in his government: all that a weak underflanding, madly conducted, could undertake, was undertaken: arbitrary power was the means used, and the end defigned was a change of religion. Happy was it for England that this end fo plainly declared itself: it rouzed even thofe whom no danger to Liberty could have ever alarmed, and taught the preachers of non-refiftance to refift. A revolution was evidently necellary to fave the whole, and that ne ceffity produced one. King James the Second loft his crown, and the nation gave it to their deliverer, the Prince of Orange: the government was fettled on a firmer foundation, agreeable to the ancient Saxon principles from which it had declined; and, by a happiness peculiar to itfelf, grew fironger from the fhocks it had fuftained. LETTER LXIII. SELIM, TO MIRZA AT ISPAHAN. HE firft advantage gained by the their government, was the utter extinction of thofe vain and empty phantoms of bereditary indefeasible right, and a power fuperior to law, which King James the First had conjured up, to the great difturbance and terror of his people. With James the Second they were expelled; nor can they ever be brought back again with any profpect of fuccefs, but by that family alone, which claims from him: for which reafon, it will eternally be the intereft of the people of England, not to fuffer fuch a claim to prevail; but to maintain an eltablishment, which is founded on the bafis of their liberty, and from which their liberty cannot be separated unless the rights of both are destroyed. As the parliament plainly difpofed of the crown in altering the fucceffion, the princes who have reigned fince that time could pretend to none but a parliamentary title; and the fame force as the legiflature could give to that, it also gave to the privileges of the subject. The word loyalty, which had long been mifapplied, recovered it's original and proper fenfe: it was now understood to mean no more than a due obedience to the authority of the king, in conformity to the laws; inftead of a bigotted compliance to the will of the king, in oppofition to the laws. How great an advantage this would be, will appear, by reflecting on the mischiefs that have been brought upon this country in particular, from the wrong interpretation of certain names. FROM LONDON. But this is not the only benefit that en prerogative of the crown had been till then to ill defined, that the full extent of it was rather ftopped by the degree of prudence in the government, or of impatience in the people, than by the letter of the law: nay, it seemed as if in many inftances the law allowed a power to the king, entirely deftructive to itfelf. Thus princes had been often made to believe, that what their fubjects complained of as oppreffion, was a legal exercife of the rights of the crown: and no wonder if, in difputable points, they decided the question in favour of their own authority. But now the bounds of prerogative were marked out by express restrictionsz the course of it became regular and fixed; and could no longer move obliquely, to the danger of the general fyitem. Let me alfo obferve to thee, that whereas before, to govern by parliaments was the policy only of good and wife princes; after this period, it may be confidered in a different light, becaufe all expedients of governing otherwife are plainly impracticable, and it may not always imply a conforming the government to the fenje of the people. I will explain this to thee more distinctly when I write again. In the mean while, let me a little recal thy thoughts from past events, and the hiftory of England, to the remembrance and love of thy faithful Selim, who is not become so much an Englishman as to forget his native Perfia; but perpetually fighs for his friends and country, amidit all that engages his attention in a foreign land. LETTER LETTER LXIV. SELIM, TO MIRZA AT ISPAHAN. THE ancient revenues of the kings THE of England confifted chiefly in a large demefne of lands, and certain rights and powers referved to them over the lands held of the crown; by means of which they fupported the royal dignity without the immediate affiftance of the people, except upon extraordinary occafons. But, in procefs of time, the extravagance of princes and the rapacioufnefs of favourites having wafted the beft part of this eftate, and their fucceffors endeavouring to repair it by a tyrannical abufe of thofe rights and powers, fome of them which were found to be moft grievous, were bought off by the parlia ment, with a fixed eftablishment for the maintenance of the houfhold, compoted of certain taxes yearly raifed, and appropriated thereto. But, after the expulfion of the Stuarts, the expence of the govern.nent being augmented for the defence of the fucceffion, the crown was contrained to apply to parliament, not only for the maintenance of it's houthold, which was fettled at the beginning of every reign, Y FROM LONDON. and in every reign confiderably encreafed; not only for extraordinary fupplies, to which end parlia nents anciently were called; but for the ordinary fervice of the year. Thus a continual dependance on the people became neceffary to kings; and they were fo truly the fervants of the publick, that they received the wages of it in form, and were obliged to the parliament for the means of exercising the royalty, as well as for the right they had to claim it. Nor can this lutary dependance ever ceafe, except the parliament itself should give it up, by empowering the king to raise money, withour limiting the fum, or specifying the fervices. Such conceffions are abfurd in their own nature ; for if a prince is afraid to trust his people with a power of fupplying his neceffities, upon a thorough knowledge of them, the people have no encouragement to trust their prince, or, to fpeak more properly, his minifters, with fo blind and undetermined an authority. LETTER LXV. SELIM, TO MIRZA AT ISPAHAN. OU have feen in my laft, that, from the time of King James's expulfion, annual meetings of parliament were become neceffary to the carrying on of the government. But that the reprefentatives of the people, from too long a delegation of their authority, might not forget by whom, and for what, it was given them; and that the people might be enable to correct a bad choice, which experience fhould prove to be fuch; it was thought expedient not long after to pass a law for the chufing a new parliament at the end of every three years. This term has been fince prolonged to feven, I think for very good reafons; becaufe the country intereft could not fupport the redoubled expence of contefting with court-corruption fo FROM LONDON. much oftener than now, and there are no good grounds to fuppole that the efforts on that fide would be much lefs for a triennial than a feptennial parliament, a majority in that being equally neceffary to a court as in this: fo that the attacks would be the fame, or near the fame, and the refittance much weaker on the fide of the people. If then the good proposed by shortening the term be very uncertain, it must be confidered that very great and certain evils attend upon frequent elections, viz. the enflaming of party divifions, depraving the morals of the people, and many other inconveniences of no light weight. However, this is a point about which I have found the best men differ, and which thou wilt therefore confider as more pro blematical blematical than others I have mentioned before. I now return to my history... Among other advantages gained to liberty at this it's happy restoration, a free exercise of their religion was allowed to those who differ from the rites of the English church; which has been continued and fecured to them ever fince, with fome fhort interruptions, which even the party that caufed them is now afhamed of. Nor has any thing contributed more than this to the peace and happiness of the government, by gaining it the affection of all it's fubjects, and taking from the fpirit of faction a pretence, and a strength, of which it has often made a very bad use. I must alfo obferve to thee, that from this period a different temper has fhewn itself in the clergy of England. They are become better friends to liberty, better subjects, better Englishmen, than they had ufually been either before or fince the Reformation. Sone among them have written in defence of the religious and civil rights of mankind, with as free a fpirit, and as much force of learning and argument, as any layman has ever done; a merit peculiar to themfelves, and to which no other clergy in the whole world can pretend. The generality of them are now very moderate, quiet, and useful members of the commonwealth, in due fubmiffion to the civil authority, and defiring nothing but, what they deferve, the protection of government in the enjoyment of their juft rights. They who would deny them that, are themselves perfecutors, diftur. bers of government, and very bad members of the commonwealth. This fucceffion was facilitated and fecured by the union of Scotland with England; and Great Britain became in finitely ftronger, by being undivided, entire, and wholly an island. One condition of that union was, the admitting fixteen Scotch peers, chofen by the whole body of the peerage, into the English Houfe of Lords, but upon a tenure very different from the reft, being to fit there only for the duration of the parliament, at the end of which a new election must be made. If those elections are free and uninfluenced, this alteration in the English conftitution may prove very much to it's advantage, becaufe fuch a number of independent votes will balance any part of the House of Peers over which the court may have obtained too great an influence; but if they should ever be chofen by corruption, and have no hopes of fitting there again except by an unconftitutional dependence on the favour of a court, then fuch a number added to the others would grievoufly endanger the conftitution; and the Houfe of Lords, inftead of being, as it ought, a mediating power between the crown and the people, would become a fort of antichamber to the court, a mere office for executing and authorizing the purposes of a minister. I have now, my dear Mirza, traced thee out a general plan of the English conftitution: and believe thou wilt agree with me, upon the whole, that a better can hardly be contrived; the only misfortune is, that fo good a one can hardly be preferved. The great diftinction between the ancient plan of it and that which has taken place fince the expulfion of the Stuarts is this, that the first was less perfect; but better secured, because the nobility and people bad the fword in their hands; whereas the last is more regular, subject to fewer disorders, and in the frame of it more free, but ill fecured, the fword being only in the bands of the king. to which is added a vast encrease of the wealth of the crown, and a mighty influence gained to it by the debts of the publick, which have brought on new taxes, new powers for the raising those taxes, of a very dangerous nature, and a prodigious multiplication of officers. wholly dependent upon the court; from all which the court has acquired new means of corruption, without any new effectual fecurities against that corruption being yet gained on the fide of the people. And this fort of power is so much more to be feared than any other, as it cannot be exercised without depraving the morals, and debafing the jpirit, of the whole people; which in the end would not only enflave them, but render their fervitude voluntary, defer-ved, and remediless. LETTER LXVI. SELIM, TO MIRZA AT ISFAHAN. former reigns, when parliaments were laid afide for any length of time, the whole authority of the fate was fodged in a privy council, by the advice and direction of which all affairs were carried on. But thefe counsellors, being chofen by the king, and depending on his favour, were too apt to advife fuch things only as they knew would be moft agreeable; and thus the interefts of the nation were often facrificed to the profit and expectations of a few particulars. Yet till, as on extraordinary occafions the king might be forced to call a parliament, the fear of it was fome check to their proceedings; and a degree of caution was natural to men who forefaw they thould fooner or later be called to an account. But let us fuppofe, that any future prince could wholly influence the election of a parliament, and make the members of it dependent on himself, what would be the difference between that parliament and a privy council? Would it fpeak the fenfe of the nation, or of the court? Would the intereft of the people be confidered in it, or that of their reprefentatives? They would only differ in this refpect, that one, having no power above it, might be abfolutely free from all refraint; which, with the terror of a parliament hanging over it, the other never could. This is the only imaginable method, by which the liberty of the English nation can be attacked with any fuccefs. But thou wilt afk, To what end fhould an attack of this nature be made? Why fhould a king of England go about to deftroy a conftitution, the maintenance of which would render him both great and happy? I reply, that a king indeed can have no reasonable inducement to make fuch an experiment; but a minister may find t neceffary for his own fupport: and happy would it have been for many countries, if the mafter's intereft had FROM LONDON, been confidered by the fervant half fo warmly as the fervant's by the mafter. If a man who travels through Italy was to afk, what advantage all the wealth in religious houses, and all the idolatrous worship paid there, are to the faints they are dedicated to; the answer must be, of none at all. But the priests, who are really gainers by them, know that they abufe the people to very good purpofe; and make use of a venerable name, not from any regard they have to it, but to raife their own greatnefs, fwell their own pride, and cover and fecure their own extortion. It is only therefore by the weakness of princes, the arts of minifters, and the feduction of the people against their own interefts, the constitution of England can perifh, and probably will perifh at laft. This will happen fooner or later, as more or leis care is taken by thofe whofe duty it is to watch over it. I am not ignorant that these are fome vifionary men, who dream of schemes to perpetuate it beyond all poffibility of future change: but I have always thought the fame of political projects to render a government, as of chemical projects to render a man immortal. Such a grand elixir cannot be found; and those who would tamper with states, in hopes of procuring them that immortality, are the most unfit to prescribe to them of all men in the world. But, at the fame time that I know this, Lalfo know, that the date of a government may be prolonged by proper and falutary remedies, applied by those who underftand it's true nature, and join to fpeculative wifdom experience and temper. Nor should I think it at all a better excufe for affifting to ruin the conftitution of my country, that it must come to an end, and perhaps begins to decay, than for joining in the murder of my father, that he muft die, at laft, and begins grow old. LETTER |