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displaying Plutarch's peculiar use of it in kindling emulation by exhibiting patterns of virtue, is particularly excellent; but the portico is too august for the temple! for the Lives themselves are but meagre compositions; and in the parallel between the two Orators, Plutarch leans shamefully in favour of his countryman." P. 165.

poμev, åλλà Bíovs, in Alexandro p. 664. f.) Quippe in illo genere acta præcipue spectantur, in hoc personæ. Historicus non necesse habet de hominibus dicere, nisi quoties cum negotiis conjunguntur; neque vitarum scriptor negotia attingit, nisi quatenus cum actoribus copulantur. Fieri quidem potest, ut alter in alterius castra transeat; sed forma operis utrique prorsus diversa est. Multa recipit hoc genus scriptionis, quæ legitimæ historiæ majestas repudiat; multa excludit, quæ perpetuæ narrationis ambitus complectitur. Quod quidem ipse præmonuit Plutarchus: vidit enim calumniatores fore, qui in ingenii sui monumenta involarent; adeoque in Vita Alexandri (p. 665. a.) postulat, ne ab eo rerum gestarum seriem accuratam expectent, sed licere sibi permittant els tà τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἑκάστου βίον, ἐάσαντα ἑτέροις τὰ μεγεθη Kaì TOÙS ȧy@vas. Alienum a se duxit, quicquid non ad mores indolemque pertineret; ad hoc se totum composuit, nt ingenium et naturam cujusque gnaviter exploraret, où Tǹv ἄχρηστον ἀθροΐζων ἱστορίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς κατανόη σιν ἤθους καὶ τρόπου παραδιδοὺς, (in Nicia p. 524. α.) Sciunt ii, qui in philosophiæ studiis versantur, quam multiforme sit ingenium humanum ; quot latebras et recessus habeat animus noster, quot æstus et reciprocationes; quanta sit in viris prudentibus simulatio et dissimulatio; adeoque sentiunt, quanti laboris res sit ad consiliorum fontes recurrere, certa quævis animæ indicia, Tà tŷs ¥vxês onμcîa, deprehendere, verum

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April 28, 1799. Looked over that part of Parr's Sequel, in which he introduces, in a strange and desultory way, his observations on French politics. He combats the position that what is true in theory, may be false in practice, by maintaining that truth consists in the relation of our ideas to each other, or in the conformity of

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denique et adæquatum cujusvis eidos animo et cogitatione complecti. Viri quippe illustres ad res magnas præparati ' plerumque et personati accedunt; et quæ in vita militari for'titer, quæ in civili prudenter gesserunt, ea fere multæ medita' tionis et consilii fructus sunt. Latet inter ista præclara facinora verus homo; et subitum aliquod σúμπтæμа, quod eum imparatum et incustoditum opprimat, voluntatis et ingenii significationem sæpe continet majorem, quam maxima victoriæ • splendor et celebritas: (Οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι · πάντως ἔνεστι δήλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πράγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις, καὶ ̔ρῆμα, καὶ παιδία τις ἔμφασιν • ἤθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον, ἢ μάχαι μυριόνεκροι κ. τ. λ., 'Plut. in Alexandro p. 664, vide eund. in Catone p. 770. c. '777. e.) Hæc potius ex vitæ quotidianæ consuetudine petenda Iest, e familiaribus cum amicis colloquiis, congressibus, remis'sionibus, facetiis, negotiis otiisque domesticis.

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'Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo

Ejiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res.

In mente humana multa sunt exilia, quæ aciem fugiunt 'crassiorem; sed ad plenam animi cognitionem non minus necessaria, quam venarum ductus et meatus sanguinis subtilissimi ad perfectam corporis anatomiam. Nihil ergo prætermittit Plutarchus, unde veram et germanam cujusque indolem innotescere posse speraret. Hinc ad Agesilai ludicra, ad Catonis et Ciceronis facetias descendere non dedignatur : idem haud necessarium duxit Cæsaris et Alexandri bella sigilla

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those ideas to external objects; and wherever that relation or conformity exists, the ideas belonging to either are unalterably just, and the proposition expressing those ideas, must ever be true; that therefore a proposition true in theory, must be true in practice, where the practice corresponds to the theory; and that, where they

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Nimirum haud timuit ne aut nugax videretur,

qui illa memoraret, aut negligens, qui hæc præteriret.' Si quis porro hoc genus ipsum vitiosum esse contendat, quod non æque pateat cum locupletiore historia, is ejusdem commoda, et duo imprimis magna, aut non videt, aut non perpendit. Cum historia tot virtutis exemplis et luminibus abundet, dolendum tamen ea propter varietatem rerum non satis eminere; cum locis, temporibus, et personis divisa rarius emergant, adeoque ictu languidiore ad animos legentium perveniant. Jam si excelsi ingenii præclare gesta in unum omnia conferantur, quis non videt animo, constipatis virtutis radiis, quanto major ejus admiratio futura sit, et acrius ad imitationem incitamentum ? Non enim ex una re aut facinore præclaro virum bonum denominamus; sed perfecta virtus ex universæ vitæ tenore actionumque omnium concentu splendidius elucet. Deinde, cum uno in argumento unaque persona mens tota versatur, studium in legendo erectius retinetur. Viri enim excellentis, (ut cum M. Tullio Ep. Fam. 5, 12. loquar,) ancipites variique casus habent admirationem; exspectationem, lætitiam, molestiam, spem, timorem; si vero exitu notabili concluduntur, expletur animus jucundissima lectionis voluptate. Quanto penitius hoc vidit orator illustrissimus, tanto impensius a Lucceio postulavit, ut rerum suarum narrationem a continentibus historiis sejungeret. Aliæ quidem Plutarchi virtutes sunt et magnæ; nulla tamen commendatior, quam hæc ratio tractandi nova et prope singularis. Neque alia mihi causa occurrit, cur in tanta veterum historiarum ruina et naufragio integer fere ad

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appear to clash, we are not always to maintain that the theory is false, but that it does not apply to the particular case. Of Burke's expression, metaphysically true, and morally and politically false,' he observes that true and false' are expressions of the metaphysical, proper and improper,' 'just or unjust' of the moral, and useful or pernicious' of the political properties of objects. But this rather tends to complicate than clear up the question; and a wider and deeper view of the subject, I suspect, is required to obtain a simple and satisfactory solution.*

nos pervenerit: aut cur omnium manibus, indoctorum etiam, teratur, dum cæteri ejusdem ætatis historici paucos admodum lectores inveniunt." P. vii.

I would recommend those, who are disposed to blame the minuteness of detail, which appears in the first Volume of the Parriana, to attend to the words, which I have put in italics with single inverted commas: they at once vindicate and authorise what I have done. Those, who omit such details, are rather panegyrists than biographers. No great character can be rightly estimated without such details, and I may well ask what we should know of the true character and the general conduct of Johnson, if Boswell had followed the common road of biography? E. H. B.]

* [I am rather surprised at this remark from a man of philosophical reflection like Mr. Green; for, in my opinion, nothing can be more just or more satisfactory than the distinction made by Dr. Parr, to which Mr. Green objects.

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Metaphysically true," says Burke, with reference to reality, or the actual existence of things; "morally false," with reference to morality, the moral sense, or established notions of right and wrong; "politically false," with reference to understood expediency, or supposed utility to the interests of

Parr's style of composition, with all its excellencies, has one capital defect, it wants light and shade; everything is sacrificed to force; each part appears to be uniformly and intensely laboured; and nothing has the air of being the natural and spontaneous effusion of a mind seriously and earnestly engaged in communicating

any state in particular or of society in general. Burke would have been more logically correct, if he had said, 1. metaphysically true, 2. morally false, 3. politically wrong.

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"Johnson thus defined the difference between physical and moral truth. Physical truth is, when you tell a thing as it actually is. Moral truth is, when you tell a thing sincerely and precisely as it appears to you. such a one walked across the street; if he really did so, I told a physical truth. If I thought so, though I should have been mistaken, I told a moral truth.' Boswell's Life of Johnson 4, 6. The annotator K. remarks that "this account of the difference between moral and physical truth, is in Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, and many other books." In a Ms. copy of Paley's unpublished Lectures on Locke's Essay, which was lent to me by a friend, I found the following account: "Truth is the joining or separating of signs according as the things signified by them agree or disagree. Signs are of two kinds, 1. either ideas signs of things, or 2. words signs of ideas. By joining signs is meant the making them into affirmative propositions, as gold is malleable. By separating signs is meant the making them into negative propositions, as we say gold is not volatile. Truth is twofold, moral and metaphysical; moral, when we speak what we think; metaphysical, when our thoughts correspond with the real existence of things. Thus we say, the earth moves round the sun ; thus we say, the earth revolves round the sun. This is a moral and metaphysical truth; but the ancients said, the sun moved round the earth, which was a

VOL. II.

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