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question that the univerfe has certain bounds fet to it; but when we confider that it is the work of Infinite Power, prompted by Infinite Goodnefs, with an infinite space to exert itself in, how can our imagination fet any bounds to it ?

To return, therefore, to my first thought, I could not but look upon myself with fecret horror, as a being that was not worth the smallest regard of one who had fo great a work under his care and fuperintendency. I was afraid of being overlooked amidst the immenfity of nature; and loft among that infinite variety of creatures, which, in all probability, fwarm through all thefe immeasureable regions of matter.

In order to recover myself from this mortifying thought, I confidered that it took its rife from thofe narrow/conceptions, which we are apt to /entertain of the Divine Nature. We ourselves cannot attend to many different objects at the fame time. If we are careful to (infpec iome things, we must of course/neglect/others. This imperfection/which we observe in ourselves, is an imperfection that cleaves, in fome degree, to creatures of the higheft (capacities) as they are creatures, that is, beings of finite and limited natures. The presence of every created being is confined to a certain measure of/fpace); and confequently his obfervation istinted to a certain number of objects. The sphere in which we move, and act, and understand, is of a wider (circumference) to one creature, than another, according as we rife one above another in the fcale of existence. But the wideft of these our spheres has its circumference. When, therefore, we reflect on the Divine Nature, we are fo ufed and accustomed to this imperfection in ourselves, that we cannot for car, in fome measure,/afcribing it to HIM, in whom there is no fhadow of imperfection." Our reafon indeed affures us, that his (attributes are infinite; but the poornefs of our(conceptions is fuch, that it cannot forbear fetting bounds to every thing itcontemplates) till our reafon comes again to our fuccour,) and throws down all thofe little prejudices, which rife in us unawares, and are natural to the mind of man.

We fhall therefore utterly extinguifh this melancholy thought of our being overlooked by our Maker in the multiplicity of his works, and the infinity of thofe objects.

among which he feems to be inceffantly employed, if we confider, in the firft place, that he is omniprefent; and in the fecond, that he is omniscient.

If we confider him in his omniprefence, his being paffes through, actuates, and fupports, the whole frame of nature. His creation, and every part of it, is full of him. There is nothing he has made, that is either fo diftant, fo little, or fo inconfiderable, which he does not effentially inhabit. His fubftance is within the fubftance of every being, whether material or immaterial, and as intimately prefent to it, as that being is to itself. It would be an imperfection in him, were he able to move out of one place into another; or to withdraw himself from any thing he has created, or from any part of that space which he diffused and spread abroad to infinity. In fhort, to fpeak of him in the language of the old philofophers, he is a being whofe centre is every where, and his circumference no where.

In the fecond place, he is omnifcient as well as omniprefent. His omnifcience, indeed, neceffarily and naturally flows from his omniprefence. He cannot but be confcious of every motion that arifes in the whole material world, which he thus effentially pervades; and of every thought that is ftirring in the intellectual world, to every part of which he is thus intimately united. Were the foul feparate from the body, and with one glance of thought fhould start beyond the bounds of the creation; fhould it, for millions of years, continue its progrefs through infinite space, with the fame activity, it would still find itfelf within the embrace of its Creator, and encompaffed by the immenfity of the Godhead.

In this confideration of the Almighty's omnipresence and omniscience, every uncomfortable thought inishes. He cannot but regard every thing that has being, especially fuch of his creatures who fear they are not regarded by him. He is privy to all their thoughts, and to that anxiety of heart in particular, which is apt to trouble them on this occafion; for, as it is impoffible he fhould overlook any of his creatures, fo we may be confident that he regards, with an eye of mercy, thofe who endeavour to recomme themfelves to his notice; and, in unfeigned humility of hear, think themselves unworthy that he hould be mindful of them.

ADDISON.

CHAP. IV.

ARGUMENTATIVE PIECES.

SECTION I.

HAPPINESS IS FOUNDED IN RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT.

ALL men purfue good, and would be happy, if they knew how not happy for minutes, and miferable for hours; but happy, if poffible, through every part of their existence. Either, therefore, there is a good of this fteady, durable kind, or there is not. If not, then all good must be tranfient and uncertain; and if fo, an object of the loweft value, which can little deferve our attention or inquiry. But if there be a better good, fuch a good as we are feeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from fome caufe; and that caufe muft either be external, internal, or mixed; in as much as, except these three, there is no other poffible. Now a fteady durable good, cannot be derived from an external caufe; fince all derived from externals must fluctuate as they fluctuate. By the fame rule, it cannot be derived from a mixture of the two; because the part which is external, will proportionably destroy its effence. What then remains but the cause internal ? the very cause which we have fuppofed, when we place the fovereign good in mind,-in rectitude of conduct.

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I FIND myself exifting upon a little fpot, furrounded every way by an immenfe unknown expansion. Where am I? What fort of place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated in every inftance to my convenience? Is there no excess of cold, none of heat, to offend me ? Am I never annoyed by animals, either of my own, or a different kind? Is every thing fubfervient to me, as though I had ordered all myself? No; nothing like it; the fartheft from it poffible. The world appears not, then, originally made for the private convenience of me alone? It does not. But is it not poffible fo to accommodate it, by my own particular induftry? If to accommodate man and beast,

heaven and earth, if this be beyond me, it is not poffible. What confequence then follows; or can there be any other than this: If I feek an intereft of my own detached from that of others, I feek an interest which is chimerical, and which can never have existence.

How then must I determine? Have I no interest at all? If I have not, I am ftationed here to no purpose. But why no interest? Can I be contented with none but one separate and detached? Is a focial intereft, joined with others, fuch an absurdity as not to be admitted? The bee, the beaver, and the tribes of herding animals, are fufficient to convince me, that the thing is fomewhere at least poffible. How, then, am I affured that it is not equally true of man? Admit it; and what follows? If so, then honour and juftice are my intereft; then the whole train of moral virtues are my intereft; without fome portion of which, not even thieves can maintain fociety.

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But, farther; I ftop not here; I purfue this focial interest as far as I trace my several relations. I pafs from my own stock, my own neighbourhood, my own nation, to the whole race of mankind, as difperfed throughout the earth. Am I not related to them all, by the mutual aids of commerce, by the general intercourfe of arts and letters, by that common nature of which we all participate! Again I must have food and clothing. Without a proper genial warmth, I inftantly perish. Am I not related, in this view, to the very earth itself? to the distant fun, from whose beams I derive vigour ? to that ftupendous course and order of the infinite hot of heaven, by which the times and feafons ever uniformly pafs on? Were this order once confounded, I could not probably survive a moment; fe abfolutely do I depend on this common general welfare. What, then, have I do, but to enlarge virtue into piety? Not only honour and juftice, and what I owe to man, is my intereft; but gratitude alfo, acquiefcence, refignation, adoration, and all I owe to this great polity, and its great Governor our common Parent. HARRIS.

SECTION III.

THE INJUSTICE OF AN UNCHARITABLE SPIRIT.

A SUSPICIOUS, uncharitable spirit is not only inconfiftent with all focial virtue and happiness, but it is also, in itself,

unreasonable and unjuft. In order to form found opinions concerning characters and actions, two things are especially requifit information and impartiality. But fuch as are moft forward to decide unfavourably, are commonly deftitute of both. Inftead of poffefling, or even requiring, full information, the grounds on which they proceed are frequently the most flight and frivolous. A tale, perhaps, which the idle have invented, the inquifitive have liftened to, and the credulous have propagated; or a real incident which rumour, in carrying it along, has exaggerated and difguifed, fupplies them with materials of confident affertion, and decifive judgment. From an action they prefently look into the heart, and infer the motive. This fuppofed motive they conclude to be the ruling principle; and pronounce at once concerning the whole character.

Nothing can be more contrary both to equity and to found reafon, than fuch precipitate judgments. Any man who attends to what paffes within himself, may easily discern what a complicated fyftem the human character is; and what a variety of circumstances must be taken into the account, in order to estimate it truly. No fingle inftance of conduct whatever, is fufficient to determine it. As from one worthy action, it were credulity, not-charity, to conclude a perfon to be free from all vice; fo from one which is cenfurable, it is perfectly unjuft to infer that the author of it is without confcience, and without merit. If we knew all the attending circumftances, it might appear in an excufable light; nay, perhaps, under a commendable form. The motives of the actor may have been entirely different from those which we afcribe to him ; and where we fuppofe him impelled by bad defign, he may have been prompted by confcience and mistaken principle. Admitting the action to have been in every view criminal, he may have been hurried into it through inadvertency and furprife. He may have fincerely repented; and the virtuous principle may have now regained its full vigour. Perhaps this was the corner of frailty; the quarter on which he lay open to the incurfions of temptation; while the other. avenues of his heart were firmly guarded by confcience.

It is therefore evident, that no part of the government of temper deferves attention more, than to keep our minds pure from uncharitable prejudices, and open to candour

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