others have deformed and oppressed them. From no one of these charges, it is probable, taking into account what we already know of Erasmus,' shall we be able to acquit him on this occasion. In the part of his work with which we are concerned, 2 after some general advice, very good indeed, but very little likely to be followed-such as, that all orders of men, popes, princes, magistrates, monks, priests, people, should aim to become what they ought to be, and to discharge their several duties in an exemplary manner, he comes to some particular points of doctrine. The question of free will, he observes, is spinosa verius quam frugifera, "productive of more thorns than fruit." "It is enough," he says, "for us to agree, that man can effect nothing of himself; that, if he can do any thing, it is entirely of divine grace; that very much indeed is to be ascribed to faith, which is the peculiar gift of the Holy Spirit, and is of much wider extent than is commonly supposed,3 and is not possessed by all who say, 'I believe that Christ died for me.' Let it be allowed, that the hearts of believers are justified, that is purified, by 1 Milner, v. 315-354. (904-945.) It has been really painful to me to see, how fully Dr. Milner's representations of this eminent scholar are borne out even by Dr. Jortin's biography of him. Jortin, though naturally partial to the subject of his work, from time to time pronounces an honest and just censure of him. * Page 419, &c. "Conveniat inter nos, fidei plurimum esse tribuendum, modo fateamur et hoc, peculiare esse Spiritus Sancti donum, idque multo latius patere quam vulgus hominum credit." It might seem doubtful whether his meaning is, that the gift of faith is conferred on more persons than is commonly supposed, or that the faith given has a wider range of objects (see Heb. xi. throughout,) than is usually assigned to it. • A notable instance of the manner in which justification A. D. 1533. III. CHAP. faith: only let us confess, that the works of charity (or love) are necessary to the attainment of (final) salvation; for true faith cannot be idle, being the fountain and source of all good works. God is not properly any man's debtor, except he have made himself such by free promise; and even then our performing the condition of the promise is itself the fruit of his bounty. Yet the word reward or merit is not to be rejected, since God of his goodness is pleased to accept and reward what he himself works in us or by us.1 Let there be no contending about words, if only we are agreed about the thing itself. Nor let the ears of the ignorant multitude be filled with such speeches as these, It matters not what our works are; only believe, and you shall be saved:' and again, Whatever a man does, he does nothing but sin.' Though there may be a sense in which these things are true, yet they are drawn by the unskilful to an unsound meaning." Almost all this, no doubt, is truly excellent: but, then, was it contrary to the doctrine of Luther? was it what his opponents had taught? was confounded with sanctification: in opposition to which the reformers contended, that the true sense of justification was the forensic sense: not that it could in all points correspond with the acquittal of an accused person in a court of justice, (for, in that case, so far from including pardon, it must be incompatible with it;) but that it stood properly opposed to condemnation, not to corrupt disposition, and denoted a change of state, not of character; restoration to favour, not restoration to holiness. The latter is sanctification, not justification: the two are essentially distinct, though inseparable blessings. That this, and no more, is meant by the forensic sense of justification, see Milner iv. 510. (494.) 1 It has been seen that in this sense Luther allowed, and the Confession of Augsburg retained, the objectionable term merit--which, however, is less strong in the Latin than in the English. See above, p. 44, 45. was it even, as it would perhaps purport to be, intermediate between the two? Rather its being propounded in this manner by Erasmus is a proof of the extent to which Luther had prevailed, in his attacks upon long-established error. Erasmus himself, it is probable, would never have written or thought as he here does, had it not been for Luther. Seckendorf justly observes, that most of the positions, which he thus lays down, "might be expressed, and nearly in the same words, from Luther himself; though Erasmus was accustomed so to temper his language, that it might not directly offend against the formularies of a party which he dared not desert. His doctrine of free will, for example, here proposed, avoiding all thorny disputations, as he calls them, is substantially that which Luther maintained. Only adhere to what is thus taught concerning human impotency and imperfection, and what becomes of the sort of merit for which Eckius, Faber, and all that class of men contended?—The sentences, to which Erasmus objects, were not Luther's, but were calumniously imputed to him." So far the learned historical commentator on Lutheranism.1 The reader, indeed, may justly remark, that no sufficient proof has yet appeared, that Luther and his more judicious friends are here at all alluded to as objects of censure. But let us proceed with our review of the work. Passing to another class of topics, Erasmus thinks it "pious to believe that the prayers 1 Seck. iii. 50. "If the sentence, Man does nothing else but sin,' is in any sense true, (which Erasmus seems to say it is,) it is only in the sense which Erasmus thus expresses, We ought in all things to acknowledge our own frailty.' Seckendorf. A. D. 1533. 162 CHAP. and good works of the living profit the dead, especially if they had made provision for these services in their lifetime. But let not those," he says, "who cannot believe this, rave against the simplicity of others, but only be the more zealous of good works themselves." In like manner of the invocation of the saints he argues, that "those characters must still be supposed to retain power with God after death, at whose instance, and through whose instrumentality, he wrought miracles while they lived:" "and, if they are not conscious of the prayers which we address to them, yet Christ is, who loves simple souls, and will give us what we ask if not through the saints, yet certainly for them." 1 "Superstition, indeed, is to be reproved, but simple affection or regard of this kind is to be borne with, even though it be joined with some degree of error." Thus does he palliate dominant evils, which he cannot defend, and call that simplicity and pious affection, which he cannot but feel to be superstitious and dangerous, if not even absolutely idolatrous and thus does he, in effect, exhibit himself as the apologist of those, who were the bitter enemies of all real reformation. "How much better," observes the honest and manly Seckendorf, "to call a spade a spade!" And thus also, we may further remark, while he softens down, and puts a favourable construction on the gross errors and corrupt practices of the ruling party, does Erasmus apply harsh terms to the opposition made to those corruptions and errors by the other side. "Let them not rave (obstrepant) against the simplicity of others." "Let them worship the Father, the 1 "Si minus per sanctos, certe pro sanctis." Son, and the Holy Spirit themselves, and not with disgusting officiousness disturb (deturbent odiose) those, who, without superstition, implore the intercession of the saints." These are the terms applied to the only men who were likely to correct the prevailing evils, and who, at least as far as Luther and his colleagues, and such as they approved, were concerned, confined their opposition to arguments, and protests, and other peaceable proceedings; while their adversaries indeed raged against them, as far as they could do it, with fire and sword, with banishment, confiscation, and death; of which we shall see many instances in the period of this chapter. Again, with regard to image-worship, he says: "The zeal of those who rage against images is not, in my opinion, altogether without reason, though it is excessive: for idolatry, or the worship of images, of which there is still danger, is a horrible crime." Yet he talks of pictures and statues as being "a more vivid kind of poetry; "and, as Plato would not banish all poetry from his republic, but only that which conveyed unworthy notions of the gods, so," he says, "whatever superstition has crept in by means of images ought to be corrected, and yet their proper use preserved. Let those therefore, who think that no honour is to be paid to the images of the saints, enjoy their own opinion, but let them not rail at others, who, without superstition, so venerate images, from love to the characters represented by them, as a wife may kiss the ring or the girdle of her absent husband!"-What idle trifling is this, with which to treat grave and serious points, affecting the worship of God and the safety of souls! What principle is there so A. D. 1533. |