or standard by which he will be judged, evinces a conviction of a common standard to which his taste is right or good if conformable, while that of his opponent must be wrong or bad, if disconformable. The taste of a whole people, guided by reason and virtue, must generally be exquisite and just, their internal senses unerring and He who allows submission to be due to the determinations of all mankind, acknowledges a perfect standard for the taste of all others.

sure.

373. But besides the approbation of the majority, there are principles of reason and sound judgment which can be applied to matters or taste, as well as to the sujects of science and philosopy.

Illus. He who admires or censures any work of genius, is always ready, if his taste be improved, to assign some reason for his decisjon. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which be proceeds. Taste is, therefore, a sort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or less, with the feelings of sentiment.

374. The ultimate conclusions to which our reasonings lead, in judging concerning works of taste, refer at last to sense and perception.

Illus. 1. Just reasonings concerning propriety of conduct in a tragedy, or an epic poem, will correct the caprice of unenlightened taste, and establish principles for judging of what deserves praise. These reasonings, in the last resort, appeal always to feeling. Their foundation is deeply laid in whatever has been found from experience to please mankind universally.

2. Upon this ground, we prefer a simple and natural, to an artificial style; a regular and well-connected story, to loose and scattered narratives; a catastrophe which is tender and pathetic, to one which leaves us unmoved.

Corol. It is from consulting our own imagination and heart, and from attending to the feelings of others, that any principles are formed which acquire authority in matters of taste.

375. When we refer to the concurring sentiments of men as the ultimate test of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts, this is always to be understood of men placed in such situations as are favourable to the proper exertions of taste.

Illus. The sentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations, where arts are cultivated, and manners refined, where works of genius are subject to free discussion, and taste is improved by science and philosophy, become the principles of authority which

must necessarily be decisive of every controversy that can arise upon matters of taste.

376. We conclude, therefore, that taste is not an arbitrary principle subject to the fancy of every individual, and admitting no criterion by which to determine whether it be true or false. Its foundation is the same in all human minds. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and. which in general operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles.

Obs. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general taste of mankind.

377. In every composition what interests the heart, pleases all ages and all nations. There is a certainTM string to which, when properly struck, the human heart is so made as to answer.

Illus. 1. Hence, the universal testimony which the most improv ed nations of the earth have conspired, throughout a long succession of ages, to give to some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Eneid of Virgil.

2. Hence the authority which such works have acquired as standards, in some degree, of poetical composition; since from them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which therefore poetry ought to exhibit.

378. Uniformity of taste and sentiment resulting from our conviction of a common standard, leads to two important final causes; the one respecting our duty, the other, our pastime or amusement.

Obs. Barely to mention the first, shall be sufficient. because it does not properly belong to the present undertaking. Unhap py it would be for us, did not uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions should uniformly be directed to what is good and against what is ill, is the greatest blessing of society; and in order to uniformity in action, uniformity of opinion and sentiment is indispensable.

379. With respect to pastime in general, and the fine arts in particular, the following illustrations make the final cause of uniformity abundantly obvious.

Illus. 1. Uniformity of taste gives opportunity for sumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extensive establishments which please generally.

2. The reason is obvious: without uniformity of taste, there could not be any suitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in such works, and to advance them to perfection.

3. The same uniformity of taste is equally necessary to perfect the arts of music, sculpture, and painting, and to support the expense which they require after they are brought to perfection.

4. Nature is, in every particular, consistent with herself: we are framed by nature to have a high relish for the fine arts, which are a great source of happiness and friendly in a high degree to virtue we are at the same time, framed with uniformity of taste to furnish proper objects for that high relish; and if uniformity did not prevail, the fine arts would never have made any figure.

380. Another final cause no less obvious, is the separation of men into different classes, by birth, office, or occupation. How much soever this separation might tend to relax the connexion that ought to subsist among the members of the same state, its effects are prevented by the access of all ranks of people to public spectacles and amusements.

These assemblages of people of one country are best enjoyed in company. In this common fellowship every one partakes of the same pleasures. Such meetings are, therefore, no slight support to the social affections* and to uniformity of taste.

CHAPTER II.

CRITICISM.

381. TASTE, criticism and genius, are words cur

* On works of taste, the student may now consult Dr. Gerrard's Essay on Taste-D'Alembert's Reflections on the use and abuse of Philosophy in matters which relate to taste-Reflections Critiques sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture-Kame's Elements of Criticism'Hume's Essay on the standard of Taste-Introduction to the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful-Blair's Lectures, and Allison on Taste.

U

rently employed, without distinct ideas annexed to them.

Definition. True criticism is the application of taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. The object which it proposes is, to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of genius.

Illus. The rules of crticism are not formed by any induction, a priori, as it was called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observations. Criticism is an art founded wholly on experience; on the observations of such beauties as have come nearest to the standard which we before established; that is, of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most generally. (Art. 371.)

2. For example; Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were rulės drawn from the practice of Homer and Sophocles: they were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which mankind received from the relation of an action which was one and entire, beyond what they received from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts.

3. Such observations taking their rise at first from feeling and ́experience, were found on examination to be so consonant to reason, and to the principles of human nature, as to pass into estabJished rules, and to be conveniently applied for judging of the excellency of any performance. This is the most natural account of the origin of criticism.

382. A masterly genius, it is true, will of himself, untaught, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to the most material rules of criticism; for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often suggest them in practice.

Illus. It is more than probable that Homer was acquainted with no systems of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all posterity has admired. But this is no argument against the usefulness of criticism as an art. For as no human genius is perfect, there is no writer but may receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No observations or rules cau indeed supply the defect of genius, or inspire it where it is wanting. But they may often direct it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagances, and point out to it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are designed chiefly to shew the faults that ought to be avoided. To nature we must

be indebted for the production of eminent beauties. (See Corol. 1. F. 48.)

383. From what has been said, we are enabled to form a judgment concerning those complaints which it has long been fashionable for petty authors to make against critics and criticism.

Illus. 1. Critics have been represented as the great abridgers of the national liberty of genius; as the imposers of unnatural shackles and bonds upon writers, from whose cruel persecution they must fly to the public, and implore its protection. Such supplicatory prefaces are not calculated to give very favourable ideas of the genius of the author. For every good writer will be pleased to have his work examined by the principles of sound understanding, and true taste.

2. The declamations against criticism commonly proceed upon this supposition, that critics are such as judge by rule, not by feeling. This is so far from being true, that they who judge after this manner are pedants, not critics. For all the rules of genuine criticism will be found to be ultimately founded on feeling; and taste and feeling are necessary to guide us in the application of these rules to every particular instance.

3. As there is nothing in which all sorts of persons more readily affect to be judges than in works of taste, there is no doubt that the number of incompetent critics will always be great. But this affords no more foundation for a general invective against criticism, than the number of bad philosophers or reasoners affords against sound philosophy and logic.

384. An objection more plausible may be formed against criticism, from the applause that some performances have received from the public, which, when accurately considered, are found to contradict the rules established by criticism.

Illus. Now, according to the principles laid down in the last chapter, the public is the supreme judge to whom the last appeal must be made in every work of taste; as the standard of taste is founded on the sentiments that are natural and common to all men. But with respect to this, we are to observe, that the sense of the public is often too hastily judged of. The genuine public taste does not always appear in the first applause given upon the publication of any new work. There are both the great vulgar, and the small vulgar, who are apt to be catched and dazzled by very superficial beauties, the admiration of which in a litte time passes away and sometimes a writer may acquire great temporary reputation merely by his compliance with the passions or prejudices, with the partyspirit or superstitious notions, that may chance to rule for a time