and is bestow'd on the other to make up the lofs he has fuftained. But in numberlefs cafes where mifchief done cannot be compenfated with money, reparation is in its nature a fort of punishment. Defamation, contemptuous treatment, perfonal restraint, the breaking one's peace of mind, are injuries that cannot be repaired by money; and the pecuniary reparation decreed against the wrong-doer, can only be a fort of punishment, in order to deter him from reiterating fuch injuries: the fum, it is true, is awarded to the person injured; but not as fufficient to make up his lofs, which money cannot do, but only as a folatium for what he has fuffered.

repa

Hitherto it is fuppofed, that the man who intends a wrong action, is, at the fame time, conscious of its being fo. But a man may intend a wrong action, thinking erroneously that it is right; or a right action, thinking erroneously that it is wrong; and the queftion is, What shall be the confequence of fuch errors with respect to reparation. The latter cafe is clear: the person who occafionally fuffers lofs by a right action, has not a claim for ration, because he has no juft caufe of complaint. On the other hand, if the action be wrong, the innocence of the author, for which he is indebted to an error in judgement, will not relieve him from reparation. When he is made fenfible of his error, he feels himself bound in confcience to repair the harm he has done by a wrong action: and others, fenfible of his error from the beginning, have the fame feeling: nor will his obftinacy in resisting conviction, or his dullness in not apprehending his error, mend the matter it is well that these defects relieve him from punishment, without wronging others by denying a claim for reparation. A man's errors ought to affect himself only, and not those who have not erred. Hence in general, reparation always follows wrong; and is not affected by any erroneous opinion of a wrong action being right, more than of a right action being wrong.

But

But this doctrine fuffers an exception with refpect to a man, who, having undertaken a trust, is bound in duty to act. A judge is in that fituation: it is his duty to pronounce fentence in every cafe that comes before him; and if he judge according to the best of his knowledge, he is not liable for confequences. A judge cannot be fubjected to reparation, unless it can be verified, that the judgement he gave was intentionally wrong. An officer of the revenue is in the fame predicament. Led by a doubtful clause in a statute, he makes a feizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterward, in the proper court, are found not to be feizable. The officer ought not to be fubjected to reparation, if he have acted to the best of his judgement. This rule however must be taken with a limitation: a public officer who is grofsly erroneous, will not be excufed; for he ought to know bet

ter.

Reparation is due, tho' the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: "If A ride an unruly horfe in Lincolns-inn fields, to tame him, "and the horse breaking from A, run over B and grievously hurt "him; B fhall have an action against A: for tho' the mischief was done against the will of A, yet fince it was his fault to

tr

bring a wild horfe into a frequented place, where mischief might enfue, he must answer for the confequences." Gaius seems to carry this rule ftill farther, holding in general, that if a horse, by the weakness or unskilfulness of the rider, break away and do mischief, the rider is liable (a). But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the mifchief might have been foreseen. Thus in general a man is made liable for the mifchief occafioned by his voluntary deed, tho' the immediate act that occafioned the mischief be involuntary.

(a) 1. 8. 1. ad leg. Aquil.

Nn 2

SECT.

Several final caufes have been occafionally mentioned in preceding parts of this effay, which could not conveniently be referved for the prefent fection, being neceffary for explaining the fubjects to which they relate, the final caufe for inftance of erecting a standard of morals upon the common sense of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but flightly mentioned.

The final caufe that prefents itself firft to view, refpects man confidered as an accountable being. The fenfe of being accountable, is one of our most vigilant guards against the silent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me, it immediately occurs, What will the world fay? I imagine my friends expoftulating, my enemies reviling-I dare not diffemble my fpirits fink- the temptation vanishes. 2dly, Praife and blame, especially from thofe we regard, are ftrong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praise and blame would be feldom well directed; for how fhall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praise or blame, frequently ill-directed, would lofe their influence. 3dly, This branch of our nature, is the corner-ftone of the criminal law. Did not a man think himself accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the justest sentence pronounced against him, is oppreffion, not ju

ftice.

ftice. 4thly, This branch is a strong cement to fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood, or by country, would be no lefs fhy and referved, than if they were mere strangers to each other.

The final caufe that next occurs, being fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not feem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions disagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with so many temptations against duty, that it is not always an easy task to perfevere in the right path: would we perfevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence difagreeable, they would be extremely rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final cause refpects duty, in contradiftinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws are founded on intuitive perception; and are so simple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the most ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obfcure, they would be perverted by felfishness and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common fenfe with respect to moral duties. Reafon would afford no general conviction; becaufe that faculty is diftributed in portions fo unequal, aș to bar ali hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. At the fame time, we are taught by woful experience, that reafon has little influence over the greater part of men. Reafon, it is true, aided by experience, fupports morality, by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other intereft. But conviction feldom weighs much against imperious paffion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requifite, directed by the fhining light of intuition.

A propofition laid down above appears to be a fort of myftery in the moral fyftem, viz. That tho' evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that choice is not

permitted

permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; and that we are strictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to confequences; or, in other words, that we must not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The final caufe, which I am about to unfold, will clear this mystery, and fet the beauty of the moral system in a confpicuous light. I begin with obferving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the fociety we live in, refults from many and various circumstances intricately combined, it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every instance what particular actions will tend the most to that end. The authorifing therefore a man to trace out his duty, by weighing endless circumftances good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paffion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falfe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as obferved above, would totally unhinge fociety. It is better ordered by Providence, even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obfcure objects, we are directed by the moral fenfe to perform certain plain and fimple acts, which are obvious to us by intuitive perception.

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, fuit a being of univerfal benevolence; but is repugnant to may the nature of man, compofed of selfish and benevolent principles. We have seen above, that the true moral balance depends on a fubordination of felf-love to duty, and of arbitrary benevolence to felf-love; and accordingly every man is fenfible of injuftice when he is hurt in order to benefit another. Were it a rule in fociety, That a greater good to any other would make it an act of justice to deprive me of my life, of my reputation, or of my property, I fhould renounce the fociety of men, and affociate with more harmlefs animals.

Thirdly,