where the reasoning confifts of many steps. And tho' on a review no error is discovered, yet he is confcious that there may be errors, tho' they have escaped him.

:

As to the other kind of demonstrative reasoning, founded on fome propofition of which we are intuitively certain; I justly call it demonftrative, because it affords the fame conviction that arifes from mathematical reasoning. In both, the means of conviction are the fame, viz, a clear perception of the relation between two ideas and there are many relations of which we have ideas no lefs clear than of equality; witness fubstance and quality, the whole and its parts, caufe and effect, and many others. From the intuitive proposition, for example, That nothing which begins to exist can exist without a caufe, I can conclude, that fome one being must have existed from all eternity, with no less certainty, than that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

What falls next in order, is that inferior kind of knowledge which is termed opinion; and which, like knowledge properly fo termed, is founded in fome inftances upon intuition, and in fome upon reasoning. But it differs from knowledge in the following particular, that it produces different degrees of conviction, fometimes approaching to certainty, and sometimes finking toward the verge of improbability. The constancy and uniformity of natural operations, is a fit subject for illustrating that difference. The future fucceffive changes of day and night, of winter and fummer, and of other fucceffions which have hitherto been regular and uniform, fall under intuitive knowledge, because of these we have the highest conviction. As the conviction is inferior of fucceffions that hitherto have been varied in any degree, these fall under intuitive opinion. We expect fummer after winter with the utmost confidence; but we have not the fame confidence in expecting a hot fummer or a cold winter. And And yet the probabi

lity

lity approaches much nearer to certainty, than the intuitive opinion we have, that the operations of nature are extremely fimple, a propofition that is very little rely'd on.

As to opinion founded on reafoning, it is obvious, that the conviction produced by the reasoning, can never rife above what is produced by the intuitive propofition upon which the reasoning is founded. And that it may be weaker, will appear from confidering, that even where the fundamental propofition is certain, it may lead to the conclusive opinion by intermediate propofitions, that are probable only, not certain. In a word, it holds in general with respect to every fort of reasoning, that the conclufive propofition can never rise higher in point of conviction, than the very lowest of the intuitive propofitions employ'd as steps in the reasoning.

The perception we have of the contingency of future events, opens a wide field to our reasoning about probabilities. That perception involves more or lefs doubt according to its fubject. In some instances, the event is perceived to be extremely doubtful; in others it is perceived to be less doubtful. It appears altogether doubtful, in throwing a dye, which of the fix fides will turn up; and for that reason, we cannot justly conclude for one rather than another. If one only of the fix fides be marked with a figure, we conclude, that a blank will turn up; and five to one is an equal wager that fuch will be the effect. In judging of the future behaviour of a man who has hitherto been governed by interest, we may conclude with a probability approaching to certainty, that intereft will continue to prevail.

Belief comes laft in order, which, as defined above, is knowledge of the truth of facts that falls below certainty, and involves in its nature fome degree of doubt. It is alfo of two kinds; one founded upon intuition, and one upon reafoning. Thus, knowledge, opinion, belief, are all of them equally diftinguishable inР

VOL. II.

to

to intuitive and difcurfive. Of intuitive belief, I discover three different fources or caufes. First, A present object. Secondly, An object formerly prefent. Thirdly, The teftimony of others. To have a clear conception of the first cause, it must be obferved, that among the fimple perceptions that compofe the complex perception of a prefent object, a perception of real and present existence is one. This perception rifes commonly to certainty; in which cafe it is a branch of knowledge properly fo termed; and is handled as fuch above. But this perception falls below certainty in fome inftances; as when an object, feen at a great distance, or in a fog, is perceived to be a horse, but so indiftinctly as to make it a probability only. The perception in fuch a cafe is termed belief. Both perceptions are fundamentally of the fame nature; being simple perceptions of real existence. They differ only in point of accuracy: the perception of reality that makes a branch of knowledge, is fo clear and distinct as to exclude all doubt or hesitation: the perception of reality that occafions belief, being lefs clear and distinct, makes not the existence of the object certain to us, but only probable.

With refpect to the fecond caufe; the existence of an abfent object, formerly seen, amounts not to a certainty; and therefore is the subject of belief only, not of knowledge. Things are in a continual flux from production to diffolution; and our fenfes are accommodated to that variable fcene: a prefent object admits no doubt of its existence; but after it is removed, its existence becomes lefs certain, and in time finks down to a flight degree of probability.

Human teftimony, the third caufe, produces belief, more or less strong, according to circumftances. In general, nature leads us to rely upon the veracity of each other; and commonly the degree of reliance is proportioned to the degree of veracity. Sometimes belief approaches to certainty, as when it is founded on the

evidence

evidence of perfons above all exception. Sometimes it finks to the lowest degree of probability, as when a fact is told by one who has no great reputation for truth. The nature of the fact, common or uncommon, has likewise an influence: an ordinary incident gains credit upon very flight evidence; but it requires the strongest evidence to overcome the improbability of an event that deviates from the ordinary course of nature. At the fame time, it must be observed, that belief is not always founded upon rational principles. There are biaffes and weakneffes in human nature that fometimes difturb the operation, and produce belief without fufficient or proper evidence: we are difpofed to believe on very flight evidence, an interefting event, however rare or fingular, that alarms and agitates the mind; because the mind, in agitation, is remarkably fufceptible of impreffions: for which reafon, ftories of ghosts and apparitions pafs current with the vulgar. Eloquence alfo has great power over the mind; and, by making deep impreffions, enforces the belief of facts upon evidence that would not be regarded in a cool moment.

The dependence that our perception of real existence, and confequently belief, hath upon oral evidence, enlivens focial intercourse, and promotes fociety. But the perception of real exiftence has a still more extenfive influence; for from that perception is derived a great part of the entertainment we find in hiftory, -and in historical fables (a). At the fame time, a perception that may be raised by fiction as well as by truth, would often miflead, were we abandoned to its impulfe: but the God of nature hath provided a remedy for that evil, by erecting within the mind a tribunal, to which there lies an appeal from the rafh impreflions of fenfe. When the delufion of eloquence or of dread

(a) Elements of Criticifm, ch. 2. part 1. §7.

P 2

fubfides,

fubfides, the perplexed mind is uncertain what to believe. A regular process commences, counsel is heard, evidence produced, and a final judgement pronounced, fometimes confirming, fometimes varying, the belief impressed upon us by the lively perception of reality. Thus, by a wife appointment of nature, intuitive belief is fubjected to rational discussion: when confirmed by reason, it turns more vigorous and authoritative: when contradicted by reason, it disappears among fenfible people. In fome instances, it is too headstrong for reason; as in the case of hobgoblins and apparitions, which pass current among the vulgar in spite of reafon.

We proceed to the other kind of belief, viz. that which is founded on reasoning, to which, when intuition fails us, we must have recourse for ascertaining certain facts. Thus, from known effects, we infer the existence of unknown causes. That an effect must have a cause, is an intuitive propofition; but to ascertain what particular thing is the caufe, requires commonly a process of reasoning. This is one of the means by which the Deity, the primary cause, is made known to us, as mentioned above. Reafon, in tracing caufes from known effects, produces different degrees of conviction. It fometimes produces certainty, as in proving the existence of the Deity; which on that account is handled above, under the head of knowledge. For the most part it produces belief only, which, according to the strength of the reafoning, fometimes approaches to certainty, and fometimes is fo weak as barely to turn the fcale on the fide of probability. Take the following examples of different degrees of belief founded on probable reasoning. When Inigo Jones flourished, and was the only architect of note in England, let it be fuppofed that his model of the palace of Whitehall had been prefented to a ftranger, without mentioning the author. The ftranger, in the first place, would have been intuitively certain, that this was the work of

fome