give reasons for why we do not believe; and I would ask again, by what means are we to do this but by shewing to the inquirer what we considre to be unworthy of belief among the tenets and doctrines of our opponents? for you must observe, that we do not bring forward any thing new to be believed in; we only state our disbelief, and reasons for disbelieving, what has been handed down to us by our ignorant ancestors. Ignorant I say, and ignorant surely they were when they could talk about the ends and corners of the Earth; about the Heaven above, the Earth beneath, and the Waters under the earth-about the Sun standing still upon a Hill, and the Moon in a Valley; with many other things EQUALLY true and wonderful. Surely we, in these enlightened days, cannot be blamed for disbelieving the writings of men so palpably ignorant. But as many ignorant men, even in these days, do believe those writingsat least pretend to believe-and attempt to make others like themselves, either ignorant believers or hypocritical knaves, is it surprising that we should attempt to show good and substantial reasons for not believing them? And what has the author of "The Age of Reason" done, more than this? In the first page of his work, after stating his own belief, he says; "But lest it should be supposed that I believe many other things in addition to those, I shall, in the progress of this work, declare the things I do not believe, and my many reasons for not believing them ;" and to this text I believe he has strictly confined himself. Allowing then, Gentlemen, as you certainly must, that we find many difficulties in the way of believing, will they be removed by prosecuting us?. Certainly they will not. If our reasons are not well grounded, why does not some one, competent to the task, step forward and make it so appear? Surely among the seventy thousand Gospel Preachers which this country is supposed to contain, if we are in error, one may be found willing and able to set us right! We are ever ready to read what they have to write, we are ever ready to hear what they have to say; and we only claim in both cases the right of replying, till we have elucidated the truth or falsehood of the matter in question. If our reasons for not believing are well grounded, is it just that we should be punished for stating them? I answer, No; and Justice, Truth, and Liberality, will bear me out in the assertion. But, Gentlemen, supposing that a person could stand up before you, and prove the opinions. and principles I hold to be false, and of an evil tendency; which I can, with safety as to the result, challenge every

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living person to do, would justice demand that I should be punished?-Far from it. Õpinion is not within our controul-it is forced upon us by circumstances, and retained whether we will or no, till more powerful circumstances may happen to force a different opinion in its place. Sound and reasonable arguments may effect this, but, Gentlemen, let me again repeat, what I am persuaded you cannot but acknowledge to be a fact-that prosecution or persecution for matters of opinion, will never cause the prosecuted person to think otherwise; but, on the contrary, will fix the belief in the truth of his opinions more firmly upon him. what use is it, then, to prosecute? Has the sale of these works been stayed by the numerous prosecutions which have taken place for publishing them? Has the sale not increased in a tenfold degree with every new prosecution? How vain, then, is the attempt of men in power to regulate the mind, and form it to their purpose? How vain is the attempt of the supporters of the allowed creeds to force their dogmatical doctrines and beliefs on the honest inquirer after truth? How vain their united efforts to extinguish the rising spirit of liberty and free discussion? How vainly do they attempt to transform the child of nature, and prevent the emanation of his mind from going forth to his fellow-man? Take these things, then, Gentlemen, into your consideration-see the uselessness, the gross injustice, and the glaring impolicy of attempting to punish for matters of opinion, and by your verdict put a stop to this system of persecution for what a man cannot avoid. You may, perhaps, consider that the many convictions which have taken place on similar charges form a precedent sufficiently strong to authorize your bringing a verdict of Guilty in the present instance; but allow me to plead the counter precedent. This is not the first instance in which a Court of Justice has been obliged to stop a course of error and alter its course; as well as legislation for what is called blasphemy there has been legislation upon the word witchcraft, and by far more statute laws have been made upon the latter, than upon the former word. But after ages of error, after finding it said in the Bible (Exodus, xxii. 18), "Ye shall not suffer a witch to live," the knowledge of the present age has discovered that no such supernatural powers, as have been attributed to the word witchcraft, have ever existed among mankind; and within the last few years, the British Parliament has been occupied in repealing statutes about witchcraft, which statutes had no foundation but in human ignorance, and must

have been null and void from their origin, though many innocent persons, upon false accusation, have suffered from them. It is human innocence that has always suffered most from human ignorance. So in my case it is now quite as clear, that no such an offence as commonly passes under the name of blasphemy, could ever have been committed, as that no such an offence as has often, and for centuries been urged under the name of witchcraft, could have been committed. The defect of evidence is the same in both cases, equally with the charge of blasphemy as with the charge of witchcraft. It is our ignorance of natural powers that leads us to suppose the existence of supernatural powers; and unless supernatural powers can be proved to exist, neither the offence of witchcraft, nor of blasphemy can be proved to have existed. This, Gentlemen, I should think must sufficiently convince you, not only that I have not committed the offence with which I am charged, but that no man ever did or can commit such an offence; and this part of the charge being dismissed, the prosecution must fall to the ground; for under what other shape can it be supported? It may be said, "but here is the book, and the sale of the book sworn to." That does not affect my argument. In that book, something false must be proved to constitute my publication or sale of it, an offence against law. But it is not, because it contains falsehood, but because it contains truths which go to overthrow falsehood, that I am sought to be punished as a criminal. It is charged that my book speaks improperly of Jesus Christ. These words Jesus Christ, are not the name of a person; they are titular words; and in plain English express the words Saviour Annointed. The first is an Asiatic word, corrupted from Isse, Jesse, or Jesu, and was the common cognomen of celebrated warriors, as significant of the words Saviour, Defender, Protector, or Liberator. The second is an abbreviation of the Greek word, Christos, and signifies annointed, or a person celebrated for some acts, adopted or anointed by a certain body of people, as their chief, leader, or protector. The words never were the name of any particular person known by no other name. The history of Jerusalem knows nothing of such a person; and it was a hundred years after the alleged origin of Christianity, before the name was adopted as the name of a distinct person; therefore, before my publication can be charged to be blasphemous towards a person, it falls on the accuser to prove that Jesus Christ are words which formed the name of a person known to

have existed under such a name; and then, why such words or person are not now to be commented upon, and what they or he has to do with English law; and lastly, whether it be possible to speak evil of or to blaspheme a person alleged to have existed 1800 years ago, and as many miles distant from our country and laws. I exempt myself from all charge of blasphemy towards such a person as Jesus Christ, by saying that I have no knowledge of such person having existed, and that the history of the country in which it is now said that such a person did live, has no mention of such a person. A history of an individual never absent from one country must be inseperable from the history of that country. Gentlemen, I am well aware that by thus acting the part of an honest man, boldly asserting and defending my opinions and principles, that I am drawing forth against me strong and deeply rooted prejudices. But surely I should have been by far more deserving of punishment if I had stood up in this Court, as I might have done, and covered my defence under the mask of by pocrisy? Surely the man who speaks what he thinks, the whole of what he thinks, and nothing but what he thinks, is not so dangerous a character as he who, with hypocritical cant, assures you one thing, and at the same time means another? Throw aside, then, Gentlemen, those prejudices which an open avowal of opposite opinions may arouse in your minds; considering that though we differ, our opinions are equally the effect of circumstances beyond our power to controul. I am likewise well aware of the power which the learning and eloquence of those whom the gold of my prosecutors has brought into Court against me, may have in directing your verdict.

But, Gentlemen, let me beg you to remember that it is not in the power of the most eloquent speaker to alter the truth of the matter in debate. Flowing language, distant reasoning, and an affected assurance, may mislead the hearer, but it cannot make truth falsehood, or falsehood truth.

Gentlemen, you have heard a few extracts read from The Age of Reason, I will now read you a few others; as you can have but little knowledge of the work itself from a few partially selected passages.

Here the defendant read passages from the work in question *

* During which the Recorder stopped him twice, and asked him, if he thought such a line of conduct could be of any service to him. If he intended to read the whole book, and thus uselessly take up the time of

I have now, Gentlemen, gone through the principal part of the work for which I am prosecuted, and I now appeal to your own impartial judgment, to say whether the author has written one immoral sentence beyond the extract taken from the Bible. On the contrary, you must observe, that throughout the whole of his work, the author has endeavoured to inculcate a pure and simple system of morality. "But he has ridiculed the Christian religion," say our opponents: it is true: and what doth this prove but that the Bible is of itself ridiculous? Wit is used in vain if there be not something ridiculous to work upon; and if people choose to believe in a ridiculous book, how can they expect but that it will be held up in its true colours? "He has called the Bible a book of lies!" He bas, and rightly too. Who can read two sentences diametrically opposed to each other, and say there is not a lie in the case? And who will say after reading the "Age of Reason," and tracing the references to the Bible, that it does not contain many and glaring instances of this? "Contradictions," as numerous as the chapters, and "absurdities" an ample store are here likewise to be found in confirmation of what my author has written.-If then the Bible be that sort of book which the " Age of Reason" describes it to be, should we not rather be commended than punished for exposing it? If the Bible be true, will our writing make it false? If false, can any power make it true? Doth truth require the aid of man, or falsehood deserve it? See, then, Gentlemen, the dilemma in which this Court is now placed? It is either occupied in the needless work of stretching the arm of power to aid truth, or unjustly attempting to suppress truth and support falsehood. But my opponents say, that we are not here to try the truth or falsehood of religion, but whether I have, or have not committed an offence against law-be it so. If the charge is for libel, how is it substantiated? Have my prosecutors proved an injury done by my publication? Is it possible that one book can injure another? If my book lessens the public esteem for the Bible, is it not a proof that that esteem was ill founded? If the "Age of Reason" was an attack on an individual, who could stand up before you and prove that attack to be false and malicious; then, and not till then, can you with

the Court, he would not prevent him. It would certainly not be doing himself any good, but that was for himself to consider.

Defendant-I think it right to read to the Jury more of this book than the mere partial passages which are given in the indictment. I wish to do so, in order to show the Jury the true tenour of the work.