sure, it is evident that would be preferred by which the ends sought might be most eminently accomplished. Wise men would not appoint any thing merely from caprice,-merely to show their supremacy and independence. In the case we are imagining, the persons have an intelligent aim and purpose: they are supposed, from their personal benevolence, to be anxious to depart, in their official capacity, from the exact letter of the law, and yet to maintain and illustrate its spirit; and thus, by the institution of some extraordinary measure, to be able to extend mercy to an offender without appearing to sanction or palliate the offence. From this it is evident that the measure, whatever it be, cannot be one merely arbitrary; one, deriving its importance and power, altogether from the fact of its appointment. Surely, something would be preferred that should have in itself a rational propriety; something that should be seen to be capable of influencing the operations of government; something that might act, by way of natural consequence, upon the mind of the prisoner, impressing him with the flagrancy of his offence, the majesty of the law, the regard to rectitude, as well as to compassion, of those invested with the supreme authority. It is reasonable, I say, to suppose that something possessing such properties would be employed;

and that they would be perceived to belong to it by the persons to whom it was proposed; and, then, so far as these were understood, the reasons for the choice of the appointment would be understood. It would still be true, however, as before asserted, that the efficiency of the plea would not depend upon the apprehension by the prisoner of these reasons. That efficiency would, in respect to the government, arise from the inherent propriety of the appointment itself; and, in respect to the man, from his personal trust in it, in consequence of his believing the assurances of government. But, the man's perceiving the nature, and understanding the reasons of the appointment, would, in the first place, be a rational inducement to the exercise of trust; and, in the second place, it would thus come to pass, that, the very exercise of mind necessary to pardon would be favourable to virtue, as the properties perceived in the ground of that pardon, would be seen to constitute the strongest motives to subsequent obedience.

IV.

a

We now terminate this train of consecutive illustrations by one concluding remark, remark to which we seem to be brought as

Z

to the natural winding up of the whole subject. Suppose all that we have imagined as actually taking place; suppose that the case of an offender excited (from whatever cause) the interest described, and led to the benevolent provision of some extrinsic ground of appeal, in consideration of which, mercy might be dispensed; suppose that the knowledge of this was conveyed to him, by some official and intelligible document, stating the fact, explaining the nature of the professed ground of dependence, and pledging the government to regard an appeal founded upon it. Suppose this ;—and then suppose farther, that, believing the document to be authentic, and the facts and promises contained in it to be true, the person acted upon its suggestions, sought and secured the boon; in this case, a case altogether secular, I should say that the man was justified by faith; in other words, that he obtained pardon by means of his belief of the testimony of government.-He had been proved and pronounced a flagrant offender; by this he was necessarily exposed to punishment; it was utterly impossible for him to be justified by law; it was equally impossible for him to be justified by favour, merely in consequence of an appeal to the prerogative, or in consideration of his possessing any balancing attributes of virtue; yet, through his confidence

in a certain communication tendered him by government, the otherwise impossible object is accomplished. He trusts the promise; he urges the plea; he directs, so to speak, the eye of the executive from the contemplation of himself, to the contemplation of the ground, upon which it is asserted, and upon which he feels, a full pardon may be equitably dispensed. The consideration prevails; the plea is admitted; the pardon is given; by this he is virtually placed in the condition, and clothed with the character, of one who has vindicated and established his personal virtue; he is regarded and treated as if he were just; his offence becomes, as to its direct consequences, as if it had never been; he is proclaimed free; he is shielded from punishment; he is pardoned-he is justified-he is justified by faith.

SERMON XIII.

JUSTIFICATION.

HEB. XI. 8-19.

By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a place which he should after receive for an inheritance, obeyed; and he went out, not knowing whither he went. By faith he sojourned in the land of promise, as in a strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs with him of the same promise: For he looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God. Through faith also Sara herself received strength to conceive seed, and was delivered of a child when she was past age, because she judged him faithful who had promised. Therefore sprang there even of one, and him as good as dead, so many as the stars of the sky in multitude, and as the sand which is by the sea shore innumerable. These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and