have saved it. He wanted not diplomatic skill, but, as indeed Sebastiani himself finally decides,* true political wisdom. »

Sebastiani's fourth period, that in which we live, he deems eminently a period of diplomacy, and he hopes that the same results which have hitherto been brought about by the effusion of blood, will be henceforth accomplished by Policy and Diplomacy. We too trust that diplomacy may stand in the place of war; but not to produce the same results. We believe that there is now, throughout Europe, a sincere desire of peace in the times to which we have referred, there was an overwhelming desire of aggrandizement.

There would have been much more business for the diplomatist, if the number of independent states had continued as our author represents them in the fifteenth century, when there ex isted in Europe more than 2,000 sovereignties, either royal cor seignorial, ecclesiastical or civil. Of these, 1414 were in Ger many. Previously to the French Revolution, the number had been reduced to 249, of which 227 were in Germany, and 13 ing Italy. The French Revolution and the conquests of Bonaparte reduced the number to 49. The arrangements consequent upon the peace of 1815 have restored the character of sovereignty to many states which had been abolished; and there are now rather more than sixty states in Europe, including 29 in Germany and 5 in Italy, which have not each a population of 500,000. Even of the larger states, many are quite incompetent to preserve their own independence.

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The enumeration of independent states leads our author to the European Balance, of which he affirms that, while it is the basis of their policy with those who desire peace, it serves as a pretext to those who are ambitious of aggrandizement. We abridge his sketch of the history of this principle, which has become, he says, an integral part of the Law of Nations.ht

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During the greatness of the Roman Empire, and until after the death of Charlemagne, the law of conquest predominated. After the dissolution of the empire of Charlemagne, there was no longer any apprehension of an overwhelming power. Germany and Italy were torn to pieces by internal factions, and by dis putes with the Court of Rome. France was weak, through the incoherence of its provinces, and domestic wars. Louis XI, under whom Burgundy was re-united to France, gave consistence

P. 89.

+ Politiques policy is perhaps not a perfectly accurate transition of this word. [19 P. 257.

to this monarchy, but it was not until the days of Charles N. and Francis I. that the modern system of policy commenced. It had its origin in the rivalry of these two monarchs. The reduction of the power of the House of Austria began with the revolt of the provinces of the Low Countries. France and England gladly seized this opportunity of weakening Austria. Religious disputes, combined with political quarrels, led to the Thirty Years' War, and the treaties of Westphalia, whereby the House of Austria received a second shock. The rivalry between Austria and France was augmented by the successful ambition of Louis XIV. This was the true epoch of the origin of the system of balance. It was owing to the alarm which the house of Austria, and Holland, when it became an independent power, affected to feel at the power of France. England took little part in the quarrels of the continent. Elizabeth, in concert with Henry IV., and afterwards Cromwell, interposed, but his attention (it might have been said that of Elizabeth also) was principally fixed upon Holland and Spain. English policy fluctuated, until the hatred of William III. toward Louis XIV. occasioned the rivalry and even animosity of France and England. This rivalry broke forth under the mask of the balance, in the disputes about the succession of Spain, and at the death of the Emperor Charles VI. The peace of 1748 brought forward Prussia into the European system; the intervention of this new power, and of Russia, brought out of barbarism by Peter the Great, required a new casting of the system of balance. France and England were now the rallying points of the two parties. The French-Austrian Alliance of 1756, the Family Compact of 1761, and the various events which occurred, up to 1789, produced new combinations, and a variety of alliances and changes.

This sketch, the author conceives, is sufficient to exhibit the principle of the system of balance. He admits, that no such general principle is recognized by public conventions, but he deduces it from the right, which each state has, to oppose every measure whereby one power would arrogate to itself exclusive domination and since, he says, every powers must:

*Favier styled the Austrian Alliance unequal, because Austria' was liable to attack from several powers, Frauce from one power only. France had therefore the more burdensome obligation. Segur says, it is true that France was only liable to danger from Austria. France then makes a friend of her only formidable enemy, while Austria only delivers herself from one of many. Européenne, tells us, in a

+ But

a note in tom. ii. p. 440, that L'étude politique des nations et les resumés historiques des grandes negociations dupuis paix de Westphalie jusqu'à ce jour, formeront une partie supplémentaire." anxious to see this supplement. Fak

adopt its own views of the justice or injustice of the proceedings of another, it is impossible to lay down rules for judging of such proceedings. It would be, he adds, too great a limitation of the meaning of the word "balance" to confine it to the case of op position to the aggrandizement of one power. It applies also to the prevention of the degradation of another. It was as essential to the safety of other states, to oppose the dismemberment of Austria at the death of Charles VI., as to oppose the union of France and Spain into one monarchy. The law of nature authorizes the formation of a league among nations inhabiting the same part of the world, to repress the disproportionate strength of any one which appears incompatible with the independence of the others. It is no matter of surprise then, that, nations have laboured at the establishment of a balance, general, or applicable to particular parts of Europe, and that a change in these different systems has been regarded as 'a justifying cause of war." However difficult it may be to calculate a just balance, the system is incontestably advantageous, in restraining, through the risks or the apprehensions of war, a power ambitious of preponderance.

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These are our author's views. The readers of our eighth volume (p. 50-55) are aware that we cannot recognize in the history of Europe that systematic principle of equilibrium which some authors have imagined. Yet we suspect that, between us and the present author, there is no substantial difference, although our meaning is differently expressed; but we would observe that his illustrations support our opinion of the occasional character of the interference at least of England, in the wars of which the balance of power was the professed object. The inadequate and reluctant assistance which Elizabeth gave to the Dutch, sprang partly from the conformity of religion, partly from apprehensions of the particular danger arising to England from the Spanish predominance on the opposite coast, and very much from personal dislike between Elizabeth and the widower of her sister,

211

The interference of our William in the European wars is traced by our author himself to that King's hatred of Louis XIV; but it is well known that, notwithstanding this antipathy against Louis, which William naturally felt as Prince of Orange, he would at one time have acknowledged a Bourbon King of Spain, and would perhaps have not framed the Grand Alliance, if Louisch had recognized his title to the English thrones sino sitru A sindw Continental readers will perhaps hardly concur in our opini nion, that the support given by England to Maria Theresa is tow be traced to the good faith which has usually characterized thens

i

English policy. The Pragmatic Sanction had been guaranteed in 1731 without much deliberation, and in return for concessions supposed to be favourable to English interests now forgotten; and to the royal family of Spain, now our open enemy. From that time to the death of Charles VI., there had been no cooperation between England and the Emperor, who was left in the Polish War without support from the maritime powers. Nevertheless, not a moment was lost, after his death, even by the pacific Walpole, in promising to adhere to the engagements which had been contracted, upon by-gone inducements, nearly twenty years before. The German politics of George II. were also supposed to influence the renewal of the connection with Austria.

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It be true, as our author remarks, that any change in "the system of balance," has been considered as a justifying cause of war: but it would be difficult to name one contest, of which the derangement of the balance has been truly the operative cause.

The reasons upon which wars are justified, says our author, are often different from the motives in which they originate.§

The wars for the succession of Spain, and for the Pragmatic Sanction, were ostensibly founded on the rights of the Archduke Charles and Maria Theresa: the real motive of England was jealousy of France, and desire to preserve the balance of power. France too made a pretence of the rights of the Elector of Bavaria, but really sought to humble Austria. The Seven Years' War was justified by the violent measures of the French in Canada: the true motive was the destruction of the French navy. In like manner France was brought into the American war, not by vexations at sea, but by the wish to weaken England.||

All this is perhaps true, except that in the first two instances, that which is assigned as a secret motive was publicly avowed. Wars also sometimes originate in less statesmanlike motives,

By the second treaty of Vienna, 16th March, 1731, the Emperor engaged to abolish the Ostend Company, and entered into the arrangements of the Treaty of Seville for the establishment of Don Carlos in Italy.-Martens, Coll. des Traités, vol. viii. pt. 2, p. 213; Koch. ii.

Charles VI. died 20th October, 1740. The King's speech of November 18th announced his determination to adhere to his engagements.

Vol. I. p. 265.

Vol. ii. p. 244.

In the Politique de tous les Cabinets," by Favier and Segur, (iii. 172,) there is a curious opinion of Turgot, given in 1776, against assisting the American colonies. If, said he, the colonies should be subdued, it must be through the ruin of their resources, and England would lose the benefit of them. If they give way, and preserve their wealth, they will always be looking for independence, and oblige England to maintain a large force to keep them down.

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as the love of Buckingham for Anne of Austria, and the desire of Louvois to divert Louis XIV. from his buildings.

Mr. Fox on one occasion said, that war was justifiable only when the national honour was involved. This doctrine, if not absolutely correct, approaches to correctness more nearly than at first appears. Of the objects of war, very few perhaps are equivalent to the evils which war produces; and if a nation consulted only the balance of profit and loss, it would often rather yield the disputed point than fight for it; but then comes in the point of honour. Concession is attributed to fear, and invites new encroachments. A nation which bears insults, will not be trusted; it loses its allies, and has no friend in the hour of danger. Thus explained, the honour of a nation is inseparably linked with its interests; and Fox's dictum is neither paradox nor novelty.

The point of honour, however, occurs in cases in which the interest would be questionable. A state may have distant possessions, which are to her no source of strength or riches; but she is bound by an honourable feeling towards these dependencies, to commence or continue a war, rather than surrender any of them to an enemy. It may be said, and with some reason, that this obligation belongs to the great duty of sovereignty; and we come to this, that in national as in personal affairs, honour includes everything that is good, as well as great.

Another case in which honour may impel us to go to war, when our immediate interests would counsel peace, is where we have bound ourselves to an ally; and this is a principal reason for avoiding permanent alliances or guaranties. Even here, a proportionate estimate of profit and loss would induce us to preserve, by good faith, our credit with other powers.

But we are getting too deep into the law of nations* and state policy: we recur to what more immediately concerns the diplomatist, for whom this " Complete Treatise" is written.

Our author discusses some important questions under the head of Droit des Traités. Treaties, he says, are binding, unless the negociator exceeds "ses pouvoirs ostensibles"—that is, we presume, the instrument which he exhibits at the foreign court as his authority for treating. This doctrine is not conformable to the practice of Europe. In the commission given to a plenipotentiary, which is called his "full powers," the sovereign usually

* If we had space to go into the law of nations, we should endeavour to vindicate, upon the very principles of this author, who nevertheless disapproves of it, the practice of England in regard to neutrals, and the manner in which her wars have been com. menced—a fruitful source of misrepresentation with French writers.