lative opinions, if they have no other foundation than the busy agitation of the human brain.

Physical. Natural, including real and ideal, in contradistinction to Metaphysical, or transcending the real, and ideal; that is, the ideal which is a transcript or a combination of the real; 109 (10); 118 (12); 131 (2).

Physico-logical. An essential definition of a thing-physical is so called; 137 (8).

Plain. Style or diction so called in contradistinction to figurative; 12 (3). A delusion from confounding this sense of the word with another; 124 (34).

Plaintive. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of certain emotive feelings; 59 (14).

Plato. The doctrines of this philosopher alluded to; 109 (Note to Sect. 9); 111 (Note to Sect 10); 131 (foot-note). See also Philosophy, Philosophers in this Index.

Pleonasm. Rhetorical redundancy; 17 (13).

Ploce. A peculiar figure of speech in using a proper name; 18 (14).
Polyptoton. A sort of antithesis in rhetoric; 18 (14).

Polysyndeton. A way of prolonging an enumeration in rhetoric; 16(12). Positive. Placed, set, appointed to this meaning negative may be opposed, and in the sense requiring such opposition, the word negative has in our system a logical value: not so when opposed to affirmative; see No, Not: see also Affirmative.

Practical, Practice. Practical directions concerning Inductive Logic, 113-129 (11-36): Concerning Definition; 134-140 (4-8, and Notes): Concerning Deductive logic; 145-179 (7-45): Concerning Errors in deductive practice; 180-217 (1-22).

Predicables. What they are in formal logic;

Predicaments. What they are in formal figi; 220 (4).

Preliminary conditions. The necessity of such conditions on proposing a dispute or discussion; 139 (second Note to Chap. III.)

Prolepsis. Anticipation, a rhetorical expedient: 21 (23).

Premises. What they are in our logic; 101 (1); 141 (2); 147 (10). What they are in formal logic; 222 ("When we have to show," &c.) Pronunciation. The limited or special meaning of this term in modern tuition; 56 (5).

Proper names. This is a logical distinction, though commonly borrowed by grammar; 118 (22).

Property. Property distinguished from Accident; 136 (7); 158 (22). It is one of the five predicables in Aristotelian logic: 220 (4). Proposition. In rhetoric, one of the occasional divisions of a regular oration; 10 (2). In logic, a proposition is a sentence which develops knowledge in a greater or less degree, and in our logic considered to be a virtual syllogism; 145 (6);-in Aristotelian logic, considered to be the enunciation of a judgement, and hence distinguished from reasoning as expressed by the syllogism; 218 (3); 223 (5).

Prose. A purely logical exercise must be in prose :-rhetoric employs prose for its ordinary productions; but since it includes poetry, it also includes verse; 2 (4).

Proximum genus. The genus immediately next above the subject of defi

nition, to which genus we have to add the specific difference, and the
subject is defined; 132 (2).

Purely logical. An essential definition of a thing metaphysical is so
called; 137 (8).

Quaintness of style. Instruction and Exercise for correcting it; 27,
et seq.

Quality and Quantity of Propositions. These are distinctions in Aris-
totelian logic, the former of which our logic resigns to graminar,
admitting only the latter; 221 ("Then we have a difference," &c.),
and 223 (5).

Questions for discussion. Outlines for school speeches; 82 (9-11).
Absurdity of some such questions; 139 (second note to Chap. III.)

Real.

Real things in contradistinction to ideal; 108 (9); 117 (18);
131 (2). A real definition in contradistinction to a nominal one;
where, it must be remembered, the epithet is used with a less strict
application; 135 (6).

Realist. See Nominalist.

Reason. Reason, in a special sense, means the same as Argument; which
see. As the name of that capacity in man which distinguishes him
from brutes, we may say, that it is the capacity to use signs of know-
ledge gained, in order to accumulate further knowledge; and to use
the same signs in order to develop the knowledge accumulated. Briefly,
man is a creature capable of language,-to use the Homeric epithet, a
voice-dividing creature, that is, one who divides a natural cry into
parts of speech. Be it observed that the born-deaf, and consequently
dumb, have the mental capacity, though they want the exterior organ
for language. We may again, in other words, say, that Reason is the
power of abstraction. Brutes have knowledge with their sensations,
but their knowledge is never abstract, that is, cannot be entertained
apart from their sensations: this is Instinct; and this its true differ-
ence from Reason.

Relation. Relation, in Aristotelian logic, and even in Locke's Essay, is a
distinct general head, set in contradistinction to other general heads
under which the subjects of thought are accumulated. In our logic, it
is that in which all knowledge has its origin and its existence: that is
to say, in our logic, to know anything is to be aware of its relation to
some other thing or things, and the relation of all these things to
oneself.

Repetition. Rhetorical figures of repetition; 17 (13).

Rhetoric. Rhetoric distinguished from Grammar and Logic; 1 (1, 2);
101 (1).

Roman history. Subjects for Narrative Exercises from ; 72.

Sarcasm. A figure in rhetoric that derives its force from the speaker's
manner; 20 (21).

Scepticism. See Philosophy, Philosophers, above. All speculative phi-
losophy, that is, philosophy (if so it must be called) which builds on
hypothetical grounds, must, through its very character, terminate in
scepticism.

Science. Strictly, that which can be demonstrated from self-evident truths; and as such demonstration is impossible in physics, we must look for it, strictly, in metaphysics alone; 109 (10).

Scholastic, Schoolmen. Scholastic learning and the Schoolmen alluded to; 134 (3). The father of the Schoolmen was John Scotus Erigena, a native of Ireland, who lived in the ninth century, and first introduced, from what source is unknown, the philosophy of Aristotle. Though at first opposed, it was soon adopted by churchmen as a scientific basis of the doctrines they taught, and it continued to be mixed with divinity and all other learning during full five centuries, in which time, however, we may trace certain eras and changes. A new era commenced with the rise of the Nominalists (see Nominalist) under John Roscelin, a Frenchman, who flourished in the twelfth century. The celebrated Abelard was his disciple. The third period saw the introduction into Europe of the writings of the Arabian philosophers, the translation of Aristotle from different versions into Latin, his undisputed predominancy in all the schools, and the complete triumph of Realism. It is at this time, namely, in the thirteenth century, that we have the great names among the schoolmen, such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus; the latter two of whom had their sects distinguished by the names of Thomists and Scotists. In reaching the days of William of Ockam, who died in 1374, we attain another era. His mind, better constituted or better taught, threw off much that was trifling, and more that was erroneous, in the prevalent learning; and in a little more than a century from his time, we begin to lose the distinctive features which the term scholastic is intended to signify when applied to literature. Second intention. A term in formal logic to signify what in our logic is called a special meaning; 120 (26).

Sensation, Sensationalism, Sense. A sensation in itself is nothing more than a state of one's animal being; it is not perception till knowledge is joined to it. Sensationalism is the doctrine of those who think that knowledge begins by being sensation. A sense is the organ through which a sensation is received; 106 (6, and foot-note); 109 (note to Sect. 9); 110 (first foot-note); 111 (note to Sect. 10). The sense of any single word is the knowledge which it signifies; of two or more words is the development of knowledge; 101 (1, 2); 143 (4). Sentiment. This term, though etymologically allied to the preceding, deviates from them in meaning, at least when the former are strictly applied. It includes knowledge, and emotion joined to knowledge; and is connected in meaning with the word sense only when the latter is loosely applied, so as to imply both sensation and thought; as in saying "He has a grateful sense of your kind acts."

Shifting senses of a word. Caution against the delusion hence arising; 124 (34).

Simile, Similitude. This is a figure in rhetoric; and also one of the topics of internal argument both in rhetoric and logic; 8 (II. 3); 19 (16); 159 (23).

Slides of the voice. The tones that form the modulation of speech; 57 (7).

Socratic. The Socratic method of reasoning, consisted in so putting ques

tions, that the respondent, by his admissions, was led, step by step, to
yield the conclusion in view. Socrates, see Philosophy, Philosophers.
Solemn. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of certain
emotive feelings; 59 (16).

Sophistry. Suggestions for avoiding the delusions it creates, during the
inductive process of learning; 121–129 (31–36).

Sorites. A form of language arising from an accumulation of arguments;
167 (38).

Special, Specialize, Specialization, Species. Special means, singled out by
particular characteristics from the genus or kind to which the thing
belongs; Specialize is to make special by reduction from a general
application. Species means a sort under a kind or genus; 6 (ÏI. 1);
120 (26); ib. (30); 137 (8); 146 (8); 153 (16).
Spiritualism. In speculative philosophy, this word signifies the doctrine
that all which exists to the understanding is spirit or mind; a conclu-
sion inevitable if we admit the doctrine of ideas as taught of old, or
even as expounded by Locke. For if the mind is cognizant only of
ideas, it is as much as to say, that the other presumed substance,
namely matter, exists not to the mind, ideas being of the nature of the
mind itself. Berkeley's theory is, in fact, incontrovertible while we
adhere to the distinction between mind and matter, and the doctrine of
ideas in connection with that distinction.

State of the case.

One of the divisions of a judicial oration; 10 (2).
Stewart. Dugald Stewart alluded to; 104 (in the note to Chap. I.);
156 (foot-note); 219 (foot-note).

Style. Colloquial, Middle, and High Style exemplified; 12 (2). In-
struction and Exercises for improvement in style; 26-55.

Subaltern genus.

That which is a species with respect to some higher
genus; also that which has only species immediately under it; 132 (2).
Subject, Subjective. See Object, Objective.

Subject-matter. Where there is no subject-matter to be understood,
there can be nothing understood. Hence, a monstrous absurdity in
the doctrine of the formal syllogism; 142 (note to Sect. 2, ad finem.)
Summum genus; pl. Summa genera. The highest genus; 130 (2).
The summa genera of Aristotelian logic; 220 (4).

Syllogism. The syllogism virtually exists in every form of speech develop-
ing thought by two or more words. The name, however, is strictly
given only to the form consisting of three propositions, the first and
second being premises, out of which a necessary truth arises, which is
expressed by a third preposition called the conclusion; 101 (1); 141,
142 (2 and note); 163-167 (33-36).

.

The syllogism of formal logic. 217-225 (1–6).

Symploce. A mode of repetition in rhetoric; 17 (13).

Synathræsmus. Accumulation, a figure in rhetoric; 16 (12).
Syncategorematic. See Category, Categorematic.

Synchoresis. Concession, one of the expedients of rhetoric; 21 (23).

Synecdoche. Comprehension, a figure in rhetoric; 19 (18).

Synepy. The complete union in delivery of words that join to make
sense; 57 (6).

Synœceiosis. A sort of antithesis in rhetoric; 18 (14).

Synonymous, Synonymy. Synonymous words are those that differ in
spelling and sound, but are the same in meaning; as periphery and
circumference: compare Homonymous. Synonymy in rhetoric is one
of the figures of repetition; 17 (13).

Synthesis. See Analysis.

Tactual impressions. These are probably the early inlet of all our
fundamental knowledge; 109 (note to Sec. 9).

Tapinosis. A method of rhetorical extenuation; 21 (22).

Technical language. Though in the argumentum ad doctrinam technical
language is justifiable, it ought not to be used in ordinary cases; 4 (3) ;
27 (Sect 1, and examples at bottom of page 28 and top of page 29).
Testimony. This is one of the topics of external arguments; 6 (I.) ;
148 (12).

Themes. Themes are an admirable means of bringing a learner to a con-
sciousness of his deficiencies in the inductive process of logic: the
word theme has two meanings; examples of themes; 113 (11); 171
(43); 173, 174 (45); 184 (3); 185 (4). Outlines for themes; 229.
Thesis. A Thesis is a theme given out in the form of a proposition;
177-179 (47).

Thing. This is a term including every possible subject of thought, except
Nothing or Not-being; 130 (2). In this Manual, things are distributed
into things-physical and things-metaphysical; and the former into
things-real and things-ideal; 131 (2). Nothing or Not-being is a thing-
metaphysical.

Thinking. That conscious state in which things present themselves
really, or ideally, or in part really, in part ideally, either under familiar
relations or under new relations to each other and to the thinker ;
141 (2). One of the effects of thinking described; 212 (18).
Tooke. For an allusion to Horne Tooke's doctrines, see Locke above.
Topic. Topics are so called, as being the places, where arguments are to
be found; 5-9 (II. 1,—II. 3); 148-160 (12-24).

Transposition. Examples of rhetorical transposition; 15 (10). Also of
sentences whose parts require redistribution; 38-42 (Sect. 5).
Triads of propositions. The number of these that can be made up out of
the Aristotelian extremes and middle term, joined by is and is not;
223 ("Now disregarding," &c.), and 224 (" And as, in the first," &c.)
Trope. A trope is distinguished, by some teachers, from a figure of
speech; 12 (3, and foot-note); 19 (16).

Trust not appearances. Example of a thesis on this subject; 177-179
(47).

Truth.

Truth is knowledge that is held with certainty. But what is
truth to one individual mind, may not be truth to others. Hence, we
often justly speak of truth as something independent of the mind,
namely as knowledge yet to be reached, and even as knowledge beyond
all present reach.

Vehement. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of
certain emotive feelings; 59 (13).

Verb or Word. The verb or word is never logically complete, till all is
expressed by it which we intend to develop; 144 (5).