General proposition. Such a proposition is often put forward by the rhe-
torician with a delusive purpose; 123 (33).
Generalization. A process carried on by means of a sign, which in logic
is always a word; 120 (29).
Genus, Genera. For the purpose of clear comprehensive thought, we
assemble things under kinds (genera); 130 (2, 3); 137 (8); 146 (8).
Genus (kind) is one of the topics of internal argument; 6 (II. 1); 153
(16). It is one of the predicables of Aristotelian logic; 220 (4).
German Speculative philosophy. Remarks upon; 106 (foot-note); 111
(Note to Sect. 10); 117 (Note to Sect. 17).
Grammar. Distinguished from Rhetoric and Logic; 1 (1, 2); 101 (1);
144 (5, 6).
Grecian History. Subjects for Narrative Exercises from; 73.
Habit. Our acquiescence in the permanence of the natural course of
things is moulded by habit; 152 (foot-note).
High style. Contrasted with the Colloquial and Middle style; 12 (2).
History of to-day. Example of a theme upon this subject; 65.
Homoioteleuton. One of the minor expedients of rhetoric; 19 (15).
Homonymous. Homonymous words are the same to the eye and ear, but
different in meaning; as bull, a papal decree, and bull, the animal; in
contradistinction to synonymous words, which are different to the eye
and ear, but the same in meaning; as angle and corner. Paronymous
words are either such as are nearly but not quite synonymous, or such
as are grammatically allied to each other; for example, logician to
logic; firmness to firm; human to humanity.
Hyperbaton. Transposition, when made for rhetorical effect; 15 (10).
Hyperbole. Rhetorical exaggeration; 21 (22).
Hypothesis, Hypothetical. Supposition, the state of mind under which
knowledge is proposed, in order to be confirmed or set aside by experi-
ment. A hypothetical proposition, when it is a mere form of language,
takes its name from grammar; our logic is not, in this way, concerned
with it; 168 (39, ad finem).
Hypotyposis. Vision, a figure in rhetoric; 22 (24).
Hysteron. A species of transposition in rhetoric; 15 (10).
Idea, Ideal, Idealism. Idea is a term liable to be so variously and vaguely
applied, that, in a philosophical work, it is difficult to use it with safety.
In Locke, it signifies what in this Manual is explained as the knowledge
included under a word, whatever that word may be applied to signify.
In many writings it means a conception, that is, the mental representa-
tion of some real thing, (see Conception), or what, in our doctrine, is
called an ideal thing: it is often restricted to signify a visual ideal thing:
-and lastly by the German Transcendentalists, it is used to signify
what, in our doctrine, is called a thing metaphysical; Idealism is the
doctrine of those who consider ideas, in this last mentioned sense, to
exist originally in the mind; 106 (foot-note); 108 (9 and note); 109-
112 (10 and note); 116 (17 and note).
Ignoratio elenchi. See Elenchus.
Image, Imagination. Image, in rhetoric, signifies the representation of
something to the mind as an effect of emotion. Imagination is the
power or capacity to have emotions with such effects (compare Fancy,
above). All the figures of speech, when in proper taste, spring from
this power, and especially the more forcible; 22 (24); 52 (section 10).
Immortality. The Bible doctrine of the Immortality of man beyond the
grave, and the Platonic doctrine of the Immortality of the soul, alluded
to; 131 (foot-note).
Improvement in Style or Diction. The principle of such improvement as
a part of Rhetoric, shown to differ from the improvement sought for in
Grammar, and in Logic; 26 (Introduction).
Incrementum. A rhetorical ascent or gradation; 16 (12).
Induction, Inductive. Induction is the process of gathering knowledge;
Inductive logic, that part of the art which teaches the use of words for
this end; 101 (2); 104–111 (1-10). External arguments belong to
Induction; 148 (12). Induction distinguished from Enumeration;
151, 152 (15).
Inference. A conclusion from premises in the inductive process; 107
("In this process," &c.); 151 ("The argument from Enumeration,"
&c.); 154, 155 (17, 18).
Inflection. A slide or accent of the speaking voice; 57 (7).
Instinct. See Reason.
Intellection. The faculty of, (capacity for,) understanding: also, an
act of the understanding, as a sensation is an act of the senses.
Interrogation. A form of sentence in rhetoric, otherwise called Erotesis ;
13 (5).
Invention. The second part of Rhetoric;
Inward world. The same as ideal world; 108 (9).
Irony. A rhetorical figure in which, by our mode of delivery, we use
terms of praise so as to signify the contrary; 20 (20).
Irrelevant premises. One of the modes of verbiage; 192 (10).
Is. This very abstract verb is called the copula, when employed to con-
struct the syllogism of formal logic; 218 (3).
Judgement. Case in which we are properly said to use our judgement;
107 ("In this process," &c.). Judgement in Aristotelian logic is erro-
neously made a faculty of the mind, in contradistinction to Perception
or Simple Apprehension, and Reasoning; 218 (3): 225 (8).
Judicial. A term applied to one of the three kinds of public speeches; 2
(4). Schoolboy cases for Judicial speeches; 84, 85.
Kant. His doctrine alluded to; 112 (note, ad finem); 117 (note to sect.
17); 135 (second foot-note).
Keeping the important point out of sight. A mode of rhetorical delusion;
126 (36).
Key to the Exercises for improving Style or Diction; 87-98. Key for cor-
recting the sentences logically defective at pages 203, 204, and 206; 243.
Knowledge. Every separate word is the sign of knowledge, and all know-
ledge is in its nature abstract; 101 (3); 105-108 (2−9); 113 (12);
117 (18); 118 (21); 120 (28); 133 (3); 141 (2); 143 (4).
Language. Three arts, each having its own province, yet each assisting
the others, join to render language perfect; 1 (1); 101 (1).
Letters. Subjects for familiar letters in writing rhetorical exercises; 74-81.
Literature. Literature may be said to grow out of a perfect use of lan-
guage, such as Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric teach. But Rhetoric is
more immediately connected with Literature, with which indeed it is
co-extensive; 2 (3, 4).
Litotes. A mode of rhetorical extenuation, otherwise called Meiosis; 21
(22).
Lively. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of certain
emotive feelings; 58 (12); 59 (15).
Locke. Locke alluded to; 106 (foot-note). When logic shall be an art
resting on a foundation universally admitted to be true, the merit of
having turned inquiry concerning its nature and purpose, from the false
direction into which Aristotle and his followers had led mankind, must
be conceded, after Bacon, to John Locke, and to Horne Tooke. Yet
both these men, in following out the well-conceived purpose of their
respective inquiries, fell into egregious errors. Locke's purpose was,
to inquire into the origin of human knowledge. This he pursues with
too little regard to the moulding influence of language; and his distinc-
tion of Ideas into Simple and Complex, and these last into Modes,
Substances, and Relations, are scarcely more than distinctions without
a difference. On the other hand, Tooke attributes everything to lan-
guage he is a decided sensationalist, who, admitting Locke's founda-
tion that our knowledge begins with sensation, admits nothing, except
language, which is more than sensation; and while he argues justly
against Locke's doctrine of Complex Ideas, sees nothing beyond the
instrumentality of language in all beyond sensation. He hence con-
cludes that nouns are the primary elements of language, and that verbs
arose from nouns by the addition of something, which his Treatise
("Diversions of Purley") leaves unexplained. Horne Tooke was
obliged to leave his speculation thus unfinished ;—he had begun well,
but he had taken a wrong turning. A course continued in the true
direction, would have led him to the fact, that verbs are the primary lan-
guage of our race,―are the speeches out of which, nouns are artificially
evolved.
Logic. Logic discriminated from Grammar and Rhetoric; 1 (1, 2); 101
(1, 3); Aristotelian logic repudiated; 102 (note to chap. I.); Induc-
tive Logic; 104 (1) Deductive Logic, 140 (1); the Aristotelian doc-
trine of logic explained, and then opposed by the Principles advanced in
this Manual; 217-227 (1-11).
Major. An epithet applied to the term which is the predicate of the con-
clusion in the Aristotelian syllogism, 221 (4); and to the premise in
which this major term is compared with the middle term, 222 (ib.).
This premise is, in our logic, called the datum.
Materialism, Matter. These subjects alluded to; 131 ("There is an old
division," &c. and foot-note).
Meditative. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of
certain circumstances attending the speaker; 58 (11).
Meiosis. A mode of rhetorical extenuation, otherwise called Litotes; 21
(22).
Memory. Memory is conception, accompanied by the knowledge of time
past, relatively to the actual present. But the term is often applied
to the readiness of reviving a whole series of mental acts, by reviving
any one link of the series.
Metalepsis. A complicated metaphor; 20 (19).
Metaphor. A turn of a word from its proper application, so as to include
a simile; 19 (17).
Metaphysical, Metaphysics. Metaphysical means the same as Tran-
scendental, that is, transcending nature. Metaphysics are all those
parts of learning which keep real and ideal (in one word, physical)
things out of sight, or, at least only so far in sight as the weakness
of the understanding may require; 109 (10, and note); 114-117
(15-17, and note); 118 (20, 21).
Method. Method, in many works on logic, follows Perception (or Simple
Apprehension), Judgement, and Reasoning, as the fourth part of the
art. As the first three distinctions are built on wrong grounds, so the
fourth may be objected to, because it belongs to rhetoric much more
than to logic-See page 211, ("* It belongs to rhetoric," &c.) So
far as our pupil in logic can be assisted with respect to Method in his
essays to develop his knowledge, he will find appropriate instruction in
Chapter V., from page 211, extending from Section 18 to the end of
the Chapter.
Metonymy. A rhetorical use of one name for another; 19 (18).
Middle Style. Contrasted with the Colloquial and High Style; 12 (2).
Middle Term. That term in the formal syllogism with which the major
and minor terms are separately compared; 219 (4); 222 (ib.)
Mill. Allusion to the doctrine of Mr. James Mill; 110 (first foot-note);
-of Mr. John Stuart Mill; 120 (30, foot-note); 149 (foot-note).
Mimesis. Mimicry, or the sarcastic imitation of another's manner; 20
(21).
Mind. This subject alluded to; 131 (2, "There is an old division,"
&c., and foot-note).
Minor. An epithet applied to the term which is the subject of the con-
clusion in the Aristotelian syllogism; 221 (4); and to the premise in
which the minor term is compared with the middle term; 222 (ib.)
This premise, in our logic, is called the argument or reason.
Mode or Mood of a Syllogism. The difference in an Aristotelian syllo-
gism, which is determined by the quality (affirmative or negative) and
the quantity (universal or particular) of its premises; 223 (5).
Modulation. The management of the accents and the key of the voice in
delivery; 57 (7).
Moral. As a term in logic, this word means customary, or having all the
force which can be derived from custom. In this sense it is opposed to
metaphysical. Thus, it is morally certain that we shall have thunder
when the weather becomes very hot; it is metaphysically certain that
the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.
Mutatis mutandis. Those things being changed, which the changed cir-
cumstances require; a Latin phrase often used in argument; 160 (24).
Names. These are proper, common, or abstract; 118 (20). Names of
Arguments from three sources; 147 (11).
Narration, Narratives. The Narrative is one of the three kinds of Com-
position in rhetoric; 2 (4). The term is also applied to one of the
varieties of manner in delivery; 58 (9).
65, 67. Subjects for Narratives; 71-74.
Necessary. This term is properly applied to knowledge which is a part of
some knowledge that includes it; 147 (10); 148 (12); 154, 155
(17-19); 164 (34).
Negation, Negative. See Affirmation. See also, No, Not.
Nerves. These, as they connect the organs of sense with the brain, seem,
in the absence of the things of sense, to originate the ideal world;
108 (9).
No, Not. No or Not is an important element in the construction of the
Aristotelian syllogism, but is viewed, in our logic, as a mere gram-
matical particle of no more logical importance than other grammatical
parts of speech, 168 (39, "In our logic, again," &c.); 218 (3);
226 (9).
Nominal, Nominalist. A definition is called nominal when it does not
explain the thing;-in contradistinction to a real one, which in some
way does so; 134 (5). A Nominalist is one of a logical sect that,
throughout the middle ages, opposed the Realists. (See in this Index
Scholastic, Schoolmen.) The Realists maintained that universals corres-
pond to real substantive ideas existing in the mind; while the Nomalists
affirmed that they are names only; (viz., such names as, in this Manual,
are called Common and Abstract.) The dispute in the old shape is now
at rest, though in a new shape it still in some degree remains. Thus
in a new shape we, in this Manual, are Nominalists, so far as we oppose
the doctrine of original ideas, and the Idealists are Realists, so far as
they maintain this doctrine. See 106-112 (6-10, and note).
Not. See No, above.
Not-being, Nothing. These words alluded to; 130 (2, and foot-note).
Notion. Notion may mean the knowing or knowledge of something.
Having this sense, it is better to say of any single word that it is the
sign of a notion, than that it is the sign of an idea. See Idea, above.
Object, Objective. These terms, as contradistinguished in modern phi-
losophical use to Subject, Subjective, are alluded to; 137 (first foot-
note); 175 (46).
Observation. Theme upon; 173.
Onomatopoeia. The coining of a word from some natural sound; 19 (15).
Operations of the mind. These, which are said to be three in Aristotelian
logic, are maintained to be but one in ours; 225 (8).
Opinion. This is a judgement or inference from limited facts, and there-
fore in different degrees, a real non-sequitur that awaits further facts.
Oration, Oratory. An oration is a speech: Oratory the art of speaking,-
a term commonly used with a less comprehensive meaning than Rhetoric,
which includes all that conduces both to good speaking, and good
writing; 1, 2 (1, 2, 3, 4). An example of a school-boy's oration to
his master; 69.
Outward. Objective; terms which, in the doctrine of logic, are applied
to anything that is not already included in the mind. See Objective.
Oxymoron. In rhetoric, a saying which, though foolish if taken plainly,
means a great deal; 18 (14).
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