"Let us further observe that study is as necessary to the mind as action is to the body. If the limbs were muffled up, they would soon lose their strength: and so the faculties of the mind, if not employed, and directed to the acquisition and arrangement of knowledge, will fail in their natural acuteness, and become incapable of any steady and useful effort."(Third paragraph :) "Nor is it in books alone that we may find the means and opportunity of study. In solitude we may learn with what wisdom the Creator has fashioned even the least of his works :-in society we may observe characters and manners, and grow wise in the knowledge of mankind.”

It may be necessary to add, that the divisions or paragraphs require not to be named, if the manuscript distinguishes them in the usual way; and that italics are used above only to call attention to the propositions which are supplied.

19. PROPOSING TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE. A proposition ought not to contain more than the arguments are intended to prove; since, in the mind of the reasoner, it is, or ought to be, the conclusion from those arguments. Suppose, for instance, that the theme-writer intends, in one division of his exercise on Astronomy, to dwell upon the sublimity of its objects, he ought not, in that division, to say that "astronomy is a noble, an interesting, and a useful science," but only say that" it is sublime, noble, and interesting." Yet the omission of the word useful, would be a fault at the commencement of the theme, in proposing all the points which the reasoner intends to consider; since the utility of the science, it is presumed, would be one of the points.

A writer should be careful of even seeming to promise too much; and therefore, in a theme, all high sounding transitions or introductions should be avoided. Suppose, for instance, that the theme-writer, after dwelling on the sublimity of Astronomy, were to proceed thus:

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Having thus described and illustrated, to the best of my ability, the sublime thoughts, and correspondent emotions, to which the noble science of astronomy gives birth, I shall now proceed to show, that this branch of study is not less useful to man, than it is sublime and interesting."

This would be a transition of disproportionate length to suit a brief theme. The writer needs only say, "But the

study of astronomy is as useful as it is sublime;" and then proceed to show its uses.

20. DEVIATION FROM THE PROPOSITION. This fault occurs when the reasoner lays down a proposition, which he follows up by arguments that do not especially belong to it, but to some other proposition, which embraces both the first proposition, and the others. His reasoning, therefore, may not be wrong, if referred to something in his mind which he leaves unexpressed, but is irrelevant with regard to the proposition with which he starts: for example:

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Anger has been called a short madness; and people of the weakest understandings are most subject to it. It is remarkable that when a disputant is in the wrong, he tries to make up in violence, what he wants in argument. This arises from his pride. He will not own his error; and because he is determined not to be convicted of it, he falls into a passion."

There may be truth in all that is here said, but it is not truth to the purpose,—at least, if the commencing proposition is meant to indicate the purpose. To follow up that purpose, the reasoner should have proceeded in the following manner, or in some manner like the following:

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Anger has been called a short madness. To be convinced that the appellation is just, let us look to the effects of anger. It disturbs a man's judgement, so that he inflicts an injury on his dearest friend, whom, the next moment, he loads with caresses. It makes him run headlong into dangers, which, if his mind were clear, he would be the first to see and avoid. It is true that anger does not always disturb the mind to this degree; but that it disturbs the mind to a degree proportionate to its violence, is certain; and, therefore, be justly denominated a madness."

it may

21. DISCOURSING SHORT OF THE PROPOSITION. This fault arises from regarding a subject in some partial point of view which happens to be familiar to the reasoner, instead of regarding it in the extent implied by the term or terms proposing it. Suppose, for instance, that Education is the subject proposed to be developed, and that the reasoner is a young female ;-she would ill suit the arguments to so general a subject, although she would correctly proceed according to her limited experience, if she began thus:

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'My opinion of education is this, that reading, writing, and arithmetic, are the groundwork, and that English grammar comes next in importance. A child ought to begin French very early, because the pronunciation of that language is difficult in maturer years. I would also recommend attention to the accomplishments of dancing, drawing, and music; and, above all, I would not have needle-work neglected."

It is evident that such a detail does not meet the subject in the universal sense in which it is proposed. But how can we expect, from a reasoner, the development of more knowledge than experience has provided? Yet it may be useful to point out, to such a reasoner, that if the subject is proposed in its widest sense, the arguments should be equally comprehensive : for instance:

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My opinion of education is this, that it is then only just, when it fits the individual for his duties. For this purpose, both the mind and the body stand in need of discipline. The mind must be made acquainted with the duties of life, and instructed in all science necessary to their performance; and the body must be formed to whatever habits will most effectually conduce to the same end."

All this is applicable, whether we speak of a male or a female, a prince or a peasant, a member of civilized society, or a savage who lives by hunting and fishing; and the arguments, as to their extent, therefore agree with the proposition. Yet a writer is not bound to treat a subject thus generally: he may choose a special view, because he feels competent to no other. All that is required, in such case, is a statement, at the beginning, of what he intends—a proposition which limits the general subject, and saves the arguments from the charge of irrelevancy. Thus, the female reasoner in the example furnished above, would have been free from censure, had she begun thus:

"Of education, generally, I am incompetent to speak. I can but point out, from the experience I have had, what I think necessary to be taught to young females, raised, in our country, above the necessity of manual labour. They must learn reading, writing, and arithmetic; and English grammar comes next in importance. A child ought," &c.

22. DISCOURSING WIDE OF THE PROPOSITION. arises from an indistinct view of the subject.

This fault

Hence the

writer, instead of using arguments which agree with the proposition, and with nothing else, employs such as agree with some general proposition under which the particular one is included: he may be compared to a person that shoots toward the mark, but does not take aim precisely at it.

Example 1. "Prudence is a sure road to reputation. They who are obedient to their parents and teachers when young, obtain accomplishments which are of the highest value in maturity. As they advance in years, they fear God, honour the king, and do as they would be done by. By this manner of conduct, they may sometimes miss immediate advantages, such as short-sighted, cunning people would snatch at; but they gain what is much better, the approbation of their own hearts, and, finally, the respect and applause of mankind."

These arguments do not belong to prudence in particular, but to virtue in general, and would accordingly be suitable to this proposition,-" Virtue is the surest road to reputation. They who are obedient," &c. Arguments suitable to the other proposition, will be such as these:

"Prudence is a sure road to reputation. A man whose abilities are of a common, or even of an inferior order, but who determines cautiously, and chooses the proper time for all he says and does, will advance with certainty, though perhaps slowly. The chief cause of his progress will be, the confidence he secures for all feel the value of his advice, assistance, and agency, who knows exactly when to speak, and when to be silent, when to act, and when to cease from action."

Example 2." Disappointments are a great part of our portion in this life. In our infancy we are liable to dreadful accidents, and must trust entirely to others for safety and preservation. As we grow older, we think we can take care of ourselves, and we become confident and presuming. But almost every day brings with it some greater or less misfortune, and thus we are gradually taught not to depend entirely upon ourselves, but to put our chief trust in God."

To keep to the point, the reasoner should have proceeded thus: "Disappointments are a great part of our portion in this life. The wishes and hopes even of our childhood are as frequently checked as gratified; but this may seem inevitable, because we have not yet acquired sufficient experience to

form proper expectations. As we grow older, we think our better judgement enables us to calculate less erroneously, and we become confident," &c.

An indistinct view of a subject is often betrayed by a single expression. Suppose the theme-writer is treating of melancholy;-in urging the duty of not giving way to it, he should not say, "We are bound to bear the evils of life with patience," but "with cheerful resignation." On the other hand, if he is treating of fretfulness, he ought to argue that we are bound to bear the afflictions of life with patience.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SYLLOGISM OF FORMAL LOGIC.

1. We deem some account of this syllogism to be expedient, not because it can be of the least practical value to our student, but because the technical language pertaining to it, has, from time immemorial, been associated with the prevailing notions of logic, and we would not have our student quite ignorant of what, through the force of habit, is wont to be thought necessary in a work upon Logic. And that the account given for this purpose may be clearly understood in contradistinction to the doctrine held in this Manual, we shall conclude the chapter with a recapitulation of the leading principles of our doctrine.

Some Account of the Syllogism of Formal Logic.

2. The Syllogism which is worked by extremes and middle term, is constructed under a persuasion that the act of the intellect by which, from two things known, we reach a third, is a voluntary act; and that, in the deduction of our knowledge, real or assumed, we can, with relation to this knowledge, come to wrong conclusions, as, in the induction of it, we can wrongly apply what we know, to interpret what we do not yet know, in other words, can make wrong inferences. The persuasion is completely erroneous; but it is one into which we almost inevitably fall, if we embrace the ordinary or vulgar notion of the way in which language is the exponent of thought. The syllogism of Aristotle is built upon the common notion: let us then see what this notion is.