CONFUSED Reasoning in a circle. Irrelevant premises (void of consequence) Distinction without a difference. Saying other than is meant. Not distinguishing different senses of the same word. REASONING, Neglecting the means of distinction and division which grammar provides for the clear development of thought by words. DISJOINTED Ignoratio elenchi, (Omitting necessary propositions. Discoursing short of the proposition. ERRORS IN DETAIL WHICH COME UNDER THE GENERAL HEAD OF VERBIAGE. 6. BEGGING THE QUESTION is verbiage exhibited in such form of the petitio principii, that the pretended reasoner, in a more palpable way than under the other forms, begs that to admitted for a reason of what he asserts, which is no reason at all, but only the assertion repeated in the same, or in tantamount words: as, "Pride is odious, because it is disliked by all; for it produces universal hatred." Here, the words because and for, lead us to expect a development of the cause that makes pride odious, and of the effects which prove it so; instead of which we have two propositions which only repeat, in tantamount words, what the first had said. Omit the words because and for, and the defect disappears. We shall indeed have three propositions each meaning the same thing; but such repetition, though logically superfluous, is not always a fault in rhetoric, and in the present instance must be indulged by logic, as minister to the sister art; as, 66 'Pride is odious;-it is disliked by all ;-it produces universal hatred." Such is one way of correcting the fault, namely, by not raising the question of the truth of what is asserted, and therefore making no pretence of giving a reason for it.* But the mode of correction more agreeable *To give a reason is but to develop our knowledge with greater detail. We have always to judge whether this is, or is not expedient. In saying Pride is odious, we already express a conclusion from premises, namely to logic will be, to carry out the purpose of because or for, by adding a legitimate reason; for instance, " Pride is odious; because our self-love makes us feel it as an injury done to our own importance;"—which is an argument from the topic cause and "Pride is odious; for all persons shun the society of the proud ;"—which is an argument from the topic effect. 7. IDENTICAL PROPOSITION. This form of petitio principii differs from the last in no greater degree than its name indicates. It is a grammatical period whose two parts are identical in meaning. Thus in saying "All being exists," we have a period dividing into nominative and verb; but the one means the same as the other, and therefore in putting them together, there is no resulting sense-no conclusion from the two, but only a repetition of the same thing under a different form. Again, in saying "As the tree enlarges, so does its size increase," we have a period dividing into two sentences rendered grammatically dependent by as and so; but the one sentence means exactly what the other means, and no sense results from their grammatical union. So likewise in saying "Home is ho we have a grammatical sentence dividing into home, the nominative, and is home, the verb; and if we understand no more from the latter, than from the former, the sentence says nothing: it is, in fact, an illogical, because an identical proposition; though rhetoric vindicates it, by implying under the verb a great deal more than it actually expresses. The following are other examples that neither logic nor rhetoric vindicates: "The vain and empty glory of this world, is but nothing Here the verbiage will be corrected, and the sentence become rational, by leaving out "vain and empty." 66 Foolishly do the vain triflers we so often meet with in life, squander their useless hours in futile pursuits, while they neglect the needful duties which they ought to perform, and are guilty of continual faults which they ought to avoid." from pride, and is odious. Knowing what pride is, we know the feeling it produces in others; knowing what it is to be odious, we know what effects go along with the quality. In the deductive process, the alleging of reasons is nothing more or other than bringing forward prominently what thus lies behind the premises of our first proposition. The verbiage of this example will appear by comparing it with the following correction: 66 Many whom we meet with in life, neglect their duties, and squander their hours in futile pursuits.' "A good definition should include all the things to which the word defined is applied." The verbiage lies in using good in constructing the nominative, along with should in constructing the verb. We ought to say, either—" A definition should include," &c., or—“ A good definition includes," &c. 8. EXPLAINING A THING BY ITSELF. This form of petitio principii differs so little from the last, that it may scarcely seem to require a distinct designation. But as, when only a verbal explanation is meant, using another word having exactly the same signification is not a fault;* the learner may require to be reminded that this will be verbiage when the thing is to be explained; that is to say, the equivalent word will not explain the thing, but only be another word for it. It is, for instance, a fair verbal explanation of Justice to say that it is the quality of being just; but it is a cheat upon the understanding to deem that, by saying so, we have in any degree developed our knowledge of the thing. We should equally fail, though the fault might be more concealed, if, with an exactly equivalent meaning, we were to use a different word; if, for instance, we said, justice is the quality of being equitable. Hence, the following passage is a failure: "Justice regards both magistrates and private individuals : the former show themselves to be influenced by it, when they make an equitable distribution of rewards and punishments; the latter, when they are sincere in their words, and just in their dealings." Let impartial and honest be substituted for equitable and just, and the verbiage will be corrected. 9. REASONING IN A CIRCLE. This form of petitio principii takes place, when we go on proving one proposition by another, on the understood condition that the last, which is to establish the rest, will be self-evident: and then, instead of fulfilling the implied condition, we return to our first assertion, and use that for our proof, when it was the very * See Chapter III. Section 5, page 134. thing to be proved. Thus, it is obvious verbiage to say, "Pride is odious, because it offends our self-love; and it offends our self-love, because it is odious." The fault is less obvious, but equally present in the following example: "Wealth makes the mind uneasy; for it fills it full of care; of care for its increase; of care, lest it should diminish; of care to prevent one portion from being lost, while we are watching for another: and that all these effects are engendered by the possession of wealth, is established by the fact, that wherever we find riches, we are sure to find uneasiness and disquietude also." The latter part of this example, so far as it pretends to be an argument for what precedes, is verbiage. *We proceed to a third example: "The formal syllogism of Aristotle is the test of all valid reasoning, all reasoning being invalid which conforms not to its formulæ e. g. 'All vegetables grow: an animal grows: therefore it is a vegetable.' 'All wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their country: Solon did this: therefore he was a wise legislator.' Now both these [apparent] syllogisms, and all similar to them" (so the argument continues,) "refuse the test which Aristotelian logic provides, and both of them" (so the argument still continues,)" are instances of invalid reasoning." When, in proceeding to answer the argument, it is asked, why the latter instance, as well as the former, is an instance of invalid reasoning, the answer given is this; "That the latter as well as the former, refuses the test which the Aristotelian syllogism provides." Here, it is clearly evident that the reasoner goes back to the proposition he had to prove, namely that "the formal syllogism of Aristotle is the test of all valid reasoning," in order to answer the question, why the reasoning is wrong in saying, "All wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their country Solon did this: therefore he was a wise legislator." That the reasoning here is confusedly expressed, we acknowledge; † but that it is wrong reasoning, can never be established by so palpable an argument in a circle as the *See the second foot-note, page 180. The true character of the fault with which this latter of the two examples is chargeable, will be assigned in the next Section. instance supplies. And yet it is one of the modes of proof pursued in favour of Aristotelian logic, in the most popular logical treatise of the day. 66 10. IRRELEVANT PREMISES. Premises are irrelevant when what is said to follow from them, does not follow; as, Every horse is an animal; sheep are not horses; therefore they are not animals." It is a designation by which we may distinguish one of the modes of the general fault called a nonsequitur, namely, that in which the premises are quite void of consequence. *If our theory of deductive logic is true, a non-sequitur in thought is impossible. In the induction of knowledge, that is, in gathering it into the mind, we may indeed make the most unwarrantable assumptions, and the most fatal mistakes, and in developing our knowledge these errors will re-appear; but they will appear as premises, with no possibility (if we do not give up thought for words) with no possibility of flaw in the validity of our conclusions: inasmuch as every conclusion from premises, is but the fact of developing our knowledge, real or assumed, and of understanding our premises; and with relation to its actual premises, a conclusion cannot but be what it is. We can no more choose in the case, than we can choose in the case of sensation ;-than we can choose, for instance, what our sensation shall be, when certain food is offered to the palate, or a certain shape to the eye. Let us know what red, and also what earth is, and the moment these are embraced as premises by the understanding, is the moment of our being aware of the meaning which, as one expression, they signify; and this is the conclusion from those premises; which conclusion, if the premises are not mistaken, cannot be other than it is. In like manner, let us know that men are mortal, and that kings are men, and the moment the understanding embraces these as premises, is the moment of our being aware of the conclusion, that kings are mortal; a conclusion which, with regard to the actual premises, cannot be avoided, and cannot but be what it is. A false conclusion, then, with relation to its actual premises, being impossible, we have to ask how there can be such a thing as a false conclusion at all:—and the answer is, * See the second foot-note, page 180. |