31. In Rhetoric, it is possible to address inferior motives of action, and to keep back, in order to gain some temporary end, the truth as it exists in the mind of the artful reasoner. In Logic, it is not possible so to deceive oneself; but there are ways, nevertheless, by which, even in one's own thoughts, one may wilfully go astray. A person may choose, for instance, to remain in a state of ignorance on a certain subject, when the ways to inform himself are open. Whatever con

clusion he may reach while in this state, will be a conclusion derived from ignorance, and the process,—with such difference as the difference between Logic and Rhetoric creates,— will correspond to what, in the latter, is called, ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIAM. Such, for example, will be the process with a thinker, who, having imbibed the opinion that all people that belong to a sect in religion different from his own, are bad people, concludes that A. B., one of these people, is a bad man; which may or may not be true in point of fact, but is not made true by an argument thus derived.

32. Again, it is not only possible, but is the great error of our lives, to be led away from truth in our own thoughts by the allurement or the violence of our passions. In every case of this kind, there are two sets of data, the one set abstract, or free from our passions, the other set derived from, or suggested by them. Thus, for instance, the murderer knows that the act he is about to commit, is a crime, but there is some good suggested by his passions, which, in the blindness they create at the moment, seems to outweigh the good he leaves behind; and the conclusion which he reaches, urges him to the deed. Such a case corresponds to the process which, in Rhetoric, is called ARGUMENTUM AD PASSIONES.

PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS CONTINUED: iii. NAMES OF ARGUMENTS FROM THE FORM IN WHICH THE REASONING IS EXPRESSED.

33. The forms of language are changeable at pleasure, while the reasoning process which gives occasion to the particular form that includes the result, remains, or may remain, precisely the same. Every single word is the fit expression of intellectual acts, not perhaps ascertainable as to all the steps after the knowledge indicated by it has been attained;

but however many those steps may have been, each step in the progress to the result which the word expresses, comprehended three things,—the thing known, the thing by which it was known, and the knowledge itself abstracted from both. Thus the word man cannot express the knowledge we have under that word, unless there is first apprehended a creature distinct from other creatures, as, for instance, a creature like oneself, yet not oneself, and in most respects unlike other creatures. Such, or something like it, is the knowledge we include under the name; which knowledge involves the three things stated, the thing known, the thing or things by which it is known, and the knowledge itself. When, afterwards, our knowledge under the same word becomes mature through the force of instruction or of observation, and we understand man as a rational animal, there are still the three things already referred to; for we understand him to be rational because we understand other animals to be irrational, and our knowledge, included under, and abstracted by the word, is the result. We may, if we like, develop the knowledge which this word thus includes, in such a form as the following: "Every creature on earth that is not irrational is man; the creature now under notice or knowledge, is not irrational therefore the creature now under notice is man." These three propositions, the moment they are recognised in their connection with each other, are one expression with one meaning; and the word man includes the whole of that meaning; but the word man is, in form, a grammatical noun-substantive: the three propositions are, in form, what, in logic, is called a syllogism. Now in this way may every result of the understanding, if not already expressed in the form of a syllogism, be expanded or reduced into that form; and this form, since it represents the three things included in every act of the intellect, is commonly assumed to be the fundamental form, to which every other form is referrible, when we desire to examine its soundness.

34. But the syllogism is a fundamental form, only because it represents, in three distinct propositions, every natural act of the understanding. It has no other merit. Its claim to be demonstrative, that is, to exhibit a necessary conclusion, rests on the fact, that the first two propositions, which are called the Premises, contain the conclusion. If the premises

are denied, we must go back to another syllogism, and perhaps to another; and if we thus fairly go back to the beginning of our knowledge, that beginning will always be an induction, that is, knowledge growing out of two things which do not include the knowledge, but spring from the natural capacity of the intellect, operated upon by the things of sense. A phrase constructed of two words, may represent the syllogism as thus described,—namely the syllogism whose premises contain the conclusion as well as the syllogism whose premises infer it. For example, the phrase, Reasoning man, exhibits premises containing the conclusion which the phrase expresses; for he who knows what the word reasoning means, must know that it includes man; again he who knows what the word man means, must know that it includes the power of reasoning which is essential in man. The whole phrase, then, which is one expression with one meaning, exhibits a necessary conclusion out of the premises indicated by the words which form the phrase. This is an example of a phrase representing the syllogism whose premises contain the conclusion. Let us take another example; Mortal Man. He whose experience goes so far as to assure him that man is mortal universally, that is, including men that live, and men that will live, will find this phrase correspondent with the other: but if the premises should be doubted,—that is, if it should be doubted whether the knowledge we have under the term mortal can be applied thus universally to man; or whether the word man includes thus universally of man what we mean by mortal, then we have to await further facts in order to confirm or set aside what the phrase expresses. Suppose the facts at length suggest the result, such result will be an inference, not a necessary conclusion; till at length the previous knowledge being granted, the conclusion is necessarily granted with it. Now every syllogism drawn out in form, if we deny or question its premises, will lead us thus back to the same state of things, namely, a state in which the conclusion will not be a necessary consequence, but an inference. Hence, then, as there is no virtual difference between a syllogism, and any expression constructed of two words that make sense, we may take the latter, namely two words that make sense, as the original, because the simpler form of expression, which Logic employs in the deductive process, and refer all other

forms, including the syllogism itself, to that simpler form of expression. Two words that make sense may not, however, form a sentence or proposition: they may form only a part of a sentence, that is a part of speech. This indeed is of no moment to Logic, if we look only to Logic independently of Grammar. But logic though distinct in theory from grammar, is, in practice, indissolubly connected with it; and hence a complete expression of logical deduction must be at least a sentence. Now the shortest sentence that can be constructed, is that which consists of nominative and verb; and this, as being the shortest and simplest form of expression, may be regarded as the original form in which knowledge is developed in deductive Logic; as, "Man reasons; "John lives; "Fairies frolic."

"Man dies ;

and

35. But the noun and the verb, which are the only essential parts in the logical development of knowledge, may each be a constructed part, that is, may be a part indicative of further logical development. Instead of saying "reasons," (see above,) we may say, "is a reasoning creature; the whole proposition will then be, "Man is a reasoning creature." The other propositions may be developed in a similar manner. Whether developed in this way or not, the process of the understanding will be the same: the result must always be expressed by instrumental signs, which being joined, form one expression with one meaning. Thus, for instance, the following sentence, when all its parts are put together, is one expression for one meaning, Man, noble in reason, infinite in faculties, in form and moving express and admirable, in action like an angel, in apprehension like a god, -is a wonderful piece of work." The development of its one meaning is, primarily, into two parts, which two parts may be called nominative and verb. These two parts are subordinately divisible, till we reach the grammatical single parts of speech which form the larger grammatical parts. In Rhetoric, it might be advisable to reach the result by several distinct sentences; and each sentence, in Rhetoric, might advisedly take the form of exclamation: * but these expe

66

*For instance, as it stands in Shakspeare, "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties! In form and moving, how express and admirable! In action, how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god!"

dients are forms for influencing other minds, not forms which the thinking mind requires for the development of knowledge in order to satisfy itself. This doctrine being admitted, we conclude that the sentence consisting of nominative and verb, however these two parts are subordinately divisible, is the original or primary form in the logical development of knowledge.

36. Still, as the custom of Logic, from time immemorial, has been, to refer all forms of speech to that of the SYLLOGISM; and as this agrees essentially with the doctrine unfolded in the previous remarks; there is no necessity to oppose such reference. The following names and distinctions, which assume the syllogism for their foundation, may therefore be acquiesced in:

but

37. An EN'THY-MEME is a form of language which includes the three propositions of a syllogism, while it expresses only two of them. Thus, if we say, "Brutes are not rational agents, and therefore are not accountable," we imply, do not express the datum, "None but rational agents are accountable." Again, when we say "John lived in London; for he lived with his uncle; the reason given in the second proposition for what is stated in the first, includes the datum that his uncle lived in London; since without that datum, it would be no reason at all.

38. A SORI-TES is a form of language which includes two or more syllogisms, while it so expresses the reasoning, that each proposition is the ground of the following one, till we reach that in which we design to rest in other words, it is the accumulation of one argument upon another; as, "Man is a creature endowed with reason and liberty; every creature so endowed is accountable for his actions; an accountable creature will be punished for his evil, and rewarded for his good deeds; therefore man will be punished or rewarded." 39. A Logic which builds its principles on the arbitrary

*The reader has to be admonished, that in all these remarks, we are contending against the formal logic of Aristotle, of which the pervading characteristic, is, to attribute to the changing forms of language essential differences of mental act. Against such doctrine, a more explicit opposition is offered in the sixth chapter of this work; to which chapter the reader is referred for a better understanding of the purpose of the several remarks now in progress.