an illicit process of the major term,* would be to prepare him for being operated upon, when off his guard, by such means of delusion as it is the object of this section to characterize.

33. The next means of rhetorical delusion which may be mentioned, is a means very much in use at the present day, that of appending to an abstract or general proposition, every special practical inference which it may suit the views of the reasoner to draw from it. Thus, it having been said, and, in general terms, safely said, that wholesome food is food fit for our species; and a certain article of food having been found wholesome by such and such a people, we are required to act on the general admission, and force its use on a different people. Now the proof that it is wholesome does not reach further than the experimented instances, and our general admission cannot fairly be extended to such an issue. With regard to people who live in another climate, or under any other different circumstances, the proof is yet to come, and till it come, the issue proposed is a practical non-sequitur ;

*See Whately's Logic, Book III. § 7.

A great part of what follows in the remaining four sections under the present head, though not literally quoted from, is suggested by the excellent matter contained in Dr. Whately's Chapter or Book on Fallacies (referred to in the previous note). That the author of this Manual has not been able to draw greater benefit from the chapter in question, is caused, as he thinks, by the mischievous interference in it of Aristotelian principles. If Dr. Whately had not predetermined to be more consistent than his fellow Aristotelians, if, like them, he had given up the doctrine of the formal syllogism when he came to treat on fallacies, and spoken of them in the language of common sense, the Chapter, which is now excellent only in parts, would have been excellent as a whole. But Dr. Whately, (unfortunately as the author thinks,) does his utmost to reconcile this part of his logic with what precedes, chiding his brethren for having here renounced their science. "Whenever," he says, "they have to treat of anything that is beyond the mere elements of logic, they totally lay aside all reference to the principles they have been occupied in establishing and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language." (Introd. Book III.) The effect of Dr. Whately's greater consistency appears to be this, that in endeavouring to draw a line between logical and non-logical fallacies,-between what can be explained on the principles of Aristotle, and what must be explained according to common sense, he very much mystifies the latter mode of explanation, while he is obliged to draw his intended line in so zig-zag a way, that, for whatever purpose, one cannot help thinking it had better not have been drawn at all.

a case of having proved too little.* Again; we may allow that every one has a natural claim to be free; but the admission of this in the abstract, does not bind us to join in every special act which it may be cited to justify. Employed in this way, it is an argument that proves too much ;* for with lax unconditional interpretation, it necessitates the freedom of madmen, and of infants or idiots. Again; we may very safely admit that a Representative is one who represents others; but from this general admission, it can never be inferred in what particular manner he is bound to represent them; it may be as their messenger, it may be as their spokesman, it may be as their delegate with special restricted powers, it may be as the member of a legislative assembly. What are his duties in any case or capacity whatever, will evidently be undeterminable by the general signification of the word: to ascertain these duties, we must ask in what way, by prescription, or law, or usage, or power specially held and specially granted, he is required to act.-These three examples may stand for many others that might be given, involving such abstract terms as Socialism, Communism, Equality, Fraternity. We may admit the justness of general definitions drawn from these and similar words; but we are not bound to join in following out the definition into practical consequences when we have no test from experience or custom to warrant our proceedings.

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34. Another means of rhetorical delusion, is that of shifting from one sense of a word or a proposition to another, so as to lead the logician, in his inductive progress, to admit the conclusion of the one sense, as the conclusion of the other. This delusion often takes place in thought, without any exterior cause, other than the equivocal character of the word. "Thus," says Dr. Whately, a young divine perceives the truth of the maxim, that for the lower orders one's language cannot be too plain, that is, clear and perspicuous, so as to require no learning nor ingenuity to understand it :—when he proceeds to practice, the word plain indistinctly flits before him, as it were, and checks him in the use of ornaments of style, such as metaphor, epithet, antithesis, &c.; which are opposed to plainness in a totally different sense of the word.”—

* See Chapter V. Sections 11, 12,

Hence, in many instances, "a dry and bald style, which has no advantage in point of perspicuity, and is least of all suited to the taste of the vulgar." (Book III. § 5.)—The next example is also from Dr. Whately, though with different arrangement. In saying, "He who necessarily goes or stays," we may mean he who goes of necessity, or stays of necessity: Or we may mean this alternative, that he must either go or stay as his will may determine. Now the person under the former description is evidently not a free agent; but the person under the latter has all the freedom which we can attribute to a free agent. The sophist may, however, so conceal his transition from one of these two meanings to the other, as to get an admission of the doctrine of universal absolute necessity, the doctrine which insists that no man is, in any case, a free agent.

35. A further means of rhetorical delusion is that of making a conclusion which is true of an aggregate, appear to be true of the particulars of the aggregate; or the reverse of this. We need not notice the former mode at present, because it can hardly be practised successfully on one who is not trammelled by the forms of the Aristotelian syllogism, a caution against the false forms of which has already been given above (Section 32); and also because an occasion will occur for exhibiting some examples in Chapter V. (Section 10.) But the reverse of this mode of delusion may be here noticed, namely, that of making a conclusion which is true of the particulars of an aggregate, appear to be true of the aggregate. Now there can hardly be a delusion in so plain a case as the following:-we conclude, or more properly infer, when, in throwing dice, a person casts two sixes now and then, that he does so by what we call chance or good fortune; but if he casts two sixes fifty or a hundred times running, we can hardly be driven or seduced into the same inference, reason guided by experience teaching us, in such case, some very different inference. Yet in cases not dissimilar, a hearer or reader may, by a juggle, be led away from this natural procedure of the understanding. Let our example take the form of a dialogue; only, be it observed, the events supposed in it are prospective, not determined. Tom, I would advise you to resign your place immediately." may be promoted to it?"

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'What, in order that you No, not for that reason, though

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I am the next to succeed you; but because of some news I have just learned, that you will be placed in a much better situation, if when it is vacant, you are in a condition to have it offered to you.” "How so?" 66 'Why A. B. is so ill that his doctors say he cannot live a month." "And what then?" "Why his office being vacant, will be eligible for you, if, which you know is an established proviso, you are not in place at the time." "But there are others for whom it will also be eligible." "Yes, but they are only a few; and, doubtless, your uncle will, by that time, be returned from America, who has interest sufficient to make your superior qualifications properly understood. With all these concurrent probabilities in your favour, I do say you must get this place, if you resign that which would decidedly prevent you from it." Now, if without regard to further considerations, such as the possibly very low value of the one place and very high value of the other, Tom should, on this representation, give up his place, he would be guilty of a practical non-sequitur-of being deluded in a case of having proved too little. The sophist speaks of concurrent probabilities, as if, in the aggregate, they made up a greater probability, when the fact is, that the number of the probabilities diminishes the value of each as regards the issue of the aggregate, so that the value of the whole must be calculated inversely to their number.

36. Perhaps the remaining means of rhetorical delusion, may be summed up by saying that they are all carried on with the purpose of keeping out of sight, as much as possible, the particular point or points to which attention is required, for the purpose of reaching the truth that stands opposed to the immediate interests of the sophist. If any accredited book of rhetoric had systematized the particular means of carrying out such a purpose, it would be the business of logic to oppose, for the benefit of its inductive learner, a correspondent arrangement of means to avoid the several snares. But whatever may be the corruption of our nature in practice, we are not so lost as to tolerate such a system in theory, any more than we tolerate a written art of poisoning or of seduction. As, therefore, there is no system to oppose, there will be very little system in the observations which follow. It cannot be doubted, however, that unscrupulous persons who have partial ends to carry, do find too easily, without express instruc

tion, the means to their purpose: and it is for us to meet these artifices, if not by instruction directed against each means in detail, yet by general remarks which may indicate their common character, and how they are designed to operate. Now, the ordinary plan of calling off attention from an important questionable point, is, to refer to it as a point not questioned among the select well-informed class of persons who are presumed to be the leaders of opinion. By this plan, a modest hearer or reader, not included, by his own modesty, in the class, may doubt the extent of his information, so as to suppose that he has not reached the knowledge which persons of that select class enjoy. The plan here spoken of, may be carried out variously. First, for example, the questionable point may be delayed till the end of a long preliminary discourse, a discourse not at all touching the particular point, but dwelling on unquestionable generalities, advanced, all along, on the understanding that they involve the particular point yet to come; which point, when it comes, is stated as a thing of course, that all persons of competent information have already admitted. Or, secondly, the questionable point may be mingled with another, about which there is no question; and the two may be so shifted that at last they seem one, and a conclusion may be insisted on which carries the questionable point, though it truly carries only the other. Or, thirdly, the questionable point may be so put to the hearer or reader in the very form of a question, that if he is seduced to answer it according to the form in which it is proposed, and not according to the form in which the truth requires it to be proposed, namely as being true or false, he must give an answer suitable to the views of the sophist. Or, fourthly, a series of cases may be proposed, as being all the cases to which, respectively, an answer can be given; when there remains another case appertaining to the point at issue, by omitting which, the sophist secures a triumphant answer in favour of what it is his interest to prove. over, any of these methods may receive considerable assistance from the tone or style of the rhetorical reasoner; a tone or style indicating his connection with a high grade of thinkers, and a disparagement of those who, by their way of thinking, prove themselves not to belong to the same high class. Some examples of these several observations (they

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