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kind through the instrumentality of language. One writer indeed, understood, I believe, to be Sir William Hamilton, profound beyond any man of the present day in scholastic learning, appears to repudiate, although himself an advocate of formal logic, any blending of it with other doctrine, censuring, in a very learned Article of the Edinburgh Review (April 1833) "the attempts lately made to conciliate, to the declining study a broader interest than its own." Dr. Whately, then of Oxford, now the Archbishop of Dublin, has eminently succeeded in an attempt thus characterized. Of him, the reviewer says that he is "a very shrewd, and (what is rarer in Oxford) a very independent thinker." The effect of Dr. Whately's Oxford education, joined to his shrewdness and independence of mind, has been this, that the logic of Aristotle, rejected by philosophy since she succeeded in throwing off the trammels imposed by the schoolmen, has, through him, regained a footing in some places,* which, but for him, she had lost for ever, "Oxford," as the reviewer observes, "being the only British seminary where the study of logic-proper" (formal logic) "can be said to have survived." Now as to this logic, we are ready to admit before proceeding further with ours, that it is a science, and it is an art, but a science and an art quite distinct from our logic, re-asserting that ours is the logic in use by mankind :—and what we have to say Dr. Whately's treatise, is, that it owes its popularity not to what it contains of Aristotelian logic, but in spite of what it contains, by the excellence of the matter which he erroneously arrogates as a part of that logic. Had his volume presented nothing but what pertains to formal logic, we might have left him to whatever arguments can be found in its favour: but in order to bring it back into respect, he far transcends its proper sphere. First alleging, what is not true, that all reasoning whatever has its foundation in the principle of the formal syllogism, he proceeds to discourse, with admirable intelligence and skill, on the many causes of faulty induction; the notice of which properly belongs only to such a work as the present, such for instance as the errors imbibed through the instrumentality of language, the force of prejudice on our thoughts, the crudities engendered by imperfect systems; which kind of matter we affirm to have no proper place within the limits of formal logic. How true an observation is the following! "A fallacy which, stated barely, would not deceive even a child, may deceive half the world when diluted into a volume." (Logic: Of Fallacies, III. § 6.) Of the soundness of this remark, it would not be easy to find a better instance than Dr. Whately's own volume. Let the logic of Aristotle stand separate and alone, and it cannot be saved from the neglect into which it was confessedly falling: dilute it through the excellent, but distinct matter, which forms the bulk of Dr. Whately's volume, and half the world are inclined in its favour. Of the half world thus biassed, one part will be incapable, and the rest indisposed, that is too idle, to dissipate the superinduced error; for, as Dr. Whately says in another place," there is probably not one person in ten, who is physically capable of the degree of steady application requisite for embracing the principles of logic, or any other science; and, a much

*Wonderful to say, chiefly in America, the country celebrated for going-a-head.

greater number to whom this, though not an impossibility, is a very great difficulty." (Preface-early editions.) Thus, then, it is possible that Dr. Whately's "Logic," may have acquired a temporary popularity, in spite of a radical defect, which, when known, must vitiate the whole as a system, though what is unfairly made a part of that system cannot be deprived of its independent merit. And this possible defect we assert to be actual. The formal syllogism, which he makes the basis of his system, is not the basis of all reasoning. It is a purely grammatical contrivance for reducing every other form of expression to one single form, without any change of the mental act by which the knowledge signified was received. The things of sense inevitably suggest unnumbered relations to the understanding :—the following is only one of them, that if a thing is contained in or under another, and this under a third, the first is contained under the third. But so plastic is language by the possible variation of terms, of propositions, and of larger forms of discourse, (all of which differ as grammatical forms only, without corresponding differences in the reasoning mind,) that we can, if we please, express any other understood relation, in the form strictly appropriate to one; through which possibility, we have a science, of which the enunciation of the one particular relation referred to above, is the axiom, while the art, (a purely grammatical art,) is the reduction of every expression to the one form, that so the axiom may be applied to it, and a demonstration scientifically ensue. In all cases this will be a demonstration of what is already inevitably understood;-as Dugald Stewart says,-the demonstration of a demonstration; and the practice will be, (so far as we keep to the practice which belongs to the science,) that, dismissing from the mind the things concerning which we reason, we shall reason with the words, and not immediately concerning the things the knowledge of which is included in the words: briefly, we shall reason with words, and not by means of words; the latter of which is proposed by our logic. The value of this art and science, needs not be here discussed: all we mean at present, is to assert its distinctness from our logic: more about it will be learned as we proceed. It may be sufficient to have stated thus much now, with the hope that what cannot be made quite clear to our student in the present stage of his progress, will become so as he advances.

CHAPTER II.

INDUCTIVE LOGIC.

1. Inductive Logic is the art or practice of gathering knowledge by the instrumentality of words. In every act pertaining to this practice, three things occur, the knowledge which the word already includes, the thing known by reason of this previous knowledge, and the increased knowledge which includes some other thing or things. What follows will, it is hoped, make this doctrine understood.

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THEORY OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC.

2. We use a word inductively when, having some certain knowledge which it represents, we advance, by its assistance, to further knowledge, which we draw under or into the same sign. Let us suppose the word red was originally an exclamation uttered on first becoming conscious of that sensation;* and let us suppose that it subsequently loses its exclamative character, and remains a sign of that first knowledge :— :-when the sensation re-occurs, the knowledge re-occurs, and with it the sign; and by the aid of the sign, we are able to entertain our first knowledge of what red is, distinctly from the varying circumstances of its re-occurrence, and to include under it what is common to both occasions of knowledge; to include, for instance, under the same word red, the knowledge derived from the red of the crocus, and from the red of a certain earth; and thus we go on, including with our greater experience more and more knowledge under the same sign, till we have extended its meaning as far as convenience or the custom of language allows.

3. Let us take the word man as another example: let us suppose it was at first an exclamation uttered on first having knowledge of a creature that was not one's self, yet was like one's self: let us suppose it to lose its exclamative character, and to remain a sign of that first knowledge:—when another occasion of similar knowledge occurs, the former knowledge occurs with it, and the sign enables us to include what is common to both occasions; to include, for instance, under the same word man, the knowledge of what a man is, derived from the tall dark man, and the short fair man; and thus we go on till we include under the same sign all attainable knowledge of our species as distinguished from creatures of every other species.

4. Let us take the word John as a third example: let us suppose, that this was at first an exclamation uttered when we first knew John distinctly from self: let us suppose it to lose

* If we know nothing except by reason of something already known, it is a fair question to ask, how our knowledge can have had a beginning. This question, which needs not stop us here, I have endeavoured to answer in "Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics;" Second Essay (Sequel) page 73.

its exclamative character, and to remain as a sign of this our first knowledge of John :-when another occasion of knowing John occurs, the former knowledge occurs with it, and we now know him distinctly from each occasion in particular,from the occasion when he was walking cheerful in the garden, and this new occasion when he is lying sorrowful on the bed. Thus we go on, augmenting our knowledge of John, by familiarity with him under various circumstances of his existence, and including this knowledge in the sign which is his proper name.

5. Let us take the word proud or pride as a fourth example : let us suppose it to have been an exclamation, when, for the first time, some one person was known to treat another proudly: let it lose its exclamative character, and remain a sign of that first knowledge: the next occasion of similar knowledge may be quite different in persons and circumstances; yet, with the aid of the sign, we are able to hold our knowledge of what it is to be proud, or to have pride, distinctly from the variable circumstances; and by the same aid, we can go on increasing this knowledge, by deriving it from a larger and larger number of instances; and including our enlarged knowledge in the sign which helps us onward to still larger.

6. We shall better understand the previous representation of the manner in which our knowledge is increased, and of the use of signs in fixing and helping it onward, by a few further considerations.

First, we have to consider that all our knowledge is originally derived from the things of sense.* Yet a sensation is

*This, as it is well known, is Locke's doctrine; a doctrine which, carried out on mistaken principles by some of his followers, particularly in France, has issued in what is called Sensationalism. The philosophers of this school propose to show that all ideas begin by being sensations, which doctrine another school of philosophers, chiefly Germans, oppose by what is called Idealism; or the assertion of certain principles or original ideas existing in or being a part of the mind itself. Extremes of opinion seldom fail to be erroneous; and as seldom does it happen that, before the extremes are reached, there is not, in whatever opposing doctrines, some truth on both sides. With regard to the statement in the text, if taken in connection with what immediately follows it, it can scarcely give offence to either of the parties just alluded to:-the Idealists cannot say that we reduce everything to sensation; nor can the Sensationalists aver

not knowledge; nor can it, by itself, create, or be created into knowledge: there must be a knowing faculty, or capacity to know. Now, to know a thing is to be aware of its relation or relations to some other thing or things: to know red, for example, there must be something else known at the same time with it: we must know blue, black, or white, &c., at the same time that we know red. Wherever there is knowledge, there are therefore premises, of which that knowledge is the conclusion; and red expresses a conclusion out of such premises. Neither do we know what man is, but by knowing at the same time what is not a man: neither do we know John as an individual, but by being aware of John's existence distinctly from the changeable circumstances of his existence : neither do we know what it is to be proud or have pride, but by knowing what it is not to be proud. In all these instances, (and in all other instances it is the same,) the word which signifies knowledge, signifies a conclusion arising out of premises.

In this process of gathering knowledge, we suppose the previous knowledge and the new phenomena to be so brought before the intellect, that an inference instantly arises. But new phenomena often present themselves under circumstances that ought to occasion doubt; and we then exert or ought to exert some consideration before we admit an inference; which is called a use of our JUDGEMENT. This is a voluntary act, and upon it we lay the blame or praise of the inference. We have, for example, a new substance before us which seems to be an earth, and we include it under that name. If it turn out not to be an earth, we say our judgement has deceived us, and what we calculated upon as warranting a conclusion in the deductive process, remains a faulty inference in the inductive. This observation was proper to be made in this place, though it needs not further impede the development of the theory in progress.

7. Secondly, then, (to go on with our theoretical development,) we have to consider that a sign cannot legitimately

that we suppose the existence of original ideas, inasmuch as we go no further than the supposition of a power or capacity to receive knowledge; although, as it should seem, contrarily to the Sensationalists, we affirm it to be a power or capacity distinct from the capacity or liability to have sensations.

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