initiative of laws, it can do nothing, nor introduce any thing of its own authority; it can advise, delay, suspend;-that is the mission of all assemblies which in free governments occupy a situation analogous to its own. But to fulfil that duty, to respond to the utility justly expected from it, more than any other, it requires a moral ascendency-prestige, we might almost say-and any thing which tends to confer that quality is of advantage for the prudent conduct and profitable deliberation of the great affairs of the country. On this article two amendments were presented, one by M. Bonjean, and the other by Count de Sartiges. The first proposed to confer upon the Senate the right of initiating laws; to institute a joint committee of fifteen members of each Chamber to consider any question upon which a dissidence may have arisen; to enable either Assembly to suggest modifications in the Constitution, and to fix the number of the Senate at double that of the departments, the one half to be nominated by the Emperor for life, and the other to be elected for six years by the Councils-General. The second was to the effect that in the case of the Legislative Body after a second deliberation not being able to agree to the alterations suggested by the Senate to a Bill, the two Chambers shall vote simultaneously on the question of the promulgation of the law; a collective majority equal to two-thirds of the whole number of votes in the two Houses to be decisive. The committee considers that M. Bonjean's amendment contains two principles, the first of which is the complete assimilation of the attributes of the Senate to those of the Legislative Body; and the second, a change in the mode of nominating the Senators. With regard to the former, the committee unhesitatingly reject it, as being entirely in opposition to the whole spirit of the Constitution, and, in fact, an alteration in the fundamental pact which is not within the competence of a Senatus Consultum. As to the second, it was found to be equally unacceptable, both in principle and the means of execution suggested. The idea of the author was to increase the importance of the Senate as much as possible, and with that view not only does he desire similar attributions for the two Chambers, but to make their origin as analogous as possible. Such a result is by no means desirable. By the side of a political body receiving a lively impulse from public opinion, and in some sort reflecting the generous impatience of the nation, a necessity exists for a power, calmer because it is more durable, more reserved because it has less initiative, and less disposed to change than to stability. In a monarchical State the choice of the Sovereign, accompanied by the principle of inheritance or of immovability, has seemed the most simple means of constituting this moderating Chamber. And if any proof were wanting of the wisdom of the existing institution, it would be furnished by the difficulty the author of the amendment experiences in projecting a plan for adopting the contrary principle. He recommends that the half of the senators should be chosen by the Councils-General. But the very first effect of that measure would be to pervert the

mission of those bodies. Forming thus an electoral college, they would cease to be nominated with a view to departmental interests, which would become only a secondary matter. Considering all these reasons, and moreover the antagonism which might be produced in the Senate itself between the two different classes of its members, your committee were unanimous in rejecting the amendment. In reference to that of Count de Sartiges, the object of which was to establish a means of settling a disagreement between the two Chambers, it was evidently inspired by a spirit of conciliation; but the means of carrying it into execution would raise many objections and have one capital defect-they would not avoid contradiction, but prolong it. Why go to foreign countries to seek for complicated forms which are the results of special manners? The Senate is at present in a better position to avoid the dangers of these conflicts, of which exaggerated fears are entertained, and it will never forget that the country has the right to count upon its prudence. The graver the circumstances may be the more caution will it exhibit in the exercise of a right the imprudent use of which would be incontestably perilous. These amendments having been set aside, the committee examined the text of the article. On the second paragraph, M. Boinvilliers proposed to omit the words' with reasons assigned,' and as many difficulties would naturally attend compliance with this requirement, and as in a public discussion the motives for the rejection are manifested in the debates, his views were adopted. The committee propose to add the following paragraph, The Bill of which the Senate opposes promulgation cannot be again presented in the Legislative Body in the course of the same session.' The object of this clause is to avoid an immediate contradiction of a decision of the Senate, which fact could only result in producing ill-feeling between the great powers of the Article 6 accords to the Legislative Body the privilege of fixing its own regulations and of naming its President, VicePresidents, and Secretaries. Baron Brenner had proposed as an amendment that the elections of the President should be submitted to the Emperor for approval, but the committee was of opinion that the article, as it stood, conferred a larger power on the Chamber, and accordingly retained the original wording. Article 7 grants the right of interpellation to every member and that of voting orders of the day, with reasons assigned, but requires the latter to be referred to the bureaux, if demanded by the Government. The committee propose to add the words, The bureaux name a committee, on the summary report of which the Legislative Body pronounces. Some members had proposed the re-establishment of the Address, but the committee considered that the practice was little in harmony with a system which permits every member to interpellate the Government and to demand explanations, and had no hesitation in rejecting the amendments. Article 8 requiring amendments to be sent to a committee and communicated to the Government, and in case the latter does not accept them, neces

sitating their being laid before the Council of State, the committee propose to insert the words, when the Government and the committee do not agree,' before the reference to the Council of State. The reason for so doing was that the Council ought not to be placed in the position of being consulted on a matter after the Government had expressed a decided opinion upon it. Article 9 orders the Budget of Expenses to be presented to the Chambers of Chapters and Articles, and the estimates of each Ministry to be voted by Chapters, in conformity with the nomenclature annexed to the Senatus Consultum. No objection whatever has been made against this article. Article 10, in like manner, was fully approved. It declares that for the future all international treaties concerning commerce or customs shall be submitted to the Chambers. Article 11 fixes the relations of the Senate, Legislative Body, and Council of State with the Emperor and among themselves by Imperial decree. The committee propose to alter it as follows, 'The relations, as fixed by the regulations between the Senate and the Legislative Body, and with the Emperor's Government, are fixed by Imperial decree. The constitutional relations between the several Powers are fixed by a Senatus Consultum.' The Imperial decree which had hitherto regulated these relations was so clearly unconstitutional, that a Senatus Consultum was necessary in 1852 to delegate the power to the Emperor, but the committee consider that the time has now arrived to return to principles, and re-establish the authority of the Senatus Consultum in this order of decisions. Article 12, abrogating all enactments contrary to the provisions of the present Senatus Consultum, was at once agreed to. M. Michel Chevalier had proposed that a special Senatus Consultum should permit publicity for the discussion now about to open; but the committee refused to accept the amendment: first, because the hall of meeting could not be got ready in time, and next, because there seemed no absolute necessity for such an innovation, after sixteen years passed without any inconvenience under a different system. A member of the committee had proposed to decide that the Government should be obliged to choose the Mayor from among the persons forming the Municipal Council. The committee refused to accede to the motion, considering that the Mayor had divers functions, as not only head of the municipal authority, but representative of the Government. In such a case the committee was of opinion that the central power ought to have full latitude of choice. To sum up, Messieurs les Sénateurs, the committee, although on several questions different opinions have been manifested and maintained by some members, now unanimously proposes to you to join in the initiative of the Emperor. We await with confidence the honest execution of these new resolutions, as well as that of all the measures announced in the exposé des motifs presented by the Government. This Senatus Consultum will have an inevitable influence on the destinies of the country; it is one of the acts that mark their date in the history of a nation. The initiative of laws, rights of

amendment, interpellation, order of the day with reasons assigned, the responsibility of Ministers, the publicity of your debates, the intervention of the law and of Senatus Consulta in decisions of high interest-all this both accords and ensures considerable changes. Measures of this kind ought to disarm the sincere or simulated distrust of those who represented the direction of the affairs of the country as insufficiently controlled. In presence of such a situation, of a real freedom in speech, and in the press, if violence increases instead of subsiding, good citizens will doubtless comprehend that, as there is an hour when they come forward to aid the public force against riots in the streets, so there is one when they are bound to rise up and combine against the disturbance of the State. Whatever may happen, the legislation of 1852, in all its restrictive points, disappears. We ought, however, in justice, to take an inventory of what it has produced for the country. After sixteen years of public peace, it leaves the territory of France enlarged, her income increased by 20,000 millions, the general commerce tripled; gratuitous primary instruction more than doubled; professional education established; nearly 6000 mutual aid societies founded; caisses for the aged, insurances, co-operative societies created; telegraphs, railways, all the elements of prosperity; all the establishments of public assistance augmented in considerable proportions; the most absolute freedom of conscience; religious edifices multiplied; our cities purified; our navy transformed; the maintenance of peace and respect for France supported by 1,400,000 soldiers ready to show themselves at the frontier; lastly, the country conducted from a dictatorial régime to the most extended constitutional liberty. The generation of 1852 can say to that of 1869, This is what I have done. You can do still better if you consolidate the work which I undertook.' If the people whom it is sought to intoxicate with a new sovereignity understand that demagogues are only courtiers whose interested flatteries deceive nations as they once deluded kings, that true friends speak in severe language, then power, whether popular or the reverse, is bound to listen to them, under pain of vacillating and tottering to its fall. The true character of a great and free people is to be on its guard againt chimerical promises and dreams of impossible equalities. Confidence in himself, respect for the law, patience in expectation, and calmness in his right-such are the true qualities of the citizen; such are the features that constitute his own personal dignity and the greatness of his country. If by virtue of your efforts in sixteen years France has established herself in that sage and fecund liberty to which the Elect of the nation has conducted her through so many perils; if you shall still hold this torch of political life which we now present, as we held it, propagating light, but never conflagration, then the suvivors of that epoch will applaud you, and will be happy to say to you, with patriotic emotion and joy, 'You have done better than

ود و We

In the debate that followed, on the 1st of September, Prince

Napoleon, the cousin of the Emperor, delivered a very remarkable speech, which made a great sensation in France. He said,

"Before examining the Senatus Consultum, I think my duty requires me to express my gratitude to the Sovereign who, in a time of profound peace, commences the transformation of the empire of personal authority, to use the expression of our honourable President, into one of liberal ideas. I approve the present measure; but I do not think it goes far enough, and I should like to see other provisions introduced into it. In the first place, and to clear the ground for discussion, I am anxious to affirm my entire and complete devotedness not only to the Emperor, but also to his son. I understand, better than any one, that my interest as well as my affections are indissolubly bound up in the Empire. My personal vanity might be gratified, I admit, by what is now going on, as for a long time past I had been a partisan of the present transformation. I had also asked for the liberty of the press and the right of meeting long before they were conceded, in principle at least, by the letter of the 19th of January, 1867. I am happy to see the Senate now called on to accomplish a Parliamentary reform of great importance, but I regret to see that body and the committee manifest in the work a certain feeling of hesitation and of want of confidence. They seem to approve reluctantly and to make reserves." M. de Maupas.-" Such, Monseigneur, are not the sentiments of the committee."

The President." Nor of any of its members."

Prince Napoleon.-" That at least is the spirit and tendency of the report; and when the country sees an examination accompanied with so much reticence, and made with so little ardour, it may feel uneasy, and inwardly doubt whether in reality these reforms are desirable. As for myself, I accept them unreservedly. I believe the co-existence of the Empire with liberty to be perfectly possible, and those men who think that it is not are themselves as irreconcilable as they maintain those two words to be. Liberty may be for a time eclipsed, but it is a beacon towards which all civilized nations are tending, and France has a right to count herself among the number. Those men who look upon the present reforms as contrary to the principles of the Empire are enemies of the Government; those who consider them as an experiment only are equally dangerous. I would have the empire of personal authority burn its vessels and abandon all ideas of receding. The art of governing is to give way to just aspirations, and not to resist. When all around us in industry and science is advancing, would you have political institutions to remain stationary? Progress is as necessary in the latter as in the former, and that onward march belongs to the Imperial traditions. The Constitution of 1815 did not resemble that of the year VIII. Napoleon I. had not abdicated his post, but had accepted Parliamentary Government in principle. I do not say that in the application there were not some hesitations, the consequence of his previous career and the nature of his genius, but I affirm that his reason had converted