condition and organization of our military force was discussed in both Houses with considerable interest later in the Session. The first occasion was in the House of Lords, where the subject was gone into with much ability and fulness by Viscount Monck. The noble lord began his speech by observing that the answer to the question of the proper strength of our army depended on the possibility of our being attacked, and of the strength of the possible attacking power. He showed that when, as now, Europe was bristling with arms, no country could be secure against those arms being in certain events used against it, and that the forces which great Britain had available to resist an invasion were neither so numerous nor, from the want of training and unity of command, so effective as continental armies. The organization of the regular forces was defective; the reserve force was a force mainly on paper; and the Militia, which was the primary reserve force of the country, required reform in all respects. It was admitted to take at least six months to prepare a recruit to take his place in the Line; but a militiaman had but five months' training spread over five years. The delay in preparing him for action would be increased by the fact that he was now armed with the old muzzle-loading musket, and would need experience in the use of weapons of precision. Militia officers, too, were deficient in training. As for the Volunteers, Lord Monck objected entirely to treating them as part of the standing force of the kingdom. Their voluntary origin prevented, he believed, the cultivation of the docility essential to military efficiency. Besides, they were liable to be called out for military duty only in case of an invasion. But then it would be too late to prepare the necessary locomotive agencies and supply machinery; and that, moreover, was a season when those who formed the mass of the force would be more useful in other places. Sir John Burgoyne, in his recent pamphlet, had come to the same conclusion as himself. On the whole, Lord Monck thought the article the country bought was indifferent, and the price it paid far too high. A regular soldier cost at the rate of 377. in France, 337. in Prussia; but in England, 1007.; and the cost of the other branches of the military force was in the same proportion. The long service system in use in England made the cost still heavier, without at all increasing the men's efficiency. The short service system, as exemplified particularly in Prussia, was, he considered, better in all ways, and the obstacles to its introduction into England were not insuperable. The employment of British troops in the colonies and India, and the purchase system, were the main hindrances to a better organization of our army. But the first difficulty was, he hoped, in the course of removal, and the abolition of the purchase system was desirable, even apart from this consideration. It must be admitted, however, that the short service system could not be applied to India. He concluded with the sketch of a plan for regimental re-organization.

Lord Northbrook, while pointing out that Lord Monck, in his

comparison of the British with continental warlike strength, had omitted all reference to our peculiar insular advantages and to our naval power, and while also doubting the fairness of the comparison of our own and continental armies in point of cost, supported as the latter were by conscription, represented that the Government had already taken an important step towards removing one impediment to a re-organization of our military system by the withdrawal of a large force from colonial for home service. He admitted the advantages of a short service system in facilitating the creation of a reserve of trained men, and in making military service more popular, and he showed that the difficulties in the way of applying the system to India itself were less than Lord Monck thought. Mr. Cardwell had, he showed, given his attention to the question whether the term of service might not be shortened, in consideration of a term of service in the reserve. He detailed also various contemplated changes which would have the result of improving the efficiency of the Militia, whose officers, he showed, were not at present inefficient, and of the Volunteer Force, which, however, he denied had ever given itself out for part of the standing army, as Lord Monck seemed to suppose. Even as it was, it was easy of proof that our military resources and defences were immensely greater than they had been formerly.

The Duke of Cambridge thought Lord Monck's whole argument pointed to a conscription, an impossible alternative in England, though one which, of course, wonderfully simplified the question of military organization, and still more of expense. Whatever, at any rate, was done in the way of introducing organic changesfor instance, the short-service system-he hoped the existing system would be allowed to go on pari passu till the new system had been proved adequate. He testified to the sincerity of the Government as military reformers.

Lord Dalhousie approved the Government plan for shortening the period of enlistment, and in return making service in the reserve compulsory. This would be a means of getting rid of married men in the army, and thus saving the expense of the transport of women and children. He hoped, however, the Government would not be induced to meddle with the system of purchase. At all events, he warned them against taking two or three different systems on trial.

Lord Truro urged on the Government the necessity of devoting greater attention than at present to increasing the efficiency of so valuable a force as the Volunteers. The defences of the country generally were, he thought, extremely inadequate. He should take an early opportunity of drawing the attention of the House to this important question.

After a few words of explanation by Lord Monck, the discussion closed.

In the House of Commons, at a later date, Lord Elcho took the opportunity of a motion to go into Committee of Supply, in order

to elicit the opinion of Members as to the expediency of organizing a permanent army of reserve. He himself regarded this as a measure of urgent necessity. In the outset, he admitted that the numbers of our forces were sufficient, provided that they were welded into a homogeneous whole; and that the principle of our military system was sound, if judiciously and effectively administered. This system he divided into three parts-a regular army, raised voluntarily, and liable to foreign service; the Militia, raised compulsorily, in theory at least, but only liable for home defence; and the unpaid Volunteer Force; and, premising that every subject of the Queen, by law, is liable to military service, he went on to discuss how these three forces could best be utilized for the formation of an efficient army of reserve. As to the army, it ought to have an independent reserve of its own; and of all the schemes suggested he preferred Sir Hope Grant's. By this the term of enlistment would be for twenty-one years-seven years in active service in the line, seven in the first reserve, liable to foreign service if called on, and seven in the second reserve, only liable for home defence; and he calculated that if this scheme, which might be tried alongside of the present system, were set in operation at once, at the end of fourteen years, at an annual cost of a little over half a million for extra pay, the regular army would have a reserve of 130,000 men, of whom half would be available for foreign service. As to the Militia-the backbone of our military system-Lord Elcho recommended that a certain number, according to a roster, should be liable for foreign service; but he laid most stress on an enforcement of the ballot; and as an experiment, just to see how it would work, he sketched out a plan under which for the next five years 5000, men should be balloted for annually. He did not propose to drill or call them out, but simply to enrol them; and in support of the scheme he urged that, but for our insular position, conscription would undoubtedly be enforced among us, and that that security was not worth now so much as in former times. For the Volunteers he recommended improvement of organization, the division of England into districts, and more frequent drill in large masses.

Mr. Akroyd seconded the motion. He expressed his belief that the ballot would be popular with the working classes, and that the Volunteer Force was that in which their services would be most readily obtained.

Colonel Loyd Lindsay also concurred in Lord Elcho's views.

Lord Bury was almost enthusiastic in support of the ballot. He believed that if those in whom the people had confidence would say it was necessary, it would be generally accepted. Proceeding to make some suggestions of his own, he was of opinion that liability to foreign service should be an invariable condition of militia service, and he advocated the establishment of camps of instruction, at which the Militia should be trained with the regular army. As one result of the ballot, he anticipated that the authorities would get a stronger hold over the Volunteers.

Mr. Cardwell agreed with many of Lord Elcho's views, especially that the regular army should have an independent reserve, consisting of men in the position of furlough men, not belonging both to the Militia and Regulars. He held, too, with him, that the true basis of army reform was long periods of enlistment and short periods of service, but twenty-one years was too long. To the main point in Lord Elcho's motion-the ballot-he gave an unreserved opposition, and particularly at the present moment, when recruiting for the army and Militia had never been more brisk, and when, the Yeomanry being full and the Volunteers gradually increasing, there was no necessity for coercive measures. If ever we did resort to them, it must be as a last resource. We had ample materials of every kind at hand for an army of reserve. What we wanted was an efficient organization to combine them. Mr. Cardwell, as to the length of service, stated that he was in communication with the Indian Government on the subject, and he hoped next Session to submit a plan which would establish periods of service comparatively short, but long enough to cover Indian reliefs and which would secure a due admixture of young and old soldiers. As to the reserve forces, the country would be divided into manageable districts, in which there would be a staff to take charge of all the forces within it, whether regular or reserve. Various measures were in contemplation for the improvement of the Militia. The Yeomanry, it was hoped, would be converted into mounted rifles; and as to the Volunteers, inquiries were being made whether further aid could be given them under more stringent conditions of efficiency. Plans were also being considered for the organization of the Staff, and from all these measures Mr. Cardwell expected to put our military power on the most efficient footing -a small army at home in time of peace, capable of expansion, and an ample reserve force behind to fill it up when necessary.

Colonel Wilson Patten thought that the supporters of the motion had taken a very inadequate view of our defensive powers, but admitted that sufficient attention, as a rule, had not been paid to the matter. He strongly deprecated the ballot as unfair, and even iniquitous, unless under an overpowering necessity, and agreed entirely with Mr. Cardwell's plan for short terms of service. At the same time he assured him that by certain relaxations of conditions the present army reserve scheme would produce more men. Mr. T. Hughes thought that some mode of compulsory enlistment would have to be resorted to, and he believed it would not be unpopular.

Mr. H. Vivian and Major Walker advocated an increase of the Militia. Sir John Pakington strongly deprecated the adoption of the ballot except as a last resort, and criticised Mr. Cardwell's speech, which, he thought, consisted merely of fair promises. The motion was ultimately withdrawn.

The Naval Estimates were moved by the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Childers, on the 8th March, and were the subject of

several discussions. The right hon. gentleman said that the total amount required for this branch of the service was 9,996,0007., viz. 8,164,000/ effective services, 1,515,000l. non-effective, and 316,000%. transport services, which was a reduction of 1,027,0007. on the previous year, and 1,300,0007. from the year 1867-68. These reductions were divided generally over all the votes, and after the accounts had been corrected there would be a reduction of 199,000l. for wages, 73,0007. victualling departments, 127,000l. dockyards, 57,000. stores, 331,000%. contracts, and 21,000l. transports. Having premised this, he divided his statement under three main heads-the changes in the Admiralty establishments, the policy of the Government in regard to our fleets, and the shipbuilding programme. Under the first head, after a review of past controversies on the composition of the Admiralty, from which he drew a conclusion decidedly adverse to the abolition of the Board and the substitution of a Secretary of State, he explained the changes he had made the chief of them being those of seating the Controller at the Board, and giving him the control of the matériel of the Navy, putting the personnel in the charge of one of the Junior Lords, and giving the Secretary control over the finances. He had succeeded in concentrating all the administrative departments of the Admiralty about Whitehall, and the general result of his changes was a saving of 20,000l. a year, with no injustice to any individual. About 90007. a year would be saved in the superintendence of the dockyards, though there was an increase of 24,000l. for wages, and there would be a considerable saving in petty charges for maintenance, &c., while the great works at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Malta would be pushed on with increased vigour. Inquiries were also going on into the victualling and hospital departments, which he anticipated would lead to considerable reductions. Under the second head-the mode of dealing with the fleet-he had reduced the South American, Pacific, China, Indian, and African squadrons from eighty ships and 11,600 men to sixty-four ships and 8500 men. It had been arranged that the Indian Government should pay about 70,000l. a year towards the expenses of vessels kept in Indian waters; and it was proposed almost immediately to send a flying squadron of our finest vessels to visit foreign stations, and to despatch a few of the coastguard vessels on a cruise. The reduction of men and boys was from 66,770 to 63,000, to the credit of which, however, the late Board of Admiralty was chiefly entitled. Mr. Childers discussed next the condition of the lists of officers, which he pronounced to be very unsatisfactory, not only costly to the country, but productive of inefficiency, and he said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would shortly bring in a Bill to commute the half-pay of a certain number of officers, and thus the Admiralty would be able to recast the lists according to the present requirements of the service. Passing to the last head-the ship-building programme-after showing that at the end of the financial year pretty nearly all the ships now in hand would be completed, he announced that two turret-ships, which would be the